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Abstract 
Since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) declared its caliphate in June 2014, 
there has been an unprecedented amount of terrorist attacks conducted in the West by 
individuals either inspired by jihadist ideology or linked to ISIS.  As evidenced by the 
number of ISIS-related attacks throughout Europe and North America, the West faces an 
ongoing and persistent transnational threat from Islamic terrorism.  There is an extensive 
amount of literature on terrorism and ISIS.  However, there is a gap in literature on the 
potential impact of ISIS on the future of Islamic terrorism.  This qualitative case study 
explored how ISIS potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  
Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory served as the framework for this study.  
Interviews and one open-ended questionnaire on Islamic transnational terrorism were 
collected from 15 individuals within the defense enterprise, academia, and individuals 
working in private defense organizations, using purposive sampling.  Analysis occurred 
by using Braum and Clarke’s six phases of coding.  The results of this study indicated 
ISIS has shaped the future of transnational terrorism by demonstrating likeminded 
extremists no longer have to travel to conflict zones in order to plan or receive guidance 
on attack targets while using simple attack methods and weapons.  Additionally, ISIS 
empowered and encouraged its members to interact with potential recruits or supporters 
through social media and open forums, which may possibly be emulated in the future by 
likeminded groups.  The results contribute to positive social change by providing 
decision makers information on the future of Islamic transnational terrorism, thus 
allowing for appropriate countermeasures that mitigate terror activities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Research 
Introduction 
Since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) declared its caliphate in June 
2014, there has been an unprecedented amount of terrorist attacks conducted in the West 
by individuals either inspired by jihadist ideology or linked to ISIS (Europol, 2016).  
While some attacks had a minimal number of victims, others caused significant casualties 
such as Nice (July 2016, 86 casualties), Orlando (June 2016, 49 casualties), Brussels 
(March 2016, 32 casualties), and Paris (November 2015, 130 casualties). As evidenced 
by the tragic events in France in 2015, Belgium in 2016, and dozens of less sophisticated 
attacks throughout Europe and North America for which ISIS claimed responsibility, the 
West faces an ongoing and persistent transnational threat from Islamic terrorism (Nesser, 
Stenersen, & Oftedal, 2016).  According to Wainwright (2016), “it’s certainly the highest 
terrorist threat we have faced for over 10 years and we need to up our game as a 
collective counter terrorist community to make sure we can protect our citizens from 
this” (para. 3).  For the purpose of this study, the West refers to North America (Canada 
and the United States) and Europe, including the 28-member states of the European 
Union (EU), plus Switzerland, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand (see Appendix A). 
 There is an extensive amount of literature on terrorism, Islamic terrorism, and 
ISIS; however, there is a gap in literature on the potential impact of ISIS on the future 
trends in Islamic terrorism.  Moreover, the majority of literature addressing future trends 
in terrorism is centered on al-Qaida’s impact on terrorism.  Therefore, the purpose of this 
qualitative case study was to explore how ISIS potentially shaped the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism by examining expert perspectives on ISIS and transnational 
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terrorism.  The implications for positive social change that resulted from this study are 
aimed toward agencies tasked with a counterterrorism mandate, the U.S. intelligence 
community, decision makers, and private organizations that conduct research on terrorist 
organizations.  Specifically, this research may assist in saving lives by identifying future 
trends in Islamic terrorism and the potential short term and long-term implications of 
such trends for the West, which would allow for the proper mitigation and response by 
Western governments.  In addition to the introduction, background, and problem 
statement, Chapter 1 includes the significance of the study, research framework, research 
questions, nature of the study, definitions, research assumptions, delimitations, 
limitations, and a summary.   
Background 
 On November 13, 2015, ISIS suicide bombers and gunmen conducted 
simultaneous and coordinated attacks in multiple locations in the 10th and 11th 
arrondissements (districts), and the Bataclan concert hall in Paris, France.  The attacks 
left 137 dead and injured another 368 individuals (Neiberg, 2017).  On March 22, 2016, 
ISIS operatives conducted another mass casualty attack in Brussels, Belgium, detonating 
suicide bombs in the Maelbeek metro station and Brussels Airport in Zaventem, leaving 
32 dead (Europol, 2016).  Such attacks (see Appendix B for a list of attacks) represent 
decentralized plots and networks, as well as acts of terror. 
 On July 14, 2016 in Nice, France, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel deliberately 
drove his cargo truck into a crowd of people celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France.  
ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 85 people and injured 434 (Sanchez, 
2016).  Four days later, Riaz Khan Ahmadzai launched an axe attack on a train in 
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Germany.  Five people were wounded; Ahmadzai was shot dead.  Prior to the attack, the 
perpetrator made a martyrdom video and stated an ISIS instructor ordered him to commit 
the attack (Ulrich, 2016).  Six days later, Mohammad Daleel detonated a suicide bomb in 
Ansbach, Germany.  The bomber pledged allegiance to ISIS’s caliph al-Baghdadi prior to 
the attack and marked the first suicide bombing in German history (Conner, 2016). 
 Such examples of lone actor attacks are one part of ISIS’s transnational approach 
which involves self-radicalization or acts of violence directed by ISIS recruiters on the 
Internet.  Combined with more complex attacks (see Appendix C for a list of attackers) as 
evidenced by the tragic events in France in 2015, Belgium in 2016, Orlando in 2016, and 
dozens of less sophisticated attacks throughout the world for which ISIS claimed 
responsibility, the international community faces an ongoing and persistent transnational 
threat from ISIS, both from centrally organized plots and lone actor attacks.  For the 
purpose of this research, threat is defined as “a function of capability and intent” 
(Fisherman, 2014, p. 7). 
ISIS has significantly undermined stability in Syria and Iraq, and to some extent 
the larger Middle East, while posing a threat to global security (U.S. Department of State, 
2014).  To mitigate the perceived ISIS threat, in August 2014, the U.S. military, along 
with coalition partners, commenced a series of actions, including airstrikes, designed to 
degrade ISIS.  Specifically, the coalition included 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) partners, 28 NATO members, and 8eightindependent countries for a total of 59 
nations participating in some form in the counter-ISIS campaign, with the U.S. 
conducting the majority of the military operations (Benitez & Maletta, 2014).  
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 In response to the initial U.S.-led airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, ISIS released several 
official statements publicly and explicitly called for attacks against Western governments 
that were participating in the counter-ISIS coalition (Levs & Yan, 2014).  Moreover, 
security and intelligence services worldwide are not only troubled by the returned foreign 
fighter threat, but also concerned with ISIS’s narrative using propaganda and social 
media to inspire homegrown extremists to take violent action in their own country 
without having traveled to conflict zones such as Iraq or Syria. 
ISIS’s narrative especially gained traction in Europe, evidenced by several 
sponsored or inspired attacks, including the November 2015 Paris attacks, March 2016 
Brussels bombings, and attack in Nice, France that resulted in 84 killed, along with the 
significant amount of foreign fighters stemming from Europe (Barnes & Faucon, 2016).  
Moreover, ISIS educated lone actors on the benefits of using simpler attack tactics on soft 
targets throughout Europe.  The impact of such attacks allowed ISIS to promote its 
agenda without having to devote a significant amount of resources to the operations.  
Additionally, such attacks and tactics are designed to overwhelm Western security 
services and intelligence agencies while straining homeland security resources, possibly 
setting the stage for bigger attacks in the future.  This paper clearly addressed the 
difference in attacks that are designed, sponsored, and directed by ISIS as opposed to 
attacks conducted by individuals that are inspired by ISIS’s violent narrative. 
This paper was authored with the understanding that current events, including 
international interventions, are taking place all over the world to mitigate the threat from 
ISIS.  At the time of this study, counter-ISIS forces were involved in military efforts to 
degrade ISIS strongholds in Iraq and Syria, and it is unknown the short and long-term 
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outcome of such efforts.  According to Clarke and Gartesstein-Ross (2016), “as ISIS tries 
to transition from jihadist state to insurgency or transnational terrorist group and 
eventually back into a state, a new strategic doctrine will likely be born” (para. 10).  
Therefore, this study examined how ISIS shapes a possible new strategic Islamic 
transnational terrorism approach.  Currently, there is a gap in literature on future trends in 
terrorism.  This study filled a gap in literature by presenting a qualitative examination 
into ISIS’s potential impact on Islamic terrorism to provide a more nuanced and well-
structured understanding of the long-term asymmetric threat from ISIS and potentially 
other terrorist organizations against the West.  
Of note, while ISIS is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), its Arabic language acronym Daesh, and the Islamic State (IS), this paper 
addressed the group as ISIS, unless used differently in a direct quote.  Moreover, I used 
the term jihadist throughout the paper.  For the purpose of this study, jihadism refers to 
religiously-motived violence inspired by ISIS or likeminded groups, a concept commonly 
used by both critics and supporters of the term.  
Problem Statement 
 ISIS presents unprecedented security challenges to the international community as 
the group controls territory in Syria and Iraq (at the time of this paper), rejects the norms 
of international law, and recruited over 5,000 Western Europeans to join its cause in 
Syria and Iraq.  It is estimated that over 4,000 foreign fighters have since returned to their 
country of origin (Bakker & Singleton, 2016; Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015).  ISIS’s 
initial gains in Iraq and Syria are credited to innovation and its ability to adapt to its 
constantly changing environment, which resulted in different organizational survival 
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strategies to include both centralized and decentralized attacks abroad, thus increasing the 
threat to Western nations.  ISIS recruited thousands of European foreign fighters and 
leveraged social media with the intent to spread its violent narrative and global ambitions 
and promote terrorist acts directed at Westerners.   
 In the wake of the unprecedented number of ISIS-linked attacks conducted 
globally in 2016, including an emphasis on smaller scale attacks that require less 
organizational support and direction, ISIS represents a new type of jihadist threat 
(Hegghammer, 2016).  Specifically, ISIS’s declaration of a self-proclaimed caliphate, 
combined with its ability to recruit an unprecedented number of foreign fighters, 
territorial gains and losses, and manipulation of social media signifies a different 
approach from the Salafi-jihadist norm (Soufan Group, 2015).  According to Hoffman 
(2006), terrorist organizations that want to survive have an organizational responsibility 
to learn and adapt their modus operandi amid Western counterterrorism measures in the 
post-9/11 environment.  Terrorist groups that do not learn will eventually be irrelevant, 
while groups that learn from prior innovation will be more adaptive in circumventing 
Western counterterrorism measures and have a better chance of organizational survival 
(Gartenstein-Ross, 2018).  Gartenstein-Ross (2018) concluded that the ability of terrorist 
groups to learn from one another and how one group’s modus operandi is adopted by 
other terrorist organizations is not researched enough within academia.  Therefore, it is 
important to examine and understand how ISIS has potentially shaped the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism in the years to come.  While there is current and relevant 
research pertaining to the political, security, and economic repercussions of transnational 
terrorism, as well the evolution of ISIS, there is a gap in literature regarding how ISIS has 
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potentially shaped the Islamic transnational threat, potential implications, and the future 
of terrorism.  Moreover, the majority of studies conducted on terrorism focus on the 
current state of terrorism, while studies that address the future of terrorism are al-Qaida 
focused.   
 According to Lievan and Walton (2013), the civil war in Syria significantly 
changed the global transnational threat against the West from terrorist organizations and 
groups like ISIS.  SIS represents a transnational threat that can be considered of a 
gamechanger within the global jihadist front; therefore, it is imperative for the defense 
enterprise and policymakers to comprehensively understand ISIS’s impact on Islamic 
transnational terrorism and potential implications.  Therefore, this study filled a gap in 
literature by examining how ISIS potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational 
terrorism and potential implications for the West.  Such insight could contribute to the 
prevention of radicalization and terrorism. 
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine an asymmetric conflict 
between ISIS and the West.  This bridged a gap in literature related to the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism.  Such knowledge is critical in mitigating the threat from 
Islamic terrorist groups like ISIS.  To explore how ISIS has potentially shaped Islamic 
transnational terrorism, it was necessary to examine expert perspectives on ISIS and 
terrorism while examining the group’s approach (from June 2014 to June 2017) that may 
impact transnational terrorism in the years to come.  By examining the transnational 
terrorism approaches by Islamic terrorist groups like ISIS, the study provides an 
improved understanding of the future threats that may face the West and supports the 
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development of antiterrorism and counterterrorism actions needed to mitigate such 
threats.  
Framework 
Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory served as the framework for this study.  
Specifically, the asymmetric conflict theory centers on asymmetric conflict when the 
resources between two belligerents (i.e. ISIS and the West) differ and one (or both) 
belligerents attempt to exploit its opponent’s weaknesses (Stepanova, 2008).  Moreover, 
the theory incorporates vital unconventional transnational terrorism concepts (i.e. 
transnational terrorism modus operandi)  that at least one of the combatants (i.e. ISIS) 
may use to offset its deficiencies in quality or quantity.  As Stepanova (2008) said, 
nation-states generally have conventional military superiority and power over nonstate 
actors.  However, terrorist organizations may have other qualified advantages due to 
ideologies and organizational structure in their confrontations with states, allowing 
weaker opponents like ISIS to defeat stronger adversaries (Roberts, 2000; Stepanova, 
2008).  Therefore, by using Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory as a framework, it 
allowed for a thorough examination of how ISIS potentially shaped Islamic transnational 
in the years to come.  Chapter 2 examines Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory in 
more detail. 
Research Questions 
To bridge a gap in literature and in order to explore and examine the impact of 
ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach, I addressed one central question:  How has ISIS 
potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism?  Additionally, in order to 
fully answer the research question, the research answered the following subquestions:  
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SQ1: How is the nature of the threat from ISIS different than other threats from Islamic 
terrorist groups in the past? 
SQ2: Is ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach innovative?  If so, how? 
SQ3: Will other designated terrorist groups learn from ISIS’s transnational approach and 
adopt similar modus operandi against the West?  If so, how? 
SQ4: What is ISIS’s long-term impact on Islamic transnational terrorism? 
Nature of the Study 
To answer the research question, it was appropriate to use a qualitative case study 
method.  Qualitative research permits the researcher to investigate the phenomenon of 
interest using interviews and questionnaires for empirical research (Creswell, 2013).  
Specifically, a case study approach allowed for an examination bounded by time of 
knowledge by exploring, understanding, and explaining expert perspectives on how ISIS 
has potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism by examining its 
approach from June 2014 to June 2017.  I used semistructured interviews and email 
questionnaires for data collection and conducted thematic analysis. 
This study was considered exploratory in nature due to the lack of data related to 
the research question.  An exploratory approach allowed for an exhaustive collection of 
data that was used for extensive analysis on how ISIS potentially shaped the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism and the possible implications for the West.  Moreover, an 
exploratory approach enabled me to examine a multitude of expert perspectives by 
including participants in various disciplines which allowed for differing views on the 
research topic.  The exploratory approach permitted me to present a complete depiction 
of the research topic.  
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Definitions of Attack Typology 
 It is difficult to capture the exact relationship between someone who commits a 
terrorist act and the organization for which the act is claimed.  Often, the attacker is 
labeled connected, linked, influenced, or related and the attack itself as top-down or 
bottom-up.  For example, a rarely-used 9/11-style attack in which al-Qaida leadership 
groomed the team of attackers and facilitated the travel to the West demonstrated a top-
down and bottom-up approach to attack planning and execution.  According to Hoffman 
(2010), labeling a terrorist attack either top-down or bottom-up implies it was sanctioned 
by organizational leadership, who even possibly provided guidance for the terrorist 
attack, as opposed to an attack by spontaneous individuals inspired by a violent narrative.   
The more traditional process of terrorism involves an organization guiding the 
recruitment of the fighters, having complete oversight regarding the organization’s 
operational influence, and remaining actively involved in planning, plotting, and 
implementation of attacks.  However, the top-down or bottom-up approach did not fully 
explain the phenomenon of individuals who are inspired by a terrorist organization to 
commit an act of violence.  Often, those individuals are self-trained and/or self-directed 
with a limited capacity for committing large scale attacks.  
 As applicable to this research, many of the attack plots targeting the West were 
neither clearly bottom-up nor top-down, making the attacker’s exact relationship with 
ISIS difficult to determine.  Therefore, this study used the following definitions of attack 
typology which represents the spectrum of terrorist attacks, including those with 
substantial leadership involvement (i.e. 9/11) and no leadership involvement (i.e. Riaz 
Khan Ahmadzai’s knife attack on a train in Germany inspired by online ISIS 
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propaganda).  The following definitions are not intended to be used beyond describing 
transnational attack typology and are listed according to the amount of ISIS involvement. 
1. Training and Top-Level Directives: The attacker trains in the organization’s 
heartland, is tasked by top leaders to attack in the West and is supported 
materially by the organization in the planning and preparation process.  
2. Training and Mid-Level Directives: The attacker trains in the organization’s 
heartland and is encouraged by mid-level cadres to carry out a more or less 
specified attack in the West, but has little or no interaction with the top leadership 
and receives little or no material support from the organization.  
3. Training: The attacker trains in the organization’s heartland, but is not 
specifically instructed by anyone to attack in the West.  Instead, he develops the 
motivation to attack in the West himself, in the belief that he is doing what the 
organization wants. 
4. Remote Contact With Directives: The attacker communicates remotely 
(typically by telephone, email, or social media) and bilaterally with cadres of the 
organization and receives personal instructions.  
5. Remote Contact Without Directives: The attacker communicates remotely and 
bilaterally with members of the organization, but does not receive instructions.  
6. Sympathy, No Contact: The attacker expresses ideological support for the 
group through his propaganda consumption, written or spoken statements, or 
some other aspect of his behavior, but does not communicate bilaterally with 
anyone in the organization (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015, p. 21). 
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For this study, the term ISIS-connected referred to an attacker that met definitions one 
through four, and ISIS-inspired referred to definitions five and six. 
Research Assumptions 
Several assumptions were applied to this study.  The first assumption was the 
selection of an exploratory case study was appropriate to understand and explain ISIS’s 
impact on Islamic transnational terrorism.  Secondly, the use of interviews was the 
optimal approach to explore the implications of ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach.  
Moreover, it was assumed the research questions were authored in a way that would 
accurately explore how ISIS shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  
Fourthly, it was assumed the interview data from subject matter experts was accurately 
transcribed and the study incorporated key concepts.  Additionally, it was assumed the 
number of research participants was enough to adequately form conclusions.  Lastly, it 
was assumed the results of the research would lead to positive social change by possibly 
providing researchers and decision makers information on the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism, thus allowing for appropriate countermeasures that mitigate 
future acts of terrorism.  
Scope and Delimitations 
This qualitative case study was restricted to expert perspectives on how ISIS 
potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  The research participants 
were selected based on their relevance to the research question, and I elected to use 
purposive sampling, eliminating other sampling techniques.  Expert perspectives based 
on open source information on terrorist organizations can lend insight into the strategic 
goals of a terrorist group, even if it compromises its operational security (Winter, 2015).  
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It was beyond the scope of this research to examine all of ISIS’s activities, transnational 
terrorism directed at non-Western countries, and the relationship between ISIS and other 
terrorist groups.  Therefore, transferability will be limited, as this study focused only on 
ISIS and transnational terrorism targeting the West and did not examine other terrorist 
organizations or attacks against non-Western countries.  More details on transferability 
are discussed in Chapter 3.  Additionally, it was outside the scope and focus of this 
research to examine the religious narratives that lend justification to ISIS for promoting 
violence against the West.  Therefore, this research strictly focused on how ISIS 
potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism directed against the West 
in order to fill a specific gap in literature. 
Limitations 
The primary limitation of this study was that it relied on interviews and email 
questionnaires for data to lend insight into the phenomenon.  Security and safety issues 
prevented the opportunity to collect data from individuals directly involved with ISIS 
who could have possibly provided additional insight into the principle research question.  
Moreover, the research was limited to open source information and did not include 
classified information (in accordance with Executive Order 13489), which may have 
limited the responses from the research participants.  I reminded the research participants 
to limit data to open source information to avoid accidental or unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information.  I understood many of the experts who participated in this study 
have access to classified material; however, it was assumed their data was unclassified 
and they had permission to lend insight into the topic.  Additionally, I took appropriate 
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steps to eliminate bias within the study.  Chapter 3 includes details on how I eliminated 
research bias. 
Significance 
Islamic violence stemming from the Middle East prompted many European 
governments to revamp security policy and allocate additional resources for safeguarding 
against terrorist threats (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015).  As the U.S. and many European 
nations have provided the majority of material and air support to counter-ISIS operations, 
Western citizens are often singled out in overt and public threats sanctioned by official 
ISIS media outlets. Specifically, Dabiq and Rumiyah, ISIS’s official English language 
magazines, make promises of defeating the West.  Additionally, issues of Dabiq and 
Rumiyah, along with other ISIS propaganda highlight and praise successful attacks 
against the West by ISIS-affiliated individuals, and often encourage attacks directed at 
Westerners.    
 According to Hegghammer (2016), the jihadi resurgence after 2011 caught many 
by surprise, and there was a lack of research on the topic.  Moreover, there have been 
observed changes to jihadist modus operandi (to be described in detail in Chapter 2) and 
a lack of current literature on the topic and the future of terrorism.  This research filled a 
gap in literature on terrorism directed at the West.  Specifically, there is a gap in literature 
related to the future of terrorism as most terrorism-related research describes the present 
state of terrorism.  Additionally, the majority of literature attempting to forecast Islamic 
terrorism trends and analysis is al-Qaida-related.  As such, there is a gap in literature 
pertaining to ISIS’s potential impact on the future of Islamic terrorism.  Therefore, this 
research will help close the gap in literature by exploring ISIS’s potential impact on 
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Islamic terrorism in an effort to understand terrorism strategically by identifying potential 
future Islamic terrorism trends.  Furthermore, this research will improve understanding 
within the defense enterprise (to include policy makers) regarding the future of Islamic 
terrorism by providing findings that assist with forecasting the Islamic transnational 
terrorism threat.  Specifically, understanding how ISIS has potentially shaped the future 
of Islamic transnational terrorism carries significant implications for Western military 
and policy responses, along with counterterrorism strategies. 
 The implications for social change resulting from this research are intended for 
the defense enterprise, academia, and the private sector tasked with a defense mandate.  
By understanding how ISIS has potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational 
terrorism, it provides policy and decision makers additional information on possible 
strategies that could be employed by Islamic terrorist organizations.  Such knowledge 
should allow security and law enforcement agencies to possibly shift counterterrorism 
resources in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.  
Summary 
Chapter 1 introduced and explained the problem statement, purpose of the 
research, research questions, nature of the study, key definitions, research assumptions, 
research limitations and delimitations, and the significance of the study.  Moreover, 
Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory was identified as the theoretical framework that 
was used as a lens for the inquiry.  Chapter 2 will provide a review of scholarly literature 
related to the central research question, specifically focused on ISIS’s external operations 
approach related to global jihad directed against the West.  Chapter 3 will discuss in 
detail the qualitative method that will be used, along with specifics related to data 
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collection and data analysis.  Additionally, Chapter 3 will discuss why a case study 
approach was selected, as well as the mitigation of ethical and validity concerns.  Chapter 
4 will present and elaborate on the results of the study.  Chapter 5 will discuss the 
findings in relation to the literature, as well as explore implications for social change.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 will recommend additional research and that could be conducted 
relevant to the central research focus. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This study examined an asymmetric conflict between ISIS and the West, while 
bridging the gap in literature regarding how ISIS potentially shaped the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism directed against the West.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
outline the literature as it pertains to the key aspects of the study, including the theoretical 
framework.  Literature related to transnational terrorism, Salafi jihadism, Abu Musab al-
Suri, ISIS, and the threat it represents to Western countries will be presented.  
Additionally, there is a section on the importance of using open source information for 
this study and terrorism-related research and forecasting. 
ISIS is more adaptive in its transnational terrorism approach than other terrorist 
organization, thus presenting unique security challenges (Europol, 2016).  Additionally, 
ISIS’s use of the Internet to spread its violent narrative aided in the recruitment of foreign 
fighters, lone actor attacks, and radicalizing homegrown violent extremists.  Specifically, 
ISIS’s main propaganda themes that this study identified and were relevant to this 
research were: recruitment, promotion of the caliphate, and encouraging enemy attacks. 
There is a wealth of literature on the evolution of ISIS, its propaganda, and 
transnational terrorism.  However, there is a gap in literature regarding the impact of 
ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach and what it means for the future of Islamic 
terrorism and the West.  ISIS employs a terrorism approach not restricted by geographical 
borders, and this study examined the strategic implications of its methods on the future of 
Islamic terrorism.  Chapter 2 includes this study’s literature search strategy, the 
theoretical foundation used for the study, a brief background on transnational terrorism 
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and ISIS, and a section on the importance of using publicly available information for 
terrorism-related research. 
Literature Search Strategy 
 This study used several literature strategies, which included exhaustive searches 
in all relevant Walden University Library literature and statistical databases.  
Specifically, the databases included EBSCOHost and ProQuest, as well as the 
International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Homeland Security 
Digital Library, LexisNexis Academic Library, SAGE Premier, and Military and 
Government Collection, along with Academic Search Premier.  Moreover, the literature 
included publicly available literature discovered from US government websites, reputable 
think tanks, and peer-reviewed literature retrieved from Google Scholar.  To uphold 
academic standards, peer-reviewed journal articles published within the last 5 years were 
emphasized.  The search terms for this study included ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State, Daesh, foreign fighters, Syria, Iraq, Abu Musab al-
Suri, Mustafa bin al-Qaidr Setmariam Nasar, Umar Abd al-Hakim, transnational 
terrorism, Islamic terrorism, terrorist attacks, modern terrorism, terrorist propaganda, 
terrorism propaganda, ISIS propaganda, al-Qaida propaganda, lone-actor, lone-wolf, 
self-directed terrorism, terrorism and the internet, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida, 
AQI, al-Nusra Front, and asymmetric conflict. 
Asymmetric Conflict Theory’s Application to Research 
 Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory served as the theoretical framework for 
this study.  Specifically, Stepanova’s theory is applicable to this study as the theory 
centers on asymmetric conflict when the resources between two belligerents (i.e. ISIS and 
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Western nations) differ and how one (or both) belligerents attempt to exploit its 
opponent’s weaknesses.  Moreover, the theory incorporates vital unconventional 
transnational terrorism concepts that at least one of the combatants may use to offset its 
deficiencies in quality (weapons and technologies) or manpower.  
Transnational terrorism (also referred to as international terrorism) is the fastest 
growing systematically-used form of modern terrorism in regional asymmetric armed 
conflicts (Stepanova, 2008).  As asymmetric terrorism is a tactic to offset the advantages 
of the strong, the weaker side often advocates and targets civilians of the stronger 
opponent.  According to Stepanova (2008), the need to target noncombatants and 
civilians serves as a force multiplier against a stronger opponent; such targets are largely 
considered the weakest points of an opponent that has conventional dominance.  
Moreover, such attacks put public pressure on the state to react, thus draining domestic 
resources and often leading to threat fatigue. 
For a conflict to be considered asymmetric, there must be a disparity between the 
belligerents involved in the conflict.  Such disparities are generally classified into 
economic power and military power.  As Stepanova (2008) said, nation states have 
conventional military superiority and power over nonstate actors.  However, terrorist 
organizations may have other qualified advantages due to ideologies and organizational 
structure in their confrontations with states, allowing weaker opponents like ISIS to 
defeat stronger adversaries (Roberts, 2000; Stepanova, 2008).   
Additionally, the weaker opponent can exploit the stronger opponent’s organic 
and inherent vulnerabilities that are difficult and take time to fix.  For example, a weaker 
opponent can exploit sects of the stronger opponent’s disaffected population by spreading 
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extremist ideologies that support the weaker opponent’s objectives.  Such a tactic gains 
more traction in segments of society that share the ethnicity and religious beliefs of 
whomever the weaker opponent publicly claims to defend.  The weaker opponent tends to 
publicly encourage, no matter how unrealistic it is, that such segments of society could 
take up arms against stronger opponents, thus challenging the economic and political 
systems that are responsible for their perceived societal disadvantages. 
ISIS has significantly less economic and military power than its Western 
adversaries.  As such, the economic and military superiority of the Western nations over 
ISIS represents, by definition, an asymmetrical conflict.   Stepanova’s asymmetric 
conflict theory has been applied in various terrorism-related research.  For instance, Jones 
and Smith (2010) examined concepts within Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory.  
Specifically, Jones and Smith (2010) investigated the role of ideology in the development 
of Islamic terrorism, as well as homegrown violent radicalization, both concepts vital to 
ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach.  Moreover, Stepanova’s research and 
asymmetric conflict theory has been cited in research that explores Islamic terrorism 
trends, studies that examine the reason terrorist groups target civilians, trends and 
patterns in armed conflicts, and assessments on combating terrorism (Abrahms & Potter, 
2015; English, 2013).  Therefore, I deemed Stepanova’s asymmetric conflict theory as an 
appropriate theoretical lens for this study and relate my analysis with this theory in 
Chapter 5. 
Transnational Terrorism Primer 
There are two main varieties of terrorism: transnational and domestic (Rosendorff 
& Sandler, 2005). Both domestic and transitional terrorism can stem from causes that 
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include but are not limited to separatism, ethnonationalism, social injustice, single issues 
(e.g., abortion), nihilism, religious freedom, fundamentalism, leftist ideology, and 
anticapitalism (Sandler, Arce, & Enders, 2008).  This study is focused on transnational 
terrorism and for this study, transnational terrorism was defined as: 
When such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target 
group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or 
foreign ties of its perpetrators, through its location, through the nature of its 
institutional or human victims, or through the mechanics of its resolution, its 
ramifications transcend national boundaries. (Mickolus, Sandler, & Murdock, 
1989, p. 497) 
Transitional terrorism, in some form or other, has existed for over 2,000 years. 
For example, the Jewish Zealots’ battle against the Roman Empire dates back to 48 AD 
and is one of the first recognized terrorist campaigns (Sandler et al., 2008).  Other 
examples include the Hindu Thugs’ attacks against travelers in India (600 AD) and 
Assassins taking up arms against the Christian crusaders in 1090 AD (Bloom, 2005).  
According to Hoffman (2006), the modern era of transnational terrorism started in 1968, 
with the hijacking of an Israeli flight by the terrorist group the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine.  There was an uptick in transnational terrorist acts—primarily by 
leftists or nationalists—following the hijacking lasting until the late 1980s (Rapoport, 
2004).  However, religious-inspired transnational terrorist attacks increased in the 1990s 
(Enders & Sandler, 2000).  Examples of modern era transnational terrorism include the 
1972 Munich Olympics massacre, Hezbollah’s 1983 bombing of the US Marine Corps 
barracks in Beirut, the 1985 downing of Air India Flight 182 by Hindu extremists, the 
22 
 
 
 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and 
Kenya in 1988, and the coordinated terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (Sandler et 
al., 2008).  A terrorist attack targeting a country’s embassy is considered transnational as 
embassy territory is considered the targeted embassy’s land (Sandler, 2005).  In all 
attacks, terrorists crossed borders to conduct the attack and the incidents were high 
profile enough to focus global attention to the perpetrators’ causes.  
As the term implies, transnational terrorism has ramifications for two or more 
countries.  It can range from an incident initiated in one country and terminated in 
another to spillover terrorism when political grievances (i.e. Middle East) motivate 
attacks in other countries, evidenced by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
U.S. and the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks on public transit in Madrid, Spain (Enders, 
Sandler, & Gaibulloev, 2011).  Specifically, in the case of the March 2004 attack in Spain 
and the July 2005 London bombings that targeted the public transport system, terrorists 
used such Western targets to generate global awareness for their political grievances by 
increasing media attention to their cause.   
As transnational terrorism is a method of asymmetric conflict and differs from 
more conventional issues, it generally presents unique security challenges and unwanted 
security externalities. For example, one country’s counterterrorism policies could impact 
the economic, security, and political environment for another country.  If one country 
increases its homeland security or takes counterterrorism actions abroad, the terrorist 
attack intended for that country may transfer location to a less-secure environment where 
targets are softer, impacting that nation’s economic, security, and political environment 
(Rosendorff & Sandler, 2005). 
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Experts within academia, the defense enterprise, and the U.S. government often 
suggest post 9/11 security policy and military operations encouraged anti-West agendas 
by known terrorist organizations, thus endangering citizens worldwide (Chomsky, 2016).  
A recent example of this is Operation Inherent Resolve, the military component of the 
coalition to degrade ISIS. In August 2014, the U.S. military, along with 28 NATO 
members and 23 NATO partners, commenced a series of actions—to include airstrikes—
designed to degrade ISIS (Benitez & Maletta, 2014; McInnis, 2016). 
Leading the efforts, which largely included weapons, ammunition, training, and 
equipment, were the U.S., the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, Greece, 
Germany, France, Estonia, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Canada, Bulgaria, Australia, 
and Albania.  The U.S. and the United Kingdom provided the vast amount of military 
support, while the remaining countries provided assortments of military equipment, 
including aircraft, and sent military advisors to train identified coalition allies in Syria 
and Iraq (Benitez & Maletta, 2014).  Furthermore, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Iraq, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. were conducting the 
counter-ISIS airstrikes intended to degrade the organization (Benitez & Maletta, 2014).  
As of August 2017, the coalition conducted 11,235 airstrikes in Syria and 13,331 
airstrikes in Iraq, for a total of 24,566 airstrikes against ISIS-related targets (U.S. DoD, 
2017)  The initial coalition counter-ISIS airstrikes, confluent with other criticisms of 
Western military actions (i.e. drone strikes and civilian deaths) in predominantly Muslim 
lands, fueled ISIS’s narrative to take violent action against Western interests, possibly 
increasing the global terrorism risk to citizens whose government is participating in the 
operations (Blanchard, Humud, Katzman, & Weed, 2015).   
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In addition to the unique challenges transnational terrorism causes to Western 
governments, guarding against such attacks is resource intensive, both by way of 
associated costs and intelligence and security service manpower and priorities.  Since 
9/11, hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent on global security (Sandler et al., 
2009).  Today, governments worldwide fund a vast array of anti-terrorism and 
counterterrorism measures to mitigate the increased threat posed by transnational 
terrorism.  However, given both the defensive and offensive government policies 
designed to fight the growing threat of transnational terrorism, several terrorist 
organizations adapted to the modern security landscape to overcome proactive security 
measures, evidenced by successful terrorist attacks sponsored or inspired by ISIS.  
Transnational terrorism presents unique security challenges as it is an effective 
asymmetric tactic employed by a weaker group against a more formidable opponent.   
Salafi Jihadism  
In order to understand Islamic terrorism and ISIS's transnational approach and its 
use of violence, it is important to understand the Salafist jihadi narrative.  The term 
Salafist jihadist was coined in 2002 by Giles Kepel and used to label Islamic foreign 
fighters participating in Soviet-Afghan War (Kepel, 2003).  Moreover, since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the term jihadism is generally used in the media and academic discourse 
to describe radical Islamism (Hegghammer, 2009).  Jihadi Salafists are generally 
adamantly opposed to the perceived Western domination of Islam, to include Western 
influence and military presence in Muslim territories (Boukhars, 2009).  According to 
Hafez (2010), Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi was credited with being one of the more 
influential figures of jihadi Salafism.  Specifically, al Magdisi's writings promoted the 
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use of violence against the West and allies of the West.  Moreover, the use of extreme 
violence, to include transnational terrorism, is encouraged to gainer attention to 
grievances and an attempt to achieve goals (Staunton, 2008).  According to Grupta 
(2009), common grievances against the West revolve around the perception the West is 
controlling the Islamic world economically, religiously, politically, and militarily.  
Additionally, Islamic extremists such as Salafist jihadist do not support or agree with 
Western values (Brinkley, 2013). 
While the scope of this study does not permit the investigation into the religious 
underpinnings of Salafism, it is important to understand some key objectives and 
grievances in order to understand transnational terrorism directed against the West.  
According to Hegghammer (2009), the objectives associated with Salafi jihadism are: 1) 
safeguarding the Muslim community from non-Muslim external threats, 2) identifying 
and correcting Muslim’s moral behaviors that are not in accordance with beliefs, 3) 
controlling and establishing sovereignty on territory under non-Muslim control, 4) 
attempting to change the political organization of states to adhere to Islamic state 
principles, and 5) possibly taking violent action against other Muslim sects.  Hafez 
(2010) concluded Salafism is characterized by the rejection of innovation within Islam, 
conducting jihad against infidel states, the concepts of takfir (excommunication) and 
tawhid (oneness with God), and the belief that God’s sovereignty is present all the time 
and supplants human reasoning.  According to Jones (2014), the Syrian Civil War 
(staring in 2011) resulted in the number of Salafi jihadists doubling.  Moreover, the 
number of Salafi jihadist groups have increased significantly (estimates as high as 50%) 
since 2010 (Jones, 2014).   
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Of the many Salafist strategists—and one often credited for influencing ISIS’s 
transnational terrorism approach and relevant to this study—is Abu Musab al-Suri, born 
Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar.  Al-Suri is widely regarded as a leading 
strategic thinker and theoretician for post September 11, 2001, transnational terrorism 
(Lia, 2007).  Al-Suri’s writings provided transnational terrorism organizations his vision 
of global jihad, while discussing the most effective strategies for conducting terrorist 
attacks against the West (Nasar, 2004).  Specifically, al-Suri’s jihadi military theory is 
largely based on “solo or cellular jihad, the act of individual jihadists organizing and 
carrying out attacks without any connection to or support from an established jihadist 
group,” and the need for a terrorist organization to establish multiple jihadi fronts which 
would allow for sustained guerilla and urban warfare (SITE, 2010, para. 3).  Al-Suri 
urged for a decentralized model that would present problems for Western intelligence and 
security organizations, which included thousands of Muslims worldwide participating in 
jihad.   
Al-Suri’s The Global Islamic Resistance Call 
Al-Suri is credited for greatly influencing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of the key 
founders of what is now known as ISIS (Clarke & Gartenstein-Ross, 2016).  Al-Suri was 
born in Syria in October 1958, alleging a genealogy from the fourth Caliph Ali.  At the 
age of 18, al-Suri attended the University of Aleppo with an interest in engineering.  
Around this same time, tensions in Syria were high, sparked by the ruling Alawite 
minority and Islamist community over political and social issues.  The tensions turned 
violent and included assassination attempts on high-ranking government officials.  It was 
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at this time al-Suri abandoned his academic studies and possibly had his religious 
awakening (Cruickshank & Ali, 2007; Lia, 2007). 
Al-Suri is largely credited for being the principle mastermind of 21st century 
transnational jihad and was reportedly Usama bin Laden’s top aid prior to his arrest in 
late 2005 (Lia, 2009).  Prior to his arrest, al-Suri published The Global Islamic Resistance 
Call (hereon referred to as The Call), a text that articulated his terrorism ideas on post 
9/11 jihad.  Specifically, it is believed al-Suri authored The Call in an attempt to 
transform al-Qaida from a hierarchical terrorist organization—for which al-Suri assessed 
it to be more vulnerable—into a decentralized movement (Nasar, 2004).   
Al-Suri stated The Call was a “comprehensive, doctrinal, political, behavioral, 
and education method” published in an attempt to advance the Muslims out of a position 
of degeneration and weakness (Nasar, 2004, p. 1,398).  Al-Suri's (2004) The Call 
examined the significant problems that he believed the Islamic world faces. Zehr (2011) 
concluded al-Suri's disquietude revolved around three core issues.  The first issue is the 
majority of Muslims do not practice the correct form of Islam.  Al-Suri (2004) blamed 
Muslim societies, secular institutions, and Western society for this shortcoming.  
Secondly, al-Suri (2004) concluded that predominately Muslim countries abandoned 
religion, evidenced by Western military occupation and presence in Muslim lands.  The 
third concern highlighted by al-Suri (2004) involved how the West (specifically the U.S. 
and Europe) made deliberate efforts to partner with predominantly Muslim countries.  Al-
Suri- (2004) felt like such Muslim countries were more concerned with global power than 
promoting Islam and such countries were subordinate to the West (Zehr, 2011).  In his 
28 
 
 
 
writings, al-Suri provided recommendations and his strategy to overcome the ills facing 
Muslims to lift the Islamic world to a position of power (Zehr, 2011).   
To overcome his concerns, al-Suri's (2004) The Call provided a blueprint on how 
the Muslim world could rise and wage jihad against Western powers.  Although deemed 
not directly involved in the execution, al-Suri’s name has been linked to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the 2005 London bombings (Lia, 2007).  
Counter-terrorism and antiterrorism experts, terrorism analysts, along with scholars often 
make the connection to ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach and al-Suri’s theory of 
jihad (Rej, 2016).  It is reported that al-Suri had a close relationship with former al-Qaida 
Iraq branch Emir Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Lia, 2007).  The two formed a relationship in 
Afghanistan, which allowed al-Suri to share his concepts regarding insurgency and 
guerrilla warfare.  Moreover, al-Suri allegedly discussed a transnational terrorism 
approach that involved attacks against the West, specifically Europe.  At the time, al-
Zarqawi was described as “uneducated and unsophisticated” (Lia, 2007, p. 329).  In 2004, 
prior to al-Suri’s arrest, al-Suri denied having a relationship with al-Zarqawi, although 
evidence suggested otherwise (Lia, 2007).  ISIS’s origin and construction were rooted in 
the ideological approach originally championed by al-Zarqawi in Iraq, who trained many 
of the militants that took up arms in the Iraq insurgency during the American intervention 
and is largely credited as being one of ISIS’s father figures (Clarke & Gartenstein-Ross, 
2016; Lia, 2007).   
ISIS Overview 
ISIS is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist and insurgent group that 
significantly expanded its presence in northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq since its 
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formation in 2011, with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate predicated 
on its interpretation of Shariah and Islam (Hashim, 2014).  ISIS’s origin and construction 
were rooted in the ideological approach originally championed by the late Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi (Tawhid wal Jihad) in Iraq in the early 2000s, who trained many of the militants 
who took up arms in the Iraq insurgency during the American intervention.  Originally, 
the group fought under the moniker of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ), but later 
swore allegiance to al-Qaida (Al-Tamimi, 2015).   
JTJ, comprised of foreign fighters predominantly from Syria, Afghanistan, 
Jordan, and Pakistan, quickly became operational in 2003, with the intent to drive U.S. 
and coalition forces from Iraq and to cause disorder to the government transition (Laub & 
Masters, 2014).  JTJ routinely conducted attacks against Shiite targets to incite sectarian 
conflict, which complicated the government transition.  Simultaneously, JTC drew 
international attention by conducting suicide bombings against non-combatants and 
released several beheading videos on the Internet (Douglas, 2014).  In October 2004, al-
Zarqawi officially pledged loyalty to Osama bin Laden and joined al-Qaida, renaming 
JTJ to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn Zaraqi, known in English as al-Qaida 
in Iraq (AQI) (Kirdar, 2014). 
AQI’s tactics, which included targeting Iraqis and Sunni leaders, alienated 
potential supporters and was criticized by Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leader within al-Qaida, 
subordinate to bin Laden.  Zawahiri requested al-Zarqawi refrain from mass bombings 
that killed civilians and to nurture a relationship with key Sunni leaders (CTC, 2010).  
Al-Zarqawi ignored the request and continued mass casualty attacks, which further 
intensified the violence between Shiites and Sunnis.  Due to backlash against it, AQI 
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joined the umbrella Salafi group Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSC), composed of six 
jihadi groups in Iraq that attempted to consolidate and coordinate efforts to rid Iraq and 
U.S. and coalition forces.  However, the MSC had little control over AQI operations.  On 
June 7, 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike (Bergan, Felter, Brown, & 
Shapiro, 2014). 
After U.S. forces eliminated al-Zarqawi, several Iraqi insurgent groups joined 
together to be viewed as more “Iraqi,” for which AQI leadership reflagged as the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI) (Katzman et al., 2014).  Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’I 
(Abu Omar al Baghdadi), an Iraqi, was announced as the emir of ISI, while Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri—al-Zarqawi’s replacement and Egyptian bomb maker—was appointed the 
Minister of War.  The appointments signified AQI would continue to employ its brand of 
extreme violence to resist U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, while gaining support from 
the international jihad community.  Additionally, AQI began prepping command and 
control structures for when U.S. and coalition forces decided to withdrawal from Iraq 
(Felter & Fishman, 2014).  Despite the name change, ISI was widely recognized as AQI 
and continued to alienate local Iraqis because of the number of non-Iraqis in leadership 
positions (Laub & Masters, 2014).  
The Iraqi resistance to AQI was a significant factor contributing to the Sunnis in 
the Anbar Province (known as the Anbar Awakening) to cooperate with U.S. and 
coalition forces to eradicate the region of insurgents, specifically AQI.  The Anbar 
Awakening also assisted in fostering the relationship between the U.S. military and Iraqi 
security forces.  By the end of 2007, AQI had difficulty maintaining territory and 
implementing its interpretations of Islamic law (Al-Jabouri, Abed, & Jensen, 2014; 
31 
 
 
 
Hashim, 2014). Moreover, by early 2008, U.S., coalition, and Iraqi security forces took 
8,800 AQI members prisoner and killed approximately 2,400 AQI fighters (Kirdar, 
2014).  By mid-2009, the U.S. government provided funding to over 100,000 Iraqi Sunnis 
to take up arms against AQI, resulting in the death of over 85% of AQI’s leaders, leaving 
the group in disorder (Lewis, 2014).  Both Abu Omar al Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-
Masri were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid in April 2010 in Tikrit, which capped off 
several years in which U.S., coalition, and Iraqi forces significantly degraded AQI 
(NCTC, 2014).  
In May 2010, and after AQI leadership suffered significant setbacks resulting 
from the death of key leadership, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed head of AQI.  Al-
Baghdadi immediately appointed many of Saddam Hussein’s former military officers to 
his leadership cadre, many who spent time fighting against U.S. and coalition forces 
during the Iraq war; however, AQI continued to struggle until U.S. and coalition forces 
withdrew in late 2011 (Ganor, 2015).  Once U.S. and coalition forces withdrew from 
Iraq, AQI operated in a more permissive security environment and gradually increased 
attacks in Iraq, most notably targeting members of the Maliki government, as well as 
freeing its members from prison (known as “Breaking Walls”) (Hashim, 2014).  With the 
absence of a foreign security presence, AQI was able to provoke sectarian violence, 
leading to an uprising in Anbar Province which pushed the Iraqi Security forces out and 
allowed AQI to expand in Anbar (Laub & Masters, 2014).  
Meanwhile, protests directed against the Bashar al-Assad regime gained 
momentum in Syria, which allowed AQI to use Syria as a training ground and expansion.  
A few months following the initial anti-Assad protests, al-Baghdadi deployed both Iraqi 
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and Syrian members of AQI to Syria to establish a potential foothold that could lead to 
organizational growth, a permissive operating environment, and with the intent to 
establish a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim state in Syria based on its interpretation of Islam 
(Laub & Masters, 2014).  The groups of detached AQI fighters led by Syrian Abu 
Muhammad al-Julani quickly recruited local fighters that opposed the Assad regime.  The 
group initially comprised of ISI fighters led by al-Julani publicly announced its formation 
as Jabhat al-Nusra Ahl as-Sham (herein out referred to as the al-Nusra Front) (NCTC, 
2014). 
In April 2013, AQI leader al-Baghdadi publicly released a statement confirming 
the establishment of al-Nusra Front.  Additionally, al-Baghdadi stated AQI and al-Nusra 
Front would merge under the moniker of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS).  
Subsequently, al-Julani publicly denied the merger, which resulted in al-Qaida’s leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri instructing al-Julani and al-Baghdadi to end the public discourse, but 
also denied the merger of the organizations.  Al-Baghdadi publicly rejected al-Zawahiri’s 
demand and proceeded with the merger while simultaneously conducting combat 
operations in Syria.  In February 2014—5months after al-Zawahiri’s request to resolve 
the conflict between ISIS and al-Nusra Front—al-Qaida publicly withdrew any 
association with al-Baghdadi and ISIS (Joscelyn, 2014). 
Although officially split from AQI, ISIS grew in size and military power and 
carried out military operations against the governments of Iraq and Syria, as well as tribal 
and rebel groups in Iraq, Syria, and the Kurdish Peshmerga.  In January 2014, ISIS 
defeated the Iraqi forces and took territorial control of Fallujah and seized control of 
Mosul 2 months later (Semple & Schmitt, 2014).  In June 2014, al-Baghdadi was named 
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ISIS’s caliph and declared a global caliphate, a concept rejected by many within the 
international Muslim community and changed the name of ISIS to the Islamic State 
(Hashim, 2014).   
In August 2014, following ISIS’s capture and control of Sinjar, Iraq, the U.S. 
began a counter-ISIS bombing campaign targeting ISIS strongholds and infrastructure 
throughout Iraq. (Barnard, 2014).  Simultaneously, ISIS encountered significant non-
Sunni villages and militias resistant to its advances, as well as Iraqi security forces and 
the Kurdish Peshmerga that slowed its territorial gains.  The U.S.-led counter ISIS 
airstrikes largely targeted ISIS-held oil wells and refineries, which significantly 
decreased the group’s revenue.  It was estimated that at the time, ISIS’s oil revenue was 
between $1 million to $2 million USD per day (Zahiyeh, 2014).  Despite the reported 
setbacks, ISIS held significant territory and proceeded to seize Ramadi, Iraq. 
 In 2015, ISIS exploited the instability in Libya and established a presence within 
the country.  Despite military efforts, predominantly Egyptian, to disrupt ISIS expansion 
into Libya, ISIS continued to establish a stronghold, specifically taking control of Surt 
(Robins-Early, 2016).  According to U.S. government assessments, the number of ISIS 
fighters in Libya doubled in recent years, with current assessments estimating between 
5,000 to 6,500 ISIS fighters located in Libya, to include key leadership (Schmitt, 2016).  
As ISIS gained worldwide notoriety, several Islamist militant organizations, 
predominantly located North Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, declared 
allegiance and/or support to ISIS.  By 2016, ISIS cultivated support from more than 40 
organizations and publicly accepted groups in 8 countries—known as wilayats, Arabic 
for “provinces”—that aided with expansion of the self-declared caliphate, global reach, 
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and strategic depth.  As of this research, the following is a list of provinces formally 
recognized by ISIS outside of Syria and Iraq: 1) Libya, 2) Egypt, 3) Yemen, 4) Nigeria, 
5) Afghanistan and Pakistan, 6) Saudi Arabia, 7) Algeria, and 8) Russia (Rahmani & 
Tanco, 2016). In return, ISIS generally provided these provinces funding, training, 
foreign fighters, and a professional standard media presence.   
ISIS’s Information Operations 
Vital to ISIS’s campaign is the implementation of Information Operations (IO) 
within its overall strategy.  While the importance of IO is not a new concept evidenced 
and documented throughout history, ISIS understood the strategic role of IO (Ingram, 
2015).  For example, ISIS’s IO campaign centered on a means to shape perception of its 
objectives, used a political-military apparatus (to appeal to pragmatic factors), and 
assisted in influencing individuals to gain support (Ingram, 2015).  According to Goode 
(2015), “the internet and other cyber assets are effective weapons in this campaign: they 
can be used to distribute subversive propaganda and disinformation, publicize attacks, 
and recruit” (p. 159). 
As ISIS represents a global threat not restricted by borders, the fight against ISIS 
is one of the more pressing concerns facing the international community since 2011.  A 
significant component of combating ISIS is mitigating ISIS’s multi-dimensional IO 
strategy (Obama, 2015).  Since mid-2014—following its capture of Mosul and nationally 
broadcasted beheadings of several Western journalists—ISIS’s IO campaign significantly 
supplemented its sanctioned media units (i.e. al Hayat and al Furqan Media) to act as 
instruments of terror and proselytization. 
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 Ingram (2015) examined the strategic logic of ISIS’s IO campaign and concluded 
the purpose of ISIS’s messaging is to gain the support of contested populations and to 
shape perceptions of individuals who are prone to radicalization.  To accomplish its IO 
objectives, ISIS draws on pragmatic factors such as security, quality of living, and 
stability to promote its political-military campaigns while condemning the actions and 
inefficiencies of its enemies.  Additionally, ISIS uses perceptual factors that provided the 
audience insight into ISIS as a functional organization, even organizational dynamics.  
When fused together, the pragmatic and perceptual approach enables ISIS to control its 
narrative and present itself as the champion of Sunni Muslims, while highlighting the 
negatives associated with other rival Sunni groups and countering enemy narratives.  
Since 2014, ISIS produced tens of thousands of sanctioned propaganda products, 
furthering its IO objectives, ensuring its message endures despite military setbacks in Iraq 
and Syria. 
ISIS Propaganda 
Terrorist propaganda is not a recent occurrence; however, the usage and tools 
evolved over time (Injac & Dojcinovski, 2015).  For the purpose of this research, and a 
widely used definition among experts on terrorist propaganda, propaganda is defined as 
“the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups 
with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for 
predetermined ends and through psychological manipulation” (Ellul, 1973 p. xi-xii).  The 
modern era of terrorism leverages the Internet, social media, and the expansion in global 
media to garner public support for its grievances and strike fear in the public (Injac & 
Dojcinovski, 2015).  According to Wilkinson (1997), terrorists use the media (as an outlet 
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for propaganda) for the following reasons: 1) radicalization and recruitment for the 
purpose of resources, 2) create fear and promote their violent narrative, 3) gain support 
for their goals, and 4) circumvent security services.   
ISIS’s effective use of online propaganda directed at Western audiences attracts 
global appeal from disenfranchised individuals. According to Shameih and Szenes 
(2015), ISIS’s propaganda strategy represents a new era for how terrorist groups 
incorporate the Internet to further its agenda.  The Internet allows ISIS to publicly 
announce—through its official websites—its strategy and accomplishments while 
inspiring home-grown violent extremists to take violent action in their own country 
without traveling to conflict zones such as Iraq or Syria.   
Through its official media production companies and media departments for its 
official branches, ISIS produces online propaganda translated in over 23 languages, 
including English, Russian, German, French, and Turkish, to spread its narrative and the 
recruitment of foreign fighters.  A few examples of media groups associated with ISIS 
are Al-Ajnad, the Al-Furqan Foundation, Amaq, Bayan Radio, and Al-I’tisaam (SITE, 
2017). Specifically, ISIS uses its propaganda as a force multiplier, encouraging radical 
individuals to conduct violent acts outside of Syria and Iraq (Zelin, 2015). 
 ISIS propaganda has several main themes to frame its message.  Specifically, 
Zelin (2015) concluded the six main types of ISIS themes delivered through its media 
are: 1) military, 2) governance, 3) da’wa, 4) hisba, 5) promotion of the caliphate, and 6) 
enemy attack.  Moreover, Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, & Moreng (2016) determined ISIS’s 
use of propaganda was designed to promote several core arguments:  
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1) IS successfully restored the caliphate, which functions effectively as a state and 
adheres to Sharia as it was practiced during the time of al-salaf al-salih, making it 
the only authentic Islamic state in the world.   
2) To the extent, from a theological, legal, and political standpoint, IS is the only 
legitimate Islamic organization in the world. It annuls existing governments, 
political Islamist groups, and rival jihadist organizations.   
3) IS constantly grows in strength and is more capable and unified than al-Qaida, 
which, IS claims, is on the verge of fragmentation and disintegration. 
(Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2016, p. 14). 
To advance its core arguments, Gartenstein-Ross et al. (2016) concluded propaganda 
narratives very similar to Zelin’s (2015) study.  Specifically, the narratives focused on: 1) 
ISIS projecting strength, 2) undermining rival jihadist organizations, 3) discrediting 
political Islamists that were outspoken against ISIS, 4) spreading misinformation to rival 
groups, 5) exploiting sectarian strains, 6) promoting the caliphate as a utopia, 7) joining 
the caliphate for a sense of brotherhood and adventure, 8) promoting violence against the 
West, and 9) obligation as a Muslim to join the caliphate. 
When ISIS promoted its military narrative, the media releases focused on 
defeating the enemy and conquering territory.  ISIS promoted successes on the 
battlefield, mainly on defeating the Iraqi Army, the Free Syrian Army, and military 
operations targeting Kurdish forces.  Additionally, ISIS military messaging focused on 
the recruitment of future fighters, promoting the skills new recruits would learn when 
attending its training camps.  When promoting its governance and hisba (moral policing) 
activities, ISIS attempted to illustrate its state-building capabilities, even though they are 
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in constant conflict.  The official media releases focus on functioning hospitals, schools, 
critical infrastructure, and judicial systems (Zelin, 2015).  ISIS’s hisba-related media 
promotes punishing—either with corporal or capital punishments—those who do not live 
up to its identified precepts.  This governance and hisba-related media are an attempt to 
demonstrate to locals and potential foreign recruits that ISIS can provide social services 
for its controlled territories.  ISIS’s da’wa media campaign focus on its narrative and 
interpretation of Islam.  Specifically, ISIS’s da’wa related online media aims to educate 
individuals to return to the one and only true Islam, which ISIS concluded many people 
abandoned or interpreted incorrectly (Zelin, 2015). 
Three main propaganda themes, recruitment, the promotion of the caliphate, and 
enemy attacks, are most significant to this research. While the overarching narrative of 
ISIS’s media is promotion of the caliphate, it specifically illustrates an idyllic and pristine 
environment of its controlled territories.  Zelin (2015) concluded this theme resonates 
with ISIS supporters, especially young supporters not living in Iraq and Syria.  The media 
also focuses on new pledges of allegiance to ISIS, giving an appearance of momentum 
despite losing territory in Iraq and Syria.  ISIS’s official media often depicts attacks from 
the enemy by illustrating attacks against ISIS infrastructure and the killing of Muslims.  
The illustration of attacks against the infrastructure is an attempt by ISIS to promote how 
the international community is destroying everything ISIS builds to help its supporters.  
Moreover, the attacks against Muslims stress the point that the international community 
will never allow Muslims to live in a flourishing society and will kill Muslims whenever 
possible.  The majority of ISIS-related propaganda occurs on the Internet; however, ISIS 
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also distributes printed media, CD/DVDs, and/or USB thumb drives within its controlled 
territories.   
ISIS’s Use of the Internet and Social Media 
Terrorist groups use the Internet as a low-cost instrument to distribute 
propaganda, communicate, and organize (Kohlmann, 2006).  The U.S. Department of 
State (2006) concluded that terrorists—especially homegrown violent extremists—do not 
always have a relationship with a terrorist organization.  According to Woods (2007),"the 
Internet bridges this gap between organizational disconnectedness by allowing for the 
global dissemination of terrorists' extremist views and promoting a larger transnational 
community of terrorists” (p. 271).  Terrorist and terrorist groups use the Internet in the 
following ways: 1) coordination and planning, 2) psychological warfare, 3) recruitment, 
4) propaganda, 5) fundraising, 6) data mining, 7) sharing information, and 8) networking 
(Weimann, 2004). 
While terrorism existed long before the Internet, the Internet assists in the 
transformation of terrorism, allowing groups like ISIS to spread its violent narrative, 
recruit and radicalize supporters, and even encourage violent attacks (Farwell, 2014). As 
of this paper, about 25 percent of the world population has access to the Internet. Of 
which, over two billion users have active Facebook accounts (Statista, 2017). Therefore, 
the Internet allows terrorist organizations to spread a violent narrative to an 
unprecedented amount of people. The Internet allows groups like ISIS a platform to 
communicate violence and spread propaganda, central components to and drawing 
attention to its cause, thus potentially attracting more supporters and recruits (Farwell, 
2014).  Social media allows ISIS a platform to communicate in a convenient, effective, 
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and a near real-time method.  As of this paper, ISIS members used social media 
applications and file sharing platforms such as Twitter, Telegram, Facebook, Ask.fm, 
WhatsApp, kik, Viper, Tumblr, Instagram, and JustPaste.it (Klausen, 2015). 
ISIS's use of the Internet represents a something of a game-changer when 
compared to how other jihad groups typically utilized such a vast platform.  According to 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (2012) “the Internet is open.  It’s highly 
accessible as it should be.  But that also presents a new terrain for warfare.  It is a 
battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do harm to our country, to our 
economy, and to our citizens” (para. 24). ISIS's online strategy is sophisticated and 
utilizes a modern approach (Aly, MacDonald, Jarvis, & Chen, 2017).  Not only does ISIS 
capitalize on the use of social networking, it also posts official publications and high-
quality videos.  As some content is deemed too violent or unacceptable by conventional 
media outlets, ISIS can disseminate the propaganda (electronic magazines, videos, and 
audio recordings of speeches) through social media and jihadi websites.  Additionally, 
jihad groups such as ISIS can use the Internet for operational planning, strategic 
communications, and virtual training (i.e. firearms).  Such information can be used by 
supporters for attacks and even terrorist cell construction (Gray & Head, 2009). 
Social media is vital to ISIS’s global operational strategy.  Historically, jihadist 
typically used password-protected web forums to communicate; however, ISIS members 
predominantly use (at the time of this research) Twitter for communication since it is 
accessible on cellphones, and relatively inexpensive (Klausen, 2015).  ISIS members 
routinely “tweet” images and pictures in-line with ISIS’s overall propaganda strategy that 
included links to other ISIS-related information.  While Twitter reacted by closing 
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accounts, ISIS responded by creating official ISIS dissemination accounts resulting in 
multiple accounts broadcasting the propaganda; therefore, closing Twitter accounts does 
not interfere with its propaganda campaign.  For example, if one official account is 
closed, the other accounts would tweet the new Twitter handle, thus allowing followers to 
track official ISIS media on a daily basis (Zelin, 2015). 
 According to Klausen (2015), ISIS employs website managers that integrate 
ISIS’s fighters and supporter’s social media content, combined with YouTube uploads to 
disseminate propaganda to larger audiences.  Website managers can perform these tasks 
from anywhere in the world, not just the combat zones, making the processes unique and 
challenging to defend against.  Additionally, social media allows for real time 
communication. Some media outlets habitually reference Twitter information for what is 
happening in places reporters have difficulty accessing, advancing it as a convincing and 
reliable source.  This allows ISIS to control the narrative in some areas of Iraq and Syria 
about its progress on the battlefields. However, ISIS attempts to limit the jihadists 
allowed to post updates on social media; only trusted fighters are allowed to post on 
battlefield results (Klausen, 2015). 
ISIS’s Commitment to Terrorism Targeting the West 
ISIS’s violent transitional rhetoric raised concern of attacks directed at Europe 
and North America.  Such rhetoric is instrumental in Western government military 
decision-making when developing counter ISIS- strategies as the transactional nature of 
the threat potentially alters the timetables for defeating ISIS.  According to Fishman 
(2014), ISIS represents a severe threat to Western interests and personnel worldwide.  
Moreover, the permissive operating environment in Syria and Iraq under ISIS control 
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significantly increases the threat to Westerners as it may allow other groups with a 
transnational terrorism agenda safe-haven.  However, according to Hegghammer and 
Nesser (2015), it is difficult to determine the threat to the West, as ISIS does not speak 
with one voice (i.e. foot soldier vice ISIS leadership). However, from 2014 through 2017, 
many public statements made through multiple official ISIS media platforms likely 
reflect the official stance of ISIS leadership of a violent anti-West agenda.   
Additionally, ISIS officially sponsored videos and magazines that directly call for 
attacks against the West during that time period. Specially, Dabiq and Rumiyah, ISIS’s 
official English language magazines, made promises of defeating the West.  In October 
2014, Dabiq (issue 4) states “at this point of the crusade against the Islamic State, it is 
very important attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance 
against the Islamic State, especially the U.S., U.K., France, Australia, and Germany” 
(Dabiq, 2014, p. 44).  Subsequent issues of Dabiq articles highlighted and praised 
successful attacks against the West by ISIS-affiliated and inspired individuals. 
In addition to Dabiq and Rumiyah, ISIS made public statements instructing 
followers to attack Westerners.  Specifically, one month after the initial counter-ISIS 
strikes in Iraq, al-Adnani (2014) stated: 
If you kill a disbelieving American or European—especially the spiteful and 
filthy French—or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the 
disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a 
coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any 
manner or way however it may be.  Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not 
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seek anyone’s verdict.  Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military (para. 
67).   
Subsequent public statements from al-Adnani hinted at ISIS-directed plots and 
continued to identify potential targets such as the White House (al-Adnani, 2015).  In 
addition to al-Adnani’s statements, al-Baghdadi had publicly called for ISIS sympathizers 
to attack in his or her homeland if unable to travel to Iraq or Syria.  Specifically, al-
Baghdadi stated in late 2014 “if you are not able to find an IED or bullet, then single out 
the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies.  Smash his head with a 
rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down 
from a high place, or choke him, or poison him” (al-Baghdadi, 2014, para. 70).   
However, Hegghammer and Nesser (2015) researched ISIS’s commitment to 
attack the West and highlighted several key points.  First, a call for sympathizers to attack 
the West is not actually ISIS putting the time, resources, and commitment to 
orchestrating the attacks.  The public pleas for attacks did not commit the organization to 
conduct attacks.  While it is evident ISIS leadership views the West as the enemy, and 
overtly supports and encourages attacks directed at Westerners, the public speeches did 
not promise an ISIS-sponsored terrorism campaign.  Secondly, the preferred first course 
of action for sympathizers is still to join the self-proclaimed caliphate; attacking in one’s 
home country is only if the individual could not travel.  Lastly, the public statements by 
al-Adnani and al-Baghdadi do not distinguish between attacking in Europe vice the U.S.  
When ISIS’s leadership identified potential targets through its public statements, both 
European and U.S. targets (i.e. the White House, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower) were 
referenced in the same speech. 
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In addition to public statements and ISIS publications like Dabiq and Rumiyah, 
ISIS has released videos calling for attacks, five of which specifically addressed attacks 
against the West (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015).  The video encouragement for attacks 
differed slightly from the public statements and from Dabiq and Rumiyah.The videos 
stressed attacks against the West are justified as retaliation for the Western involvement 
in Iraq and Syria.  However, the majority of ISIS-sponsored videos were released shortly 
after the initial U.S.-led airstrikes targeting ISIS in Iraq in August 2014.   
As previously stated, the majority of ISIS-related plots occurred after the 
declaration of its caliphate, along with the U.S.-led counter-ISIS airstrikes in Syria and 
Iraq (Europol, 2016). However, the exact number of ISIS-related attack plots are 
unknown to the research community.  While many terrorist plots have been claimed by 
ISIS or connected to ISIS by security services or law enforcement, there are limitations 
associated with connecting a terrorist attack to ISIS outside of those establishments 
(Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015).  Specifically, studies are largely based on open source 
information and researchers cannot examine the specifics of plots that were not reported 
in the press.  Even if an incident is declared an act of terrorism, it could take some time, 
up to years in some cases, for the details to be revealed during a trial or legal process, 
thus altering statistics and research on the topic. Additionally, the media may report 
details of the incident that are inaccurate or require verification that only the legal process 
can corroborate.  Moreover, researchers are not always privy to information on foiled or 
disrupted terrorism plots, making it difficult to provide assessments on the exact number 
of ISIS-related plots that have been mitigated since the declaration of its caliphate. 
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Hegghammer and Nesser (2015) concluded the 30 plots linked to ISIS were an 
indication ISIS surpassed al-Qaida as the chief provider of motivator for attacks against 
the West from 2011-2015.  Specifically, of the 30 ISIS-linked plots, 11 (37%) were 
consummated, which is 16% higher than non-ISIS-related plots over the same period.  
Furthermore, the ISIS-linked plots caused an average of 1.4 deaths per incident, 
compared to 2.9 deaths for consummated non-ISIS-linked attacks.  The lower casualty 
rate is likely an indicative that ISIS-connected plots generally involved non-complex 
attack methods and/or weapons such as handguns and stabbings. The number of ISIS-
related plots and the deaths per attack increased since the conclusion of Hegghammer and 
Nesser’s (2015) study, along with the sophistication of coordinated attacks.  For example, 
on March 22, 2016, three coordinated suicide bombings occurred in Brussels, Belgium.  
Two suicide bombers detonated suitcase bombs at the Brussels Airport in Zaventem; 
approximately one hour later, a third attack occurred on a train at Maalbeek metro station.  
In all, 35 people were killed, including 3 perpetrators, and more than 300 people were 
injured.  The attackers were members of the same terrorist cell involved in the November 
2015 Paris attacks.  ISIS claimed responsibility shortly after the attacks, stating the worst 
is yet to come.  The attacks that were possibly directed by ISIS leadership in Syria 
(Europol, 2016) were the deadliest terrorist act in Belgium’s history (Chad, Boyle, & 
Knoll, 2016).  According to Europol (2016), in 2016 alone, there were over a hundred 
ISIS-related terrorist plots targeting the West. 
Foreign Fighter Threat 
 The concept of recruiting and employing foreign fighters to support conflicts is 
not a new concept, evidenced by the high number of Muslim foreign fighters that took 
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part in Afghanistan (1980-1992), the Bosnian War (1992-1995), and the Iraq War (since 
2003) (Hegghammer, 2010).  According to Cordesman (2005), foreign fighters are 
sometimes more experienced fighters and possibly introduce new fighting tactics to the 
conflicts they join.  Moreover, foreign fighters are important to terrorist organizations 
that are looking to broaden the scope of the conflict outside of its battle space in an effort 
to increase its resources, thus increasing its chances of victory (Malet, 2013).  Therefore, 
foreign fighters are an essential component to a terrorist group looking to employ a 
transnational terrorism approach.  Specifically, a terrorist organization can train a foreign 
fighter in attack methods and execution in places like Iraq and Syria, then instruct the 
fighter to return to his home country to conduct a terrorist attack (Hegghammer, 2010).  
For example, on May 24, 2004, returned foreign fighter and French citizen Mehdi 
Nemmouche shot and killed four individuals at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium.  
Nemmouche was an ISIS foreign fighter who recently returned from Syria (Duyvesteyn 
& Peeters, 2015). 
Foreign fighters are essential for ISIS to achieve its goals (Byman, 2015).  
Hegghammer (2010) defines a foreign fighter as “an agent who (1) has joined, operated 
within the confines of an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship 
links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and 
(4) is unpaid” (pgs. 57-58). Since 2011 and coinciding with the commencement of the 
Syria conflict, foreign fighters began traveling to Syria at record numbers to take up arms 
against the Assad regime, many of which used facilitation routes established during the 
Iraq War to gain entrance into Syria.   
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According to Nicholas Rasmussen, former Deputy Director of the U.S. National 
Counterterrorism Center, Syria is an attractive location for foreign fighters with radical 
leanings and/or to further a political agenda.  As such, ISIS and other aligned jihadist 
groups can recruit, train, and provide equipment to a record number of foreign fighters, 
many who the U.S. government assessed would seek to conduct attacks in the West. 
(Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2014). 
The number of European and U.S. foreign fighters joining ISIS is of concern to 
the Western governments.  As of this paper, over 30,000 foreign fighters joined Sunni 
militant groups in Syria and Iraq, with the majority pledging allegiance to ISIS 
(Duyvesteyn & Peeters, 2015; Gates & Podder, 2015).  Of the 30,000 foreign fighters, it 
is estimated that over 4,000 Westerners joined ISIS in Syria (Hegghammer & Nesser, 
2015). However, such estimates are largely based on open source information and 
analysis.  
Like with other foreign fighters, Westerners in Syria and Iraq are likely separated 
into groups based on language, skills, and the current needs of the group (Bakker & de 
Bont, 2016). According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center Director, Nicolas 
Rasmussen (2014), the number of Westerners traveling to conflict zones are historically 
unmatched (to include conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Iraq), 
with the majority of the individuals joining ISIS vice other Sunni militant groups such as 
al-Nusra Front. At present, the exact number of Westerners who died fighting alongside 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria is unknown; however, estimates range from 1,000 to 1,500 (Reed 
& Pohl, 2017). 
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There is a debate as to the threat foreign fighters pose when returning to their 
home country after fighting in conflict zones.  For example, the May 2014 attack at the 
Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium was allegedly conducted by an extremist who spent 
a year fighting alongside ISIS in Syria.  According to research conducted by Carfarella 
and Zhou (2017), returned foreign fighters were responsible for the majority of ISIS-
related coordinated attacks in Europe from 2014 to 2016, and assessed there would be 
additional coordinated attacks in the future as more foreign fighters return to Europe. As 
of late 2017, European Union’s counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, stated 
there were as many as 2,500 Westerners still fighting alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq.  
Moreover, at least 1,500 Western foreign fighters returned to their home countries, some 
of them could provide ISIS organizational links into Western nations (Carfarella & Zhou, 
2017). According to Hegghammer (2013), 1 in 9 Muslim foreign fighters that are linked 
to a terrorist group are somehow involved in a terrorist attack after they leave the conflict 
zone. Such a number suggests that a significant percentage of foreign fighters will be 
involved in terrorist attacks outside of Syria and Iraq, regardless of sanctioned direction 
from ISIS leadership.   
Foreign fighters may gain valuable military experience in Iraq and Syria and 
possibly learn bomb-making techniques, marksmanship, and tactical maneuvering, all of 
which could be useful in consummating terrorist attack in the West.  However, the 
returnee rate is difficult to determine since foreign fighter data likely is underreported or 
inaccurately reported in the media.  Additionally, many European nations take 
preemptive measures that likely prevented attacks by foreign fighters.  For example, the 
United Kingdom arrested individuals and charged them with crimes based on their 
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involvement in the Syria conflict, thus possibly preventing an act of domestic terrorism 
(Ledwith, Pendlebury, & White, 2016). 
 In addition to the threat foreign fighters pose to Europe, the group does represent 
a threat to the U.S. (Fishman, 2014).  Specifically, U.S. government officials expressed 
concerns because of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows visa-free travel 
to the U.S. for a significant number of European citizens (Archick et al., 2015).  
Specifically, 30 European countries are eligible for the VWP (see Table 1 below for a list 
of VWP countries) and many of those countries are assessed to have a considerable 
foreign fighter presence in Iraq and Syria.  Once those individuals return from Syria and 
Iraq, they are not monitored by host nation security services and could enter the U.S. 
under the VWP.  As the threat posed by returned foreign fighters is largely a security 
issue for Europe, the 113th and 114th Congress held hearings specifically addressing the 
threat it represents to the U.S. (see Appendix E for a list of hearings). 
Table 1 
U.S. Visa Waiver European Countries 
 
Andorra Finland Ireland Malta Slovakia 
Austria France Italy Monaco Slovenia 
Belgium Germany Latvia Netherlands Spain 
Czech Republic Greece Liechtenstein Norway Sweden 
Denmark Hungary Lithuania Portugal Switzerland 
Estonia Iceland Luxembourg San Marino United Kingdom 
From “Visa Waiver Program” by the United States Department of State. Retrieved from 
https://travel.state.gov. 
 
Inspired Lone Actor Threat 
The threat of ISIS-directed and returned foreign fighters are just two tactics in 
ISIS's broad approach to transnational terrorism.  Inspiring lone actor attacks is another 
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terrorism tactic employed by ISIS which involves self-radicalization and acts of violence 
where the perpetrator did not receive personal instruction from ISIS. Since ISIS declared 
its caliphate, the number of lone actors targeting the West increased significantly 
(Europol, 2016).  According to Ellis (2016), "IS has produced a hybrid threat from 
individual attackers, detached from the broader network, but able to benefit from its 
guidance" (p. 41).  Again, for the purpose of this research, an inspired lone actor refers to 
an individual attacker inspired by ISIS's violent narrative through messaging and 
propaganda.  In order to meet this definition, an attacker may have remote contact with 
ISIS members, yet receive no unique (or personal) direction from the group. 
Inspired lone actor terrorism is not a new phenomenon and is one of the earliest 
forms of terrorism employed by non-state actors (Pantucci, Ellis, & Chaplais, 2015).  As 
previously mentioned, ISIS's narrative instructs followers who share its ideology and 
support its caliphate to conduct violence without support or direction.  According to 
Barnes (2012), lone actor attacks are a tactical adaptation in order to circumvent counter-
terrorism efforts.  For example, a complex terrorist attack (networked plot) can leave an 
operational footprint that law enforcement and intelligence agencies can identify and 
disrupt. However, an inspired lone actor can attack with little to no notice using simple 
methods, thus making it difficult for security agencies to detect.  ISIS's use of public 
speeches, social media, online publications, and propaganda videos makes it easier to 
radicalize supporters that do not travel to conflict zones and provide generic guidance and 
targets for inspired lone actor attacks. 
Inspired lone actor terrorist tactics and targets are diverse.  Tactics range from 
suicide bombings, knife and small arms attacks, and vehicular attacks (Pantucci et al., 
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2015).  For example, on July 14, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel intentionally drove 
a 19-ton truck into a crowd of people celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France.  The 
attack injured 458 people and resulted in 86 deaths.  Shortly after the attack, ISIS claimed 
responsibility for inspiring the attack and that Bouhlel answered its calls against people in 
France.  The investigation into the attack revealed Bouhlel was radicalized and inspired 
by ISIS propaganda (Europol, 2016; Sanchez, 2016).  A thorough investigation into 
targets and methods identified by official ISIS propaganda will be conducted in Chapter 
4. 
Open Source Intelligence 
It is necessary to examine publicly available information to gain valuable insight 
and investigate the concepts that may serve as the framework for ISIS’s transnational 
terrorism approach.  To properly understand the applicability of Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) in regard to terrorism research and assessments, it must be understood it derives 
from Open Source Information (OSINF).  According to Lowenthal (1998), OSINF is: 
Any and all information that can be derived from overt collection: all types of 
media, government reports and other documents, scientific research and reports, 
and commercial vendors of information, the Internet, etc.  The main qualifiers to 
open source information are that it does not require any type of clandestine 
collection techniques to obtain it and that it must be obtained through means that 
entirely meet the copyright and commercial requirements of vendors where 
applicable. (para. 2). 
As the definition of OSINF encompasses all available unclassified information, 
OSINT is the product that originates from applying analytical tradecraft to such 
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information.  Specifically, OSINT is employing “the proven methods of the intelligence 
community to open source information, and transforms volumes of information into an 
unclassified intelligence product that represents judicious source discovery and 
validation, multi-source integration and subject matter expertise” (Lowenthal, 1998, para. 
2).  When comparing OSINT to more traditional forms of intelligence, OSINT offers 
many advantages the others do not; however, there remains unsupported skepticism on 
the inclusion of OSINT into assessments.  The following is a discussion on the history of 
OSINT, the advantages of OSINT, and the myths that typically foster skepticism.  
OSINT offers vital historical background information and the geopolitical context 
for operations by providing wide array of tactically useful information (Moshirnia, 2013).  
The concept of OSINT originated in the late 1930s when analysts at Princeton University 
monitored foreign short-wave radio transmissions.  Subsequently, in 1941, the Foreign 
Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) identified the importance of collecting on such 
radio transmissions that radio became the primary source of intelligence during World 
War II (Mercado, 2001).  In a declassified report by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) about the role of collecting open source information during World War II, an 
unnamed naval intelligence officer observed, “there is very little confidential agents can 
tell that is not accessible to an alert analyst who knows what he is looking for and knows 
how to find it in open sources” (Mercado, 2001, p. 11). 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) disbanded the FBIS 
immediately following WWII, though the U.S. government recognized the value of 
OSINT during peacetime, where a naval officer approximated that 95% of peacetime 
intelligence (immediately following WWII) derived from open source material such as 
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foreign literature, the information travelers report after visiting countries, and foreign 
radio broadcasts (Zacharias, 1946).  Consequently, the FBIS, as part of the CIA, became 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.  In the 1950s, the CIA used OSINT to 
monitor adversaries such as China and the Soviet Union, specifically the Sino-Soviet 
split.  Following WWII, the U.S. confiscated unclassified documents from the Japanese, 
Germans, and Russian governments and militaries.  The CIA was particularly interested 
in analyzing such documents (primarily books and periodicals) to gain insight into Soviet 
technical capabilities.  An unnamed analyst estimated that by the early 1960s, aggregated 
open source material furnished the majority of the U.S. military knowledge on the Soviet 
Union (Moore, 1963).  Additionally, the U.S. military monitored North Vietnamese radio 
and press in order to provide intelligence reports to commanders. 
While the practical applicability of OSINT originated in WWII and has been used 
as a major source of intelligence in every conflict since, as well as peacetime, open 
source information increases expeditiously as technology advances.  In today’s global 
environment, an analyst can access open source information with greater ease and with 
very little cost to the government or organization.  According to Mercado (2004), 
advances in technology catapulted the value of OSINT, which subsequently transformed 
threat assessments pertaining to terrorism. 
Since OSINT incorporates unclassified information, it often can be timely and 
highlight current global issues.  According to Mercado (2007), collecting intelligence 
over the years changed dramatically given advances in commerce and technology.  
Moreover, Fairclough (2004) concluded OSINT might be more helpful when making 
assessments on closed societies or organizations.  For example, ISIS communicates 
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ideological concerns, priorities, and significant personnel changes on websites and 
through its sponsored publications that allows analysts greater coverage of exploitable 
data than if ISIS did not make such information public.  As such, the advent of the 
Internet allows access to extremists’ websites, international press, satellite photography, 
and commercial databases and tools accessible to organizations that produce defense 
assessments that rely solely on publicly available information (Weimann, 2004). 
According to Robert Steele, head of the Open Source Solutions Network INC, 
“Everything we needed to know to prevent 9/11 was either known to elements of the U.S. 
Government but, not shared across agency boundaries, or openly published in foreign 
language media we chose to ignore” (as cited in Vlahos, 2005, para. 3).  As quality 
OSINT includes the absorption of value-added data, it involves foreign sources of 
publicly available information.  Moshirnia (2013) concluded that failure to monitor 
foreign production of terrorism-related publicly available information would be 
detrimental to the safety of citizens worldwide.  
Since 9/11, new methods of information gathering have changed the way 
professional and scholarly practices use OSINT.  According to Benavides (2011), 
scholarly organizations use OSINT to collect, process, integrate, and share in order to 
analyze social behavior and trends, to include terrorism-related issues.  OSINT helps 
defense analysts and academics understand the global threat environment and assists in 
predicting transnational threats which could allow security and intelligence organizations 
to address potential terrorism trends (Smith, 1989).  It is estimated that OSINT has the 
potential to provide up to 80 to 95 percent of information that can be utilized by the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (Pallaris, 2008).  For example, the U.S. Senate Select Committee 
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(2012), when reviewing the attack in 2012 on U.S. facilities in Libya, concluded “the 
intelligence community failed to emphasize on collection intelligence and ignored open 
source information from social media and blog posts by Libyan nationals, that could have 
warned the potential security threats to the U.S. facilities” (p. 2). 
As it pertains to countering transnational terrorism, the use of OSINT in trend and 
predictive analysis may reduce the overreliance of classified information.  This would 
allow for a wider distribution of threat information. However, much of the quality of 
analysis derived from OSINT is a result of incorporating quality data into the analysis, as 
well as applying valid analytical techniques when analyzing the data.  According to 
Martin (2014), there is usually a significant amount of misinformation and invalid data 
that must be sifted through before quality data is discovered.  For example, the Internet 
allows for anyone with access to post information and there is no regulation over content 
accuracy.  Content inaccuracy can potentially cause misinformation which can 
subsequently result in assessments that are rooted in false information.  However, 
analysts and academics that rely on OSINT in defense assessments can reduce such 
concerns by determining the reliability of the sources by comparing the different 
resources and data.  
The evolution of the Internet allows agencies and organizations not cleared for 
classified information to make security assessments.  According to Pallaris (2008), there 
are a wide range of tools that non-intelligence agencies can utilize that assists in 
collecting, analyzing, and distributing its findings.  To assist and focus the effort, 
organizations that base analysis off of OSINT would benefit from forming a research 
question prior to collecting the publicly available information to reduce the time required 
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to sift through the data and to incorporate the correct data sets (Holland, 2013).  It is 
important to note that OSINT does not include illegal information such as leaks of 
classified information or proprietary information. The use and analysis of OSINT does 
not require special government permission.  Many non-government organizations are 
considered superior regarding their resources and capabilities for providing defense 
assessments based on OSINT, thus contributing to national security (Pallaris, 2008).  
Summary and Conclusions 
In 2014, ISIS burst on the international stage when it seized large amounts of 
territory in Iraq and Syria.  Moreover, in June 2014, ISIS declared the establishment of a 
caliphate and commanded Muslims worldwide to swear allegiance to its leader Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi and for supporters to travel to its controlled territory.  In addition to 
recruiting tens of thousands (estimates as high as 32,000) of foreign fighters to ISIS-held 
territory, the group also instructed other jihadist groups globally to accept its supreme 
authority.  In all, over 60 jihadist groups worldwide pledged allegiance to ISIS and has 
operational branches in an estimated 18 countries (Senate Armed Services Committee 
Hearing, 2015).  Moreover, ISIS focused on inspiring lone actor attacks and planning and 
conducting attacks against the West.  Such an approach was designed to garner attention 
to its cause and publicly demonstrate its resilience in the face of Western military action.   
Some experts argue the increase in frequency of attacks is a direct reflection of 
ISIS losing territory in Iraq and Syria (Watkins, 2016).  However, other experts dismiss 
that theory and argue that ISIS modified its tactics in response to new security obstacles 
and has been working for years to cultivate such attacks.  According to Hoffman (2016), 
ISIS has “put in place an infrastructure across Europe to facilitate the movement of 
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people to and from Iraq and Syria, but also to provide a bedrock of both inspirational and 
operational support for terror attacks” (para. 8).  In addition to coordinated attacks, 
ISIS—through its media and propaganda outlets—inspired hundreds of lone actor attacks 
outside of Iraq and Syria.  In an effort to understand ISIS’s transnational terrorism 
approach, the writings of al-Suri possibly reveal a blueprint on how the group strategized 
and encouraged the types of attacks that would bring it the most success.  
Chapter 2 included the literature search strategy, the research application of 
asymmetric conflict theory (theoretical foundation), a brief background on transnational 
terrorism, Salafi jihadism, ISIS, Musab al-Suri, as well as literature on ISIS propaganda 
and its use of the internet.  Moreover, it explored ISIS's commitment to attacking the 
West and the importance of publicly available information in making terrorism-related 
assessments.  Chapter 3 will include the research methodology and design, rational for 
instrumentation and data collection, role of the researcher, data storage, verification of 
data, and address ethical considerations.  Chapter 4 will include data collection, data 
analysis, results, and summary.  Chapter 5 will include the explanation of findings, the 
limitations of the research, recommendations for follow-on research, implications, 
potential social change impact, and conclusion.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, jihadism evolved and terrorism became a 
global issue, with a significant amount of attacks directed against the West.  While 
Islamic transnational terrorism is not a new phenomenon, ISIS emerged and developed a 
transnational terrorism agenda outside of Iraq and Syria, evidenced by the attacks in 
France, Belgium and several other Western countries (Europol, 2016).  Regardless of the 
fate of ISIS, the organization challenges traditional methods of terrorism, leaving many 
countries extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks.   
In an attempt to understand the evolution of terrorism, specifically ISIS’s 
potential impact on Islamic transnational terrorism, this exploratory qualitative case study 
examined an asymmetric conflict between ISIS and the West from June 2014 to June 
2017.  June 2014 is significant as that is when ISIS declared its caliphate.  The decision 
to focus on attacks against the West was due to unprecedented amount of ISIS-related 
attacks that occurred against the West from 2014 to 2017.  The results of this study 
provide defense policymakers additional data on the potential short-term and long-term 
counterterrorism ramifications resulting from ISIS’s impact on transnational terrorism.  
The focus of Chapter 3 is centered on the research design and methods used for 
the study.  This chapter is organized into the following sections: introduction, research 
questions, research design and rationale, role of the researcher, methodology, issues of 
trustworthiness, ethical considerations, permission, data storage, and a summary. 
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Research Questions 
In order to explore and examine the impact of ISIS’s transnational terrorism 
approach, I addressed one central question:  How has ISIS potentially shaped the future 
of Islamic transnational terrorism?  Additionally, in order to fully answer the research 
question, the research answered the following subquestions: 
SQ1: How is the nature of the threat from ISIS different than other threats from Islamic 
terrorist groups in the past? 
SQ2: Is ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach innovative?  If so, how? 
SQ3: Will other designated terrorist groups learn from ISIS’s transnational approach and 
adopt similar modus operandi against the West?  If so, how?  
SQ4: What is ISIS’s long-term impact on Islamic transnational terrorism? 
Research Design and Rationale 
To answer the research question, it was deemed appropriate to use a qualitative 
case study method that was exploratory in nature.  Qualitative research permits the 
researcher to investigate the phenomenon of interest in effort to describe, clarify, and 
provide descriptive analysis about said phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). Additionally, a 
qualitative approach allows for an examination (bounded by time and location) of 
knowledge through exploring, understanding, and explaining expert perspectives on how 
ISIS potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  Before selecting the 
qualitative method, I considered other research methodologies such as the quantitative 
and mixed methods approach.  However, after reviewing those methodologies, I 
concluded a qualitative study was the appropriate method to answer the research 
questions as it allowed for a more nuanced and complex understanding of the 
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phenomenon.  A quantitative or mixed-methods research approach was deemed 
inappropriate because of a lack of available quantifiable data, which would have limited 
the exploratory nature of the study. 
I reviewed the five main qualitative approaches (phenomenology, grounded 
theory, ethnography, case study, and narrative) and determined a case study research 
design was appropriate.  The case study approach allowed for an exhaustive description 
of the issue using comprehensive sources of data.  According to Yin (2003), “evidence 
for case studies may come from six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts.  An investigator must 
know how to use these six sources, which call for knowing different methodological 
procedures” (p. 83).  Moreover, a case study required me to provide detailed analysis on 
the case and its setting.   
This study was considered exploratory in nature due to the lack of data related to 
the research question.  This allowed for an exhaustive collection of data that were used 
for extensive analysis while including information from participant interviews, 
questionnaires, and literature that provide external factors related to the research topic. 
The exploratory case study approach allows researchers to present a complete depiction 
of the research topic and research questions (Strauss & Corbin, 2008).  Additionally, 
exploratory research is an effective way for building a foundation for further research 
studies on the phenomenon of interest.  
Role of the Researcher and Bias 
I was fundamental in the qualitative data collection process and subsequent 
analysis.  According to Creswell (2012), the researcher is often the main data collection 
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instrument in qualitative research.  I had direct contact with the research participants 
during the process, which included face-to-face interviews and email questionnaires.  All 
research participants were presented with the same questions.  I was responsible for 
transcribing, coding, analyzing, and interpreting the data.   
I have experience working within the intelligence community, which had the 
potential to create bias if proper steps were not taken.  To eliminate any bias associated 
with this study, I ensured data collection and interpretation was relative to the research 
questions, and provided a transparent audit trail, including the reasoning in 
methodological and analytical decisions.  I took appropriate steps to eliminate bias and to 
safeguard the study so personal views or opinions did not adversely influence the study.  
For example, research participants were able to review the transcripts from his/her 
interview to ensure my interpretations were representative of their perspective.  
Additionally, I used other reputable sources of data (triangulation) related to the research 
questions and my interpretations of the data, and such sources supported my 
interpretations.  If I would have identified bias that I could not have adequately 
eliminated, I would have sought guidance from the dissertation committee.  Moreover, 
the dissertation committee had oversight on the study and would have assisted should 
they have concluded any bias into the study.   
Methodology 
This section is organized using the following subsections: participant selection 
and recruitment, instrumentation and data collection, and data analysis plan.  Adequate 
depth will be provided in order for other researchers to replicate the study. 
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Participant Selection and Recruitment 
This study used a qualitative case study approach and the target population for the 
research were experts on Islamic terrorism within the defense enterprise, private 
organizations, and academia, which allowed for thorough and diverse perspectives.  
Research participants were identified using purposive sampling.  According to Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), when conducting purposive sampling, a “researcher 
[must] use their subjective judgment and attempt to select sampling units that appear to 
be representative of the population” (p. 168).  I sent out 35 participation emails (see 
Appendix F) and had conversations with 18 individuals asking for participation in the 
study.  Eighteen individuals originally agreed to participate; however, due to various 
reasons, three individuals canceled their interviews, leaving me with 15 research 
participants.  According to Mason (2010), the sample size is generally small in qualitative 
studies when compared to quantitative studies. 
Participants were selected from the fields of academia, private organizations, and 
across the defense enterprise.  This allowed for perspectives from a range of experts who 
have studied, taught, investigated, or authored papers on Islamic transnational terrorism.  
Data collection concluded when new data did not contribute additional insight on the 
phenomenon under investigation, also known as saturation (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  
Bernard (2012) said there is not a specific number of interviews that need to be 
conducted in qualitative research for data saturation to occur.  Rather, the researcher 
needs to be consistent with the interview questions and questionnaires by asking the 
research participants the same questions.   
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I gained access to the research participants by using the connections made while 
working in support of the defense enterprise.  As previously stated, the goal of this 
research was to explore, understand, and explain expert perspectives on how ISIS has 
potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  The research participants 
were selected based on their expertise on Islamic terrorism and security-related issues.  
The research participants were able to provide an assessment on the kind of threat the 
West faces in the years to come from Islamic terrorism. 
 As stated, I recruited potential research participants by sending an introductory 
email message for whom I had an email address, as well as face-to-face conversations.  
The email contained the following information: the purpose of the research, the options 
for participating in the study, my contact information, and an attached research consent 
form.  If the participant agreed to participant in the research, he or she was asked to 
electronically sign and return the consent form.  A complete examination of the consent 
form is found later on in this chapter.   
Instrumentation and Data Collection 
Some of the potential research participants were located worldwide, so I used the 
option of email interviewing as well as face-to-face in-depth semistructured interviews.  
Individuals participating by email were emailed a questionnaire to complete and asked to 
email the questionnaire back to me.  According to Creswell (2012), open-ended 
questionnaires are an appropriate means to collect qualitative data from participants who 
are unable to be interviewed because of geographic constraints.  Individuals that 
participated in email questionnaires were informed the questionnaires would take 
approximately 45 minutes to complete.  Individuals participating in face-to-face 
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semistructured interviews were informed the interview will take approximately 45 
minutes and would be audio recorded.  The interviews took place in a location the 
participant felt comfortable and away from distractions. 
Interviews.  One method often employed in qualitative research is the use of 
interviews (Merriam, 2009).  Interviewing can take many forms, so it is important a 
researcher employs an appropriate interview technique that will allow for an examination 
of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013).  Therefore, I selected the use of semistructured 
interviews using open-ended questions as my interviewing technique.  According to 
Merriam (2009), a semistructured interview allows the researcher to ask predetermined 
questions that are flexible in the wording while working within an interview protocol.  
The use of semistructured interviews allows for further inquiry regarding the participant’s 
response.  In order to ensure semistructured interview data is accurate for analysis, I 
considered the following key points throughout the interview: 
• avoid dominating the conversation 
• don’t ask open-ended questions that are too restrictive and avoid yes/no 
responses 
• try and keep participant’s focus on the research questions while still 
allowing flexibility in their responses 
• keep-in-mind there are no right or wrong answers and avoid presenting a 
question with bias 
• if the researcher does not fully understand the response, ask the participant 
additional questions about his or her response to aid in subsequent analysis 
of the data (Adams & Cox, 2008). 
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 I used appropriate interview protocols (see Appendix G) and estimated the 
interviews would take approximately 30 minutes.  Specifically, I reviewed the informed 
consent form with the participant and obtained permission to record the interview.  
Moreover, I asked foundational and demographic questions that will be provided in the 
analysis in chapter 4.  As the interview concluded, I asked permission to contact the 
participant again if needed to provide clarification or further insight into his or her 
responses.  Additionally, I provided the research participants my contact information 
should questions arise after the interview.  At the conclusion of the interview, I placed the 
recording device, consent form, and notes in a locked case until the time I could convert 
them to a computer for storage.  Merriam (2009) concludes audio recordings of 
interviews should be transcribed to written documents.  Therefore, I transcribed all audio 
interviews into Microsoft Word documents, saved on a password-protected computer. 
Open-ended questionnaires.  Research participants were recruited from a global 
geographic area so in addition to face-to-face interviews, I conducted email interviewing 
using open-ended questionnaires (see Appendix H for interview questions and example 
questionnaire).  According to Creswell (2013), qualitative research can be conducted with 
open-ended questionnaires.  Therefore, this research incorporated in-depth questionnaires 
with open-ended questions delivered via email to participants.  According to Meho 
(2006), email interviewing is a viable option when face-to-face interviewing is difficult 
because of geographic location or the participant is not easily accessible.  Email 
interviewing using questionnaires afforded the research participant time to think about 
the question that could provide more insight into the phenomena being researched.  
Moreover, the use of questionnaires allowed for a relaxed outlet for the participant, who 
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may otherwise be uncomfortable answering the question in a more formal setting.  I 
estimated the questionnaire would take the research participant approximately 30 minutes 
to complete.  
 Email interviewing is not without fault and I acknowledged the limitations.  In 
particular, email interviewing does not allow for direct probing and can lead to the 
misinterpretation of the questions, meaning that the respondent must select a provided 
answer and, in most cases, not have the ability to clarify any questions about the research 
question, which can alter the response of the participant (Meho, 2006).  However, the use 
of open-ended questions allowed the participant the flexibility to respond to the question 
based on his or her interpretation of the research question.  Additionally, I was not there 
to answer inquiries about certain questions or responses immediately; however, I could 
be reached via telephonically or email to clarify questions should they have arose.  In 
order to alleviate concerns and limitations regarding the research questions, the questions 
(for the interview and questionnaire) were based on the analysis of literature and 
modified until I was comfortable the questions were reliable and provided valid data.  
This provided the opportunity to rephrase, refine, and clarify the questions prior to using 
in the main study, increasing the reliability and validity of the research instrument 
(Dikko, 2016). 
Data Analysis Plan 
According to Stake (1995) and supported by Creswell (1998), a case study needs 
to be grounded in: 1) detailed description, 2) categorical aggregation, 3) direct 
interpretation, 4) pattern matching, and 5) naturalistic generation.  This study used face-
to-face interviews, as well as email questionnaires in order to obtain the data needed for 
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analysis related to the central research question and sub-questions.  This study involved 
systematic procedures to assist with the accurate interpretation of data, to include the 
identification of trends, themes, and conclusions in order to ensure the trustworthiness of 
the findings.  
NVivo 11 software was used to compile and analyze the data for word themes and 
trends.  NVivo 11 software allows Portable Document Formats, Microsoft Word 
documents, spreadsheets to be uploaded (and exported) for ease of organization, 
categorization, and coding.  The data was categorized using open coding.  The open 
coding method was selected since it allowed for more flexibility and for the opportunity 
to gain information not previously researched.  Moreover, open coding allowed themes to 
be identified from raw data without restraints (Thomas, 2006).  Coding enabled me to 
segregate and group the data in order to understand meaning and explanation (Saldana, 
2012). According to Bushaand Harter (2008), a researcher must be consistent in the 
coding and recoding of data over the course of research to safeguard the study’s 
reliability. Therefore, in order to establish intracoder responsibility, I assured the coding 
of data was consistent and accurate to ensure reliable thematic analysis, which provided 
validity to the study. In order to assist with the coding process and subsequent thematic 
analysis, I adhered to the Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six phases of coding:  
• Phase 1: The familiarization of collected data 
• Phase 2: Generating the initial codes  
• Phase 3: Searching for themes 
• Phase 4: Reviewing the themes 
• Phase 5: Defining and naming the themes 
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• Phase 6: Producing the report (p. 16-23). 
Familiarization of the data permitted me to code based on data relevant to the 
central research question and sub-questions.  Once the data was coded and entered in 
NVivo 11, I identified themes (phase 3).  This study involved thematic analysis, which 
required examination and interpretation, so I could elicit meaning and gain an 
understanding of the data in order to develop empirical knowledge (Braun & Clark, 
2006).  Moreover, thematic analysis was useful in capturing subtle meanings within a 
data set that can be used to explore a phenomenon.  The themes or patterns that emerged 
were then used for analysis (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012).  While thematic 
analysis is flexible, it did allow for an accurate analysis of data (Braun & Clark, 2006).  
When using thematic analysis, a researcher must give consideration to the relationships 
between themes using either a deductive or an inductive approach to analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006).  This research incorporated an inductive approach to thematic analysis 
which allowed for inferences from a collection of data related to the research question 
and phenomenon.   
 Consistent with data analysis that is inductive by nature, themes were developed 
by continually reading and studying the concepts presented in the interviews and 
questionnaires from experts on Islamic terrorism.  Once the themes were identified, I was 
able to add a second layer of analysis to find trends and patterns.  When no new themes 
emerge, I surmised all major themes were identified (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  
Additionally, software such as Microsoft Excel was used to create tables and graphical 
mapping to aid in describing trends and themes that resulted from the collected data. 
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Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness (also known as reliability and validity) is important to ensure the 
highest standards of integrity, accuracy, and quality within a qualitative research project.  
According to Lincoln and Guba (1990), trustworthiness refers to the truthfulness and 
accuracy of the research findings and conclusions.  Moreover, I achieved research 
trustworthiness by establishing credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1990). 
Credibility 
Credibility, often synonymous with internal validity, refers to the study's findings 
and conclusions to be truthful or agreeable with reality (Shenton, 2004).  While there are 
several methods used to establish credibility such as persistent observation, peer 
debriefing, prolonged engagement and member checking, this study employed 
triangulation (Jeanfreau & Jack, 2010).  Triangulation involved data collected from 
multiple sources and studies conducted by other researchers specific to ISIS (Yin, 2012).  
Specifically, I compared secondary source information related to the central research 
question and sub-questions and examined the commonalities and differences in the 
findings.  Comparison of such data aided in triangulation, a strategy to verify accuracy of 
the research findings (Elo & Kyngas, 2008).  Secondary data sources consisted of 
scholarly journals articles, publicly available data from reputable think tanks and 
intelligence/security organizations, biographical content related to ISIS leadership and 
organizational structure, case studies on ISIS attacks, and government sources and 
testimony related to research questions.  The use of secondary resources is a reliable 
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method to investigate a phenomenon and assist with triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994). 
Transferability 
Transferability, often referred to as external validity, pertains to the extent to 
which the research findings can be applicable in other contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1990).  
In an attempt to achieve transferability, this study used a technique known as thick 
description.  According to Merriam (2009), thick description involves describing a 
phenomenon, as well as the research setting and participants (while protecting 
anonymity) in enough detail that should allow a researcher to judge the extent to which 
research findings and conclusions are applicable to other cases.  Additionally, thick 
description is a way of achieving external validity. 
Dependability 
Dependability, regularly referred to as reliability in research, requires the 
researcher to conduct the study in a manner the findings are consistent and repeatable; 
however, the findings may not always be the same (Creswell, 2013).  This study 
established dependability through the use of audit trails by way of documentation about 
all elements of the research (Rodgers, 2008).  Specifically, documentation consisted of 
detailed transcriptions of the audio recordings from the interviews and the participants' 
email responses to the questionnaire.  Therefore, a researcher not involved in the study 
can examine the process and transcripts to evaluate interpretations and accuracy 
(Creswell, 2013). 
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Conformability 
Conformability is often referred to as objectivity in research.  According to 
Malterud (2001), conformability pertains to the extent to which the research findings and 
conclusions are shaped by research participants and not the researcher's bias or interest.  I 
expressed all biases at the beginning of the research study.  Reflexivity and audit trails 
are two methods of establishing conformability.  This research used a transparent audit 
trail that included a description of all the steps taken from when the research began to the 
conclusion of the study, to include data collection, data analysis, and data interpretation.  
As previously stated, I took appropriate steps to eliminate bias within the study. 
Ethical Considerations 
As ethics are an important part of a research study, research ethics must be 
considered across all stages of the research process.  It is essential that a researcher 
considers and identifies what ethical issues might arise during study. Research ethics are 
defined as “the application of moral standards to decisions made in planning, conducting, 
and reporting the results of research studies” (McNabb, 2008, p. 20).  Not only are 
research ethics significant to the accuracy of the study, they assist in safeguarding the 
research participants against harm.  In order to ensure ethical guidelines while conducing 
this research study, I adhered to the following ethical principles of research created by 
American Psychological Association (2016): Beneficence and Nonmaleficence, Fidelity 
and Responsibility, Integrity, Justice, and Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity. 
I completed the National Institutes of Health (NIH) training to ensure the ethical 
protection of human research participants and adhered to all NIH and Walden University 
IRB guidelines regarding the use of human research participants (certificate number 
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2592255).  For example, the purpose of the study and data collection methods were fully 
explained to the research participants.  Moreover, I preserved the anonymity of the 
participants and did not include the names in the study.  The research participants were 
only identified with participant ID codes, job title, and years of experience.  The 
confidentiality of the research participants is imperative to ensure the research 
participants answer the questions freely regarding their perspective on the respective 
question.  As previously stated, the research participants were asked to sign a consent 
form.  Specifically, the informed consent form included the purpose and procedures of 
the research and a statement the research was voluntary.  Moreover, the statement 
included that the participant could decline the invite to participate and withdraw from the 
study at any time and there was no monetary compensation for participation.  The 
participant was guaranteed confidentiality and provided instructions and contact 
information should the participant have questions regarding the research and his/her 
rights as a research participant.  Furthermore, the statement included instructions for 
submitting the research consent form, the option to participate either through the use of 
an email questionnaire or face-to-face interviews, and a statement informing the research 
participant the need to retain the consent form for his/her records.  Lastly, the form 
contained a statement that participation in the study could lead to positive social change. 
Permission 
All research participants were asked to sign a consent form.  The potential 
research participant could consent to participation in one of two ways.  First, the potential 
participant could sign the consent form and email the signed consent form back to me.  
The second option the participant had was to send me an email indicating consent.  After 
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I received the consent from the research participant, each participant was contacted by 
phone or email to set-up an interview.  This is when I determined the feasibility of a face-
to-face interview or if an email questionnaire was more appropriate. I adhered to Walden 
University’s International Review Board (IRB) ethical research standards set forth by the 
APA, the NIH and Walden University, and any applicable U.S. federal regulations.  
Walden University’s IRB provided an additional layer of protection to ensure the study 
meets the highest standards of ethical research practices, while safeguarding the research 
participants.  The IRB approval number for this study is 001-612-312-1210. 
Data Storage 
The collected data was stored electronically on a password-encrypted computer in 
a secured area.  I was the only individual that knew the password to the computer.  I 
adhered to the following principles outlined by Creswell (2013): all data was backed-up 
electronically by a password-encrypted external hard drive, a master list of the types of 
information gathered was developed, the protection the anonymity of the data by masking 
the research participant’s name in the data was completed, and I developed a data 
collection file structure that assisted in locating files relevant to the study.  All the 
research documentation was maintained on a password-encrypted computer and external 
hard drive for five years to comply with auditing protocols. 
Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of the research design that was implemented 
for the study, to include the methodology that was employed.  Additionally, the chapter 
provided the reason why a qualitative exploratory case study was appropriate, the 
research questions, an outline of the processes used for participant recruitment, data 
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collection, analysis, and storage, along with the methods utilized to ensure the highest 
standards of data trustworthiness.  Chapter 4 will provide additional detail on the data 
collection procedures and evidence of trustworthiness, in addition to the research results.  
Chapter 5 will discuss the findings as they relate to the literature and recommend 
additional research that could be conducted relevant to the central research question.  
Moreover, chapter 5 will provide the implications for positive social change resulting 
from this study.  
75 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
This study bridged the gap in knowledge by examining the perspectives of 15 
American counterterrorism experts within the defense enterprise regarding how ISIS has 
potentially shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  Chapter 4 presents the 
data, data analysis, and findings related to the central research question and subquestions.  
The central research question explored how ISIS has potentially shaped the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism.  Additionally, supporting subquestions were examined 
and centered on how ISIS is different from other Islamic terrorist groups, ISIS’s 
innovation, other designated terrorist groups learning from ISIS’s modus operandi, as 
well as ISIS’s long-term impact on Islamic transnational terrorism.  Data were collected 
for this study through 12 face-to-face semistructured interviews, two telephonic 
semistructured interviews, and one questionnaire.  Chapter 4 presents the research setting, 
demographics, data collection, data analysis and findings, evidence of trustworthiness, 
and a summary. 
Setting 
Research participants were identified using purposive sampling and data were 
collected using face-to-face semistructured interviews, semistructured telephonic 
interviews, and an open-ended questionnaire for a total of 15 experts who have studied, 
taught, investigated, or authored papers on Islamic transnational terrorism.  All 
15 research participants were U.S. citizens.  The 12 face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in a location and at a time that was convenient for the research 
participants.  The two telephonic interviews took place at a time that was convenient for 
76 
 
 
 
participants and were conducted using Skype.  One participant selected to answer an 
open-ended questionnaire and returned the questionnaire via email.  Of note, at the time 
of this study, I resided overseas.  There were no conditions that influenced participation 
in the study or influenced the interpretation of the data and subsequent findings. 
Demographics 
From the 53 experts who were contacted, 18 initially agreed to 
participate.  However, on followup, three were unable to participate for various reasons, 
including moving and traveling for work.  Therefore, a total of 15 individuals participated 
in the study.  The 15 participants were experts on Islamic transnational terrorism.  The 
research participants included 13 males and two females.  All 15 research participants 
were U.S. citizens; 11 resided overseas and four resided in the United States.  Participants 
worked in the fields of law enforcement, homeland security, the intelligence 
community, and academia.  The research participants’ differing backgrounds allowed for 
thorough and diverse perspectives (see Appendix I).   
Data Collection 
Fifteen experts on Islamic transnational terrorism within the defense enterprise, 
private organizations, and academia participated in the study.  Based on research 
participants’ availability and location, 12 individuals participated in face-to-face 
semistructured interviews, two participated through telephonic semistructured interviews, 
and one participated by answering an open-ended questionnaire.  All telephonic and face-
to-face interviews were audiotaped, allowing for subsequent transcription, and lasted 
approximately 20 to 35 minutes. The one individual who selected to participate using the 
questionnaire emailed me the completed questionnaire. After each interview, I 
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transcribed the recorded interview into a Microsoft Word document. Once all 
transcriptions were complete, I imported the transcriptions into NVivo 11 to assist with 
data organization and analysis. Third parties were not present during any of the 
interviews. Moreover, research participants were assured no identifying information 
would be included in the study and their identities would remain confidential.  All 
interview recordings and transcriptions along with participant biographical data were 
saved on a password-encrypted computer. 
Data Analysis and Findings 
In this case study, the collection of data and subsequent analysis was critical in 
addressing the central research questions and subquestions.  The results present each 
major theme, along with important experiences regarding the central research question 
and subquestions.  Both major themes and important experiences were supported by 
direct passages from the research participants.  The following section is organized 
by thematic analysis and findings. 
Thematic Analysis 
Braun and Clarke’s six-phase process for thematic analysis was used.  Braun and 
Clarke'’s (2006) six-phase process included: familiarization of collected data (phase 1), 
generative the initial codes (phase 2), searched for themes (phase 3), reviewing the 
themes (phase 4), defining and naming the themes (phase 5), and producing the report 
(phase 6) (p. 16-23). According to Braun and Clarke (2006), the first step in thematic 
analysis is getting familiar with the data.  The objective of this step is for the researcher 
to have in-depth working knowledge of the collected data.  During this phase, I immersed 
myself in the data, searching for patterns and meanings.  Additionally, this step involved 
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the transcription of the research participant interviews.  I performed this step and 
transcribed all interview data into Microsoft Word documents.  This step also allowed me 
to become familiar with the data as I started to search for meanings after reading and 
rereading the data several times. 
Braun and Clarke’s second phase in thematic analysis is the generation of initial 
codes.  After I completed step one, I was familiar enough with the data and produced 
initial codes as this step was vital to subsequent data analysis.  I organized the data into 
meaningful groups using NVivo 11. The codes were data-driven and entered manually 
(tagged and highlighted) into NVivo 11 to assist with organization.  At this point, I 
selected to code for as many themes and patterns as possible to assist with Braun and 
Clarke’s phase three (searching for themes) of thematic analysis (see Appendix J). 
The third phase in Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis process is searching for 
themes and is to be initiated once all data has been initially coded.  I began looking and 
generating broader themes during this phase by organizing the codes into tentative 
themes.  Specifically, I analyzed the codes and combined relevant codes in order to form 
overarching themes.  This process allowed me to generate both main themes and 
subthemes. 
Phase four of Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis process is reviewing the 
themes generated in phase three.  This phase allowed me to eliminate initial themes that 
the data did not support.  Moreover, I was able to combine separate themes into one 
theme in addition to breaking down an initial main theme into subthemes in order to 
provide meaningful analysis (see Appendix K).  I made sure the themes were clearly 
identified and there were distinctions amongst the themes.  The first step involved 
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reviewing the initial coded extracts to identify a coherent pattern and ensure the data 
supported the candidate themes.  The second step involved scrutinizing the candidate 
themes individually across the data set and ensuring that the themes correctly echo the 
meanings noticeable with the data set at large.  While limited recoding was needed, I was 
able to identify the main themes, how they integrated with other themes, and an overall 
initial assessment at the conclusion of this phase. 
Braun and Clarke’s fifth stage in the thematic analysis process is clearly defining 
and labeling the identified themes.  During this phase, I refined the themes in order to 
prepare for analysis.  Specifically, for each theme, I wrote a detailed analysis, while 
considering the broader research question and subquestions.  This also allowed for the 
elimination and subsequent refining of overlapping themes, as well as the creation of 
subthemes.  I also finalized the theme and subtheme titles during this phase. 
Braun and Clarke's (2006) final phase in the thematic analysis process is 
producing the report.  During this phase, I authored a concise and logical write-up of the 
data and analysis, and provided relevant data extracts to support the named themes and 
sub-themes.  The data extracts provided examples and supported my analysis without 
convoluting the analytical narrative.  Moreover, this phase allowed for final analysis and 
I was able to relate the analysis with the central research question, subquestions, and 
literature. 
Findings 
This section is organized by SQ1, SQ2, SQ3, and SQ4, followed by the central 
research question. 
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SQ1: How was the nature of the threat from ISIS different from Islamic terrorist 
groups in the past?   
Theme 1. ISIS has leveraged social media to empower supporters outside of Iraq 
and Syria to conduct external operations without direct guidance from leadership. 
The first major theme that materialized from subquestion 1 on how the threat 
from ISIS was different from other Islamic terrorist groups in the past indicated ISIS, 
unlike no other previous terror organization, leveraged social media and Internet open 
forums to empower supporters outside of the conflict zones to conduct attacks and 
operations without direct guidance from ISIS leadership.  Specifically, ISIS used social 
media to publicly announce attack strategy while inspiring home-grown violent 
extremists to take violent action in their own country using simplistic attack methods and 
weapons.  It was deduced from the highest number of occurrences with 14 out of the 15 
total sample population (93%) referencing ISIS’s use of social media differentiates them 
from other terrorist groups and the organization’s use of social media has shaped the 
future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  According to participant 15:  
But post 9/11, the US, UK and the rest of Europe clamped down, empowering, 
using social media and those types of tactics gave ISIS more reach I guess into the 
places where security was much tighter.  And they couldn’t smuggle in people 
that have been in training camps.  So, the way to do it was to empower and 
radicalize (personal communication, September 25, 2018). 
Participate 13 stated social media was vital in the recruitment of younger 
supporters and did not require ISIS to devote a significant amount of resources to 
transnational attacks:  
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Social media obviously, and having a younger cadre, they were able to do that 
fairly rapidly.  Like any terrorist group, the actual attacks were not sophisticated 
in that it didn’t have to devote a lot of resources.  From technology and using it, 
they really took advantage on their younger groups to take advantage of the social 
media platforms and technology that was already out there (personal 
communication, July 17, 2018). 
Participant 11 stressed the importance social media had on the recruitment of 
supporters who were rejected by other groups or unable to travel to the conflict zones to 
fight on behalf of ISIS.  Specifically, ISIS authorized anyone willing to take up violence 
on its behalf, tapping into violent disenfranchised individuals.  Participant 12 concluded 
ISIS’s use of social media to attract lone wolves for attacks against the West is how the 
threat from ISIS was different to terrorism threats from the past. 
Second important experience.  The second important experience from SQ1 
indicated the declaration of the caliphate that defined an objective and desired end state 
was vital to foreign fighter recruitment.  It was deduced from the number of occurrences.  
Twelve out of 15 research participants (80%) stated the importance of declaring the 
caliphate, something that could be emulated in the future by a like-minded terrorist 
organization.  As participant 4 highlighted, the declaration of a caliphate was not 
unprecedented; however, ISIS was able to publicize its caliphate worldwide while 
promising riches to supporters.  Participant 9 described the importance of such:   
It becomes attractive.  If you are just saying come fight and you don’t have an end 
goal, I think you wouldn’t get as much traction.  But by saying there is an end 
goal. Hey, the end goal is to control a piece of land and then we get to own it and 
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run it, then you put yourself in a place of power (personal communication, August 
31, 2018). 
Moreover, participant 10 indicated the caliphate identified a clear end-state, which 
gave supporters a tangible objective and end-goal and stated “It also helped reach out to 
disenfranchised individuals that are on the fringe of everything and gave them something 
to look forward to with the promise land” (personal communication, date).  Participant 6 
concluded the ISIS’s declaration of the caliphate was able to sway potential recruits who 
were frustrated with al-Qaida’s perceived lack of operations: 
I do think they was key to maybe people sitting on the fence of ideology.  Almost 
the lack of AQ type operations or actions.  People sitting on the fence that were 
disgruntled, that could relate to what the message was.  And again with territory 
and the actions taking.  They could make that decision and it moved in that 
direction.  I think that was pretty critical to their recruiting message (personal 
communication, September 19, 2018). 
Participant 5 also concluded ISIS’s declaration of the caliphate gave the 
organization an advantage over al-Qaida: 
It gave them the central rod for everyone to follow.  One of the biggest issues 
with AQ is their lack of ability to respond and keep a leader out front since Bin 
Laden went into hiding all those years ago. But having the Caliphate and 
Baghdadi as kind of a focal point as something they could drive people towards.  
The lightning rod for people to follow behind (personal communication, August 
14, 2018). 
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Moreover, in regard to the importance of the caliphate on ISIS recruitment, 
participant 12 stated:  
Tens of thousands of people flooded into Iraq and Syria from all over the world.  
The announcement of the caliphate had a catalyzing effect on the global Sunni 
world, drawing people from just about every nation on earth…ISIS rapidly 
swelled, even though most of the Sunni leadership in Cairo and Mecca, did not 
consider that legitimate.  It was enough to make ISIS a serious force to be 
reckoned with for a short period of time.  There were people who were waiting for 
ages for the caliphate restored and I think there were many other Sunni’s 
worldwide that probably weren’t 100 percent sure it was legitimate or not.  But it 
was enough to excite and energize and spur volunteers for donations.  All of that 
is incredibly hard to track.  Tens of thousands of volunteers and tens of millions 
of dollars flooded into Iraq and Syria.  And if it hadn’t been for the international 
coalition, had a very good chance of taking over Iraq and Syria and moving the 
governance there (personal communication, September 13, 2018).  
SQ2: Was ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach innovative?  If so, how?  This 
section includes theme 2, second important experience, and third important experience. 
Theme 2.  The use of small-scale attacks using simple weapons by single 
attackers will become a more frequent course of action for terrorist organizations.  The 
second major theme that materialized from subquestion 2 regarding the innovation of 
ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach found ISIS shaped the future of transnational 
terrorism by employing or encouraging less sophisticated attacks on symbols of Western 
targets and authorities, requiring less preparation, decreasing the chance of law 
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enforcement or security service interdiction. It was deduced from the highest number of 
occurrences with 12 out of the 15 total sample population (80%) referencing ISIS’s 
external operations strategy as innovative.  According to participant 5 and regarding 
ISIS’s transnational approach: 
It is the most likely attacks going forward.  There will still be plans by guys like 
AQ and larger planning by ISIS or AQAP or whomever for the kind of grander 
9/11, Madrid, London type attacks. But I just think with the ease of access and the 
inability of security services to identify every single one of these guys will make 
lone actor attacks just more common (personal communication, August 14, 2018). 
Participant 4 concluded ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach that encouraged 
lone actor attacks requires very little resources and less operational risks.  Participant 4 
stated: 
It costs them nothing.  Or next to nothing.  They have very little operation risk.  
The risk is focused in on only an individual or maybe a very small group of just a 
few people, so I think it is they wave of the future when it comes to attacks 
outside of a conflict zone.  For all of those reasons, it works.  It is effective.  It is 
cheap. It is low risk.  All of those things. And once they have decided their brand 
is brutality and death, then they have nothing to lose (personal communication, 
August 13, 2018). 
Both participant 6 and participant 9 concluded the lack financial cost associated 
with inspiring lone actors to conduct an attack in their own country will likely be a future 
trend in terrorism as it gainers significant media attention.  Participant 5 stated the biggest 
impact ISIS had on Islamic transnational terrorism is the acceptance of authorizing lone 
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actors to attack on its behalf, using simple attack methods.  Participate 3 noted that the 
lack of attack sophistication serves as a force multiplier: 
So, that is another way they have affected the future.  They are telling people you 
don’t need to know how to build a bomb.  You don’t need to know how to fly a 
plane.  You don’t need to know how to make a chemical or biological substance.  
You just need to be able to drive a car.  So, they have taken it from sophisticated, 
complicated, high impact attacks and driven into the low impact, but lower 
impact, but anyone can do it (personal communication, August 12, 2018). 
Second important experience.  ISIS's ability to author official publications and 
interact with supporters in multiple languages on social media by native speakers allowed 
for international recruitment and operations.  The second important experience that 
emerged from subquestion 2 indicated ISIS's ability to interact with supporters in 
multiple languages by native Western speakers, while authoring publications in multiple 
languages allowed for operational support and international recruitment was considered 
innovative by participants of this study.  This received out 5 out of 15 occurrences (33%) 
from the sample population.  While the concept of terrorist groups posting online 
publications in multiple languages is not exclusive, ISIS took it beyond the traditional 
scope, capitalizing on advancements in social media and technology.  According to 
participant 2:  
Inspire was an English language vehicle, but ISIS with all its foreign fighters is 
able to create a lot of different periodicals, whether this inspired them or not that 
were not only focused in English, but in French, North African dialect Arabic and 
many other languages, German and stuff.  Written by Germans, fluid, native 
86 
 
 
 
language speakers even in Indonesian and stuff like that.  Which resonated, and 
that is part of propaganda is having a native speaker speak to us.  Everyone 
knows, trying propaganda, and trying these nuanced things to motivate people, if 
you don’t have local references, when you are trying to appeal to the global scale, 
but also talking the types of local references in the way they say it in the native 
language, then that is the most attractive way (personal communication, August 
12, 2018). 
Participant 14 stated that online communication in multiple languages was 
innovative and allowed ISIS to spread its message to a wider audience.  Participant 5 
talked about the difference between AQAP and ISIS publications and concluded “even 
the use of language, AQAP was using multiple languages especially English and Arabic, 
but ISIS was able to use a lot of their recruits to develop the multilingual platforms to 
target the different places” (personal communication, August 14, 2018).  Participant 7 
concluded when ISIS started losing ground in Syria and their multi-language media 
decreased, it resulted in less inspired attacks against the West. 
Third important experience.   ISIS’s employment of women and kids in 
recruiting and operational roles may impact the future of Islamic transnational terrorism 
strategy.  According to research participants, ISIS employed a strategy for the recruitment 
of women and for the purpose of online recruitment; however, women have been used in 
operational roles as well.  Moreover, ISIS may capitalize on the children of foreign 
fighters when they return to their home country for future attacks as they face less 
scrutiny.  It was deduced from the number of occurrences with 7 out of the 15 total 
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sample population (47%) referencing ISIS’s external operations strategy using women 
and children as innovative.  Participant 7 stated:  
There are more and more studies that are coming out by people who were 
conducting research inside Syria that are saying that women have this major 
operational impact.  They were acting as recruiters. They were the recruiters.  
They were the ones thinking very strategically and influencing all of this.  So, if 
you think about that, okay, you are going to have, and a lot of them too, especially 
from Europe, saying that is was women pushing the male fighters to go 
fight…you have women and children returning from the war zone, they are under 
a lot less scrutiny, especially, children.  What can you do?  Women are just under 
less scrutiny (personal communication, August 16, 2018).  
Participant 9 and participant 10 concluded ISIS used women and children because 
they undergo less scrutiny by law enforcement and security services.  Participant 3 stated 
she thought it is possible the returnee women would take an operational role as the 
women “went through training.  They know how to operate a suicide vest.  They know 
how to operate weapons” (personal communication, August 12, 2018).  
SQ3: Will other designated terrorist groups learn from ISIS’s transnational 
approach and adopt a similar modus operandi against the West?  This section includes the 
third theme, followed by the second important experience. 
Theme 3. Designated terrorist groups have likely learned from both the successes 
and failures of ISIS's transnational terrorism approach (social media, tactics and 
techniques) and may employ a similar external operations approach. 
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The third major theme that emerged from subquestion 3 on terrorist group 
learning revealed that like-minded terrorist groups may emulate ISIS as it pertains to 
ISIS’s use of social media and its transnational attack approach (inspiring lone actor 
actors using simple methods).  This received the 13 out of 15 occurrences (87%) from the 
sample population.  Participant 4 expects newly formed groups to possibly adopt ISIS’s 
transnational attack approach but warned such as approach comes with strategic risks to 
the groups.  Additionally, participant 3 concluded: 
Killing seven people in New York City is a win for them.  It is not 3,000 people 
and two major buildings coming down.  But it is still a win.  So, they are willing 
to take quantity over quality, I think.  And I think other groups are watching what 
they do, and they realize once you have that increase in operational tempo, which 
is attack after attack after attack, or attempt and attempt after attempt.  It doesn’t 
matter how successful you are.  You are a) having attacks and projecting power 
externally, but b) you are getting all this media attention, so your brand starts to 
build.  And when you build a brand like that, you have all the people watching 
and every time there is an attempt or an attack, somebody with a like mind for 
whatever reason takes notice.  And they then have that precedent. So, hey that guy 
did that attack with that car, I can do that too.  So, it starts to build itself.  So, I 
think that is another way which they are affecting the future of terrorism (personal 
communication, August 12, 2018). 
Additionally, research indicated that ISIS’s use of the internet (mainly social 
media) will be emulated by other terrorist organizations.  Participant 6 concluded using 
multi social media platforms and communicating in multiple languages with supporters 
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will be adopted by like-minded groups.  Participate 11 stated ISIS’s use of Internet open 
forums will be a lesson learned by other terrorist groups (as opposed to password 
protected forums) and such will be implemented by other groups in the future.  Moreover 
participate 3 concluded the use of open forums is an example of one thing ISIS learned 
from al-Qaida, where al-Qaida typically operated in password protected forums, limiting 
its audience.  
Second important experience. Al-Qaida will not follow a similar model 
transnational terrorism approach, deduced from the comments of 9 out of the 15 research 
participants (60%).  Participate 9 concluded: 
I think AQ’s model has always been and will always be a longer trajectory where 
it is win the hearts and minds of the people slowly adapt them into your version of 
sharia law, your understanding of Islamic texts.  And, you know, I feel like AQ 
does attacks and they promote attacks against the West, they are also much 
focused on local operations and getting people to adhere to what they believe in. I 
don’t think AQ will follow the same ISIS model and I do think they will learn 
from it (personal communication, August 31, 2018). 
Participant 3 stated that al-Qaida charts is own course and may take on some of 
ISIS’s ideas.  However, al-Qaida likes to control its global message, brand, and methods 
of attacks more than ISIS has demonstrated.  Moreover, participant 5 commented about 
al-Qaida wanting to control its narrative:                               
I would not expect somebody like AQ be willing to take on more of the allowing 
some guy to do an attack in their name.  Which is something they have always 
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wanted and to control the message of their attacks much more closely than ISIS 
has (personal communication, August 14, 2018). 
SQ4: What is ISIS’s long-term impact on Islamic transnational terrorism?  This 
section includes the 4th theme, the second important experience, and the third important 
experience. 
Theme 4.  ISIS will survive as transnational terrorist group in the virtual world 
and continue to inspire lone actor terrorism directed against the West. 
The theme that emerged from subquestion 4 revealed that ISIS will likely survive 
in the virtual world, regardless of its success or failures in Syria and Iraq. Seven out of 
the 15 (40%) of the research participants indicated that ISIS would survive long-term in 
the virtual world and continue to inspire lone actor terrorism and that was its long-term 
impact on Islamic transnational terrorism.  Specifically, participant 11 stated:  
The virtual world where their message is circulating is going to inspire people in 
the real world.  The small guys, they people who can’t get into other groups.  The 
ones that want to be authorized by anybody to be so violent and act out their 
revenge fantasies.  That’s what ISIS really tapped.  Is people’s powerlessness and 
their willingness to subjugate themselves to any ideology or authority that 
licenses them to act out?  So that is what ISIS has got going (personal 
communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 10 thinks ISIS will change form and continue to survive in the cyber 
realm and inspire virtual jihad long-term.  Participant 6 concluded ISIS is counting on 
virtual world survival and is constantly establishing its brand on a global scale in order to 
remain relevant and endure the loss of physical territory.  
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Second important experience.  The second important experience that emerged 
from the subquestion identified North Africa as a potential growth area for ISIS 
operations.  Eight out of the 15 research participants (53%) highlighted Africa as the 
most likely growth area for ISIS.  Participant 9 stated that the Sahel is prime for ISIS 
growth; however, may have difficulty recruiting fighters to the Sahel.   Participant 4 
identified the Sahel as a potential growth area for ISIS, and also identified Egypt because 
of the unrest and poverty.  Participate 10 and participate 14 concluded significant ISIS 
expansion into North Africa. 
Third important experience. The third important experience that emerged was 
ISIS-associated returned foreign fighters potentially increases the threat to the West, 
deduced from the comments of eight out of the 15 (53%) research participants.  
Specifically, ISIS could have trained and provided operational guidance to a foreign 
fighter in places like Iraq and Syria, then instructed the foreign fighter to conduct a 
terrorist attack.  Participant 12 stated: 
Those folks coming home are going to be dangerous.  They are going to be 
especially dangerous in soft liberal places…that doesn’t have the tools and 
doesn’t have the right mentality to handle that.  Somebody coming back from Iraq 
and Syria might know how to go to their local Home Depot and build explosives.  
Those people are going to be incredibly dangerous for a long period of time 
because they have been radicalized, they have the knowhow.  And they are 
probably thinking well, the caliphate, the wheel of time turns, the caliphate is on 
the decline, but in time, especially in Europe, our populations are going to rise 
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and we will come out on top.  There is significant danger there (personal 
communication, September 13, 2018). 
Participant 10 concluded some foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria will 
have a hard time adjusting and may resort to criminal activity and violence.  Participate 6 
stated that wittingly or unwittingly, the returned foreign fighter may aid in the 
recruitment of ISIS supporters, thus increasing the threat to the host country.  Participant 
5 commented that some returnees will adhere to the radical ideology despite being back 
in one’s home country and pose a significant long-term threat. 
RQ:  How has ISIS shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism? 
Based on the findings from the four subquestions, ISIS has shaped the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism by its ability to promote attacks conducted by individuals 
unable to travel to conflict zones which creates significant challenges for the defense 
enterprise.  Specifically, ISIS has effectively demonstrated on a large-scale extremist no 
longer have to risk travel to conflict zones (lessening the risk of interdiction), in order to 
plan or receive guidance on attack targets and methods as ISIS has identified such in its 
official publications and social media postings.  Methods likely adopted by like-minded 
groups or individuals include soft Western targets utilizing simplistic attack methods 
such as stabbings or vehicular attacks, thus presenting difficulties for Western security 
agencies tasked with a counterterrorism mandate.   
Additionally, ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism 
specifically related to leveraging social media platforms at an unprecedented level to 
inspire terrorist attacks (virtual jihad) against the West.  Specifically, ISIS has 
demonstrated an effective way to interact with supporters through social media and open 
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forums.  ISIS empowered its supporters to interact with one another, sometimes in the 
language native to the supporter (i.e. French foreign fighter in Syria communicating with 
a French speaking supporter), which allows the nuance needed not typically associated 
with computer generated translations or nonnative speakers.  Related, ISIS demonstrated 
the recruiting power (especially in Western nations) of declaring a caliphate, with an 
identified objective and end state.  It is possible other like-minded groups interpreted this 
as a success and could attempt to emulate in the future.  Such western recruits potentially 
increase the long-term threat to the West once they return to their native country.  
Furthermore, ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism by its use of 
women and children.  While the exact threat from either the woman or child returnees 
arriving in Western countries is currently unknown, they likely pose unexpected and 
unprecedented challenges to security agencies as such agencies have little experience 
with this threat to assist in their decision making.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Evidence of trustworthiness was established through transferability, credibility, 
dependability, and conformability in this qualitative case study. Transferability, 
occasionally referred to as external validity, was achieved using a technique known as 
thick description.  I established transferability by describing not only the phenomenon in 
detail, but also the research setting and participates in detail.  Such detail will allow 
another researcher the ability to evaluate to what extent this study's findings and 
conclusions are applicable to other studies and cases. 
In this study, credibility was established through triangulation (Jeanfreau & Jack, 
2010).  Specifically, triangulation involved examining credible secondary sources related 
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to the research topic which assisted in verifying the accuracy of the findings.  According 
to Denzin and Lincoln (2014), the use of secondary sources is a reliable method in a 
study to assist with triangulation.  The secondary sources consisted of publicly available 
data from intelligence and security organizations, reputable think tanks, scholarly 
literature on ISIS and Islamic transnational terrorism, and government testimony.   
Dependability was established in this study through the use of audit 
trails.  Specifically, I documented all elements of the research and provided accurate 
transcriptions of the audio recordings from the participant interviews and an exact 
transcription of the one email response to the research questionnaire.  This will allow a 
researcher not involved in this specific study the ability to examine the process and 
transcripts (with the proper approvals) to evaluate the study's accuracy. 
Conformability was achieved through the use of a transparent audit trail.  The 
transparent audit trail consisted of detailed description of all the steps taken from the 
beginning of the research to the conclusion of this study, to include in-depth description 
of the data collection method, data analysis, and data interpretation.  Moreover, the 
research results and conclusions were shaped by the research participants and not my bias 
or interest.  I took appropriate steps to illuminate bias within the study. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to perform analysis of the information provided 
by the 15 research participates considered experts on Islamic transnational terrorism.  
The findings were analyzed and explained in detail on how the ISIS shaped the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism.  This study employed a qualitative case study approach 
and used Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis process as the analytic method. 
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Four main themes resulted from the four subquestions of the study, along with 
other important experiences from the data.  The study's findings indicated that ISIS has 
shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism in several ways.  Specifically, ISIS 
has successfully leveraged social media to inspire lone actor attacks in Western nations 
using simple attach methods and civilian targets.  ISIS's declaration of the caliphate was 
an important recruiting tool, one that could possibly be emulated in the future by another 
like-minded terrorist group.  
Additionally, ISIS's ability to interact with supporters in their native language 
and publish propaganda in up to 23 languages was considered innovate as it took it 
beyond the typical scope, which resonated with supporters to join the fight in Syria or 
Iraq, or possibly conduct violence in one's own country.  Other like-minded terrorist 
organizations may adopt a similar approach as they have likely learned from the success 
and failures of ISIS's transnational terrorism methods.  Moreover, the results of this 
study indicated ISIS will survive in the virtual world (and encourage virtual jihad), while 
possibly gaining an operational foothold in North Africa.  Lastly, ISIS-associated 
returned foreign fighters potentially increase the long-term transnational terrorism risk to 
Western nations, as those fighters may have received attack training and operational 
guidance prior to leaving the conflict zones. 
The central research question was answered based on the findings from the four 
subquestions.  Specifically, in regard to the central research question on how ISIS has 
shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism, a main finding was ISIS's methods 
and ability to promote attacks conducted by individuals unable to travel to conflict 
zones.  ISIS was able to provide attack guidance and targets through its 
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multilingual official publications, open internet forums, and social media 
postings.  Additionally, the use of simple attacks methods (vice complex attack methods) 
has potentially shaped the modus operandi and strategies of like-minded terrorist groups 
that conduct transnational terrorism.   
Chapter 4 included the research setting, research participate demographics, the 
data collection method, data analysis and findings, evidence of trustworthiness, and 
concluded with a summary.  Chapter 5 will include the interpretation of the research 
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations and ideas for future research, 
implications, and conclusion. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to bridge the gap in literature by 
examining and explaining the perspectives of 15 experts on Islamic terrorism regarding 
how ISIS has shaped the future of transnational terrorism.  Data were collected for this 
research through semistructured face-to-face and telephonic interviews, along with one 
participant electing to use an open-ended email questionnaire.  This study was intended 
and designed to answer one central research question and four subquestions.  The central 
research question addressed how ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic transnational 
terrorism.  The subquestions centered on terrorism innovation and ISIS’s impact on other 
like-minded Islamic transnational terrorist groups.  
The results of the study indicated ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism in many ways, which is discussed later in this chapter.  
Specifically, ISIS’s ability to promote small-scale attacks by individuals unable to travel 
to conflict zones has shaped the future of transnational terrorism as likeminded 
individuals no longer have to travel conflict zones to receive operational guidance or 
approval.  ISIS has demonstrated an effective strategy of identifying attack targets and 
methods in its official publications and allowed supporters to act on its behalf, thus 
presenting unique security challenges for Western law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies.  Chapter 5 includes the interpretation of findings, limitations of this 
study, research recommendations, implications, and a conclusion.  
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Interpretation of the Findings 
In order to explore and explain the perspectives of 15 experts on Islamic terrorism 
regarding how ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism, this 
qualitative case study addressed one central question and four subquestions.  This section 
is organized into the following subsections: central research question, SQ1, SQ2, SQ3, 
and SQ4.  
Central Research Question 
The central research question was as follows:  How has ISIS shaped the future of 
Islamic transnational terrorism?  Based on the results of the four subquestions, ISIS has 
shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism in several ways.  Specifically, ISIS’s 
ability to promote attacks conducted by individuals not directly involved in battlefield 
conflicts has possibly changed the future of transnational terrorism.  ISIS has successfully 
demonstrated likeminded extremists no longer have to risk travel to conflict zones in 
order to plan or receive guidance on attack targets and methods as they have identified in 
their official publications, audio messages, and social media postings.  This scenario 
presents unique challenges to Western security services and law enforcement as it 
possibly lessens the risk of interdiction once the foreign fighter returns to his or her 
homeland.  
Additionally, ISIS has demonstrated a powerful way to interact with supporters 
through social media and open forums.  ISIS empowered its supporters to interact with 
one another and potential recruits, sometimes in the language native to the supporter or 
recruit.  This allows for a more nuanced conversation not typically associated with 
computer-generated translations or nonnative speakers.  
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ISIS demonstrated the effectiveness of declaring a caliphate as it relates to 
Western foreign fighter recruitment.  Specifically, the caliphate identified an objective 
and end state, which were possible effective recruitment tools that other likeminded 
groups and could attempt to emulate in the future.  The Western foreign fighters 
potentially increase the long-term threat to the West once they return to their native 
country.  Additionally, ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic transnational terrorism 
through its use of women and children in operational and recruitment roles.  While it is 
unknown what exact threats from either female or child returnees arriving in Western 
countries is, they likely pose unexpected and unprecedented challenges to security and 
law enforcement agencies.  Such agencies have little to no experience with this threat to 
assist in their security-related decision making.   
The central research question findings aligned and connected with Stepanova’s  
asymmetric conflict theory, which was used as the theoretical framework for this study.  
As Stepanova (2008) highlighted, Western nations have conventional military superiority 
and power over nonstate actors.  However, terrorist organizations like ISIS may have 
other qualified advantages, due to ideologies and organizational structure in its 
confrontation with states, which allows them to compete against stronger adversaries 
(Roberts, 2000; Stepanova, 2008).  Moreover, asymmetric terrorism is a tactic to offset 
the advantages of the strong, and the weaker side often advocates and targets civilians of 
the stronger opponent, which has been effectively demonstrated by ISIS.  According to 
Stepanova (2008), the need by groups like ISIS to target civilians serves as a force 
multiplier against a stronger opponent.  Such attacks were encouraged and employed by 
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ISIS and put public pressure on the state to react, thus draining security resources and 
often leading to threat fatigue. 
SQ 
SQ1 was:  How was the nature of the threat from ISIS different than other threats 
from Islamic terrorist groups in the past?  The results of SQ1 indicated ISIS has 
successfully leveraged social media to empower supports outside of conflict zones to 
conduct attacks and operations without direct guidance from ISIS leadership.  ISIS used 
social media to publicly announce strategies and accomplishments while inspiring 
homegrown violent extremists to take violent action in their own country.  Additionally, 
ISIS’s declaration of the caliphate that articulated an objective and desired end state 
was vital to foreign fighter recruitment.  
SQ1’s theme and important experiences identified that ISIS resorted to 
unconventional transnational terrorism concepts in an attempt to offset the strength of 
Western nation states.  Specifically, ISIS was able to exploit sects of Western society’s 
disenfranchised populations by spreading extremist and violent ideologies that support 
the weaker opponents’ objectives by encouraging attacks against civilians and 
noncombatants (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; English, 2013).  ISIS’s effective use of social 
media directed at Western audiences attracted global appeal from disenfranchised 
Western individuals.  Shameih and Szenes (2015) who stated ISIS’s propaganda strategy 
represented a new era for how terrorist groups incorporate the Internet to further its 
operations and agenda.  Furthermore, Gray and Heard (2009) concluded terrorist 
groups often use the Internet through social media for attack guidance and terrorist cell 
construction.   
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SQ2 
SQ2 was:  Was ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach innovative?  If so, how?  
The results of SQ2 indicated the use of small-scale attacks using less sophisticated attack 
methods by lone actors will become the likely modus operandi for likeminded terrorist 
organizations in the future.  Moreover, Western targets will likely consist of civilians and 
symbols of authority.  Encouraging less sophisticated lone actor attacks requires less 
preparation, lessening the risk of law enforcement or security service interdiction and is 
seen as a cost-effective method for creating violence.  Lone actor terrorism is a method 
and tactical adaptation often employed by terrorist groups in order to avoid operational 
scrutiny and circumvent counterterrorism efforts (Barnes, 2012).  Often, lone actor 
terrorism occurs with little to no warning, making it difficult for law enforcement or 
security services to detect and mitigate. 
Additionally, ISIS’s ability to author publications, as well as interact with 
supporters in multiple languages allowed for operational support and international 
recruitment which was considered innovative by participants of this study.  While the 
concept of terrorist groups posting online publications in multiple languages was not 
unique, ISIS took it beyond the traditional scope, often capitalizing on advancements in 
the reach of social media.  According to Klausen (2015), ISIS employed individuals to 
manage its social media content and assisted in the wider dissemination of its violent 
narrative.  ISIS published its online propaganda in over 23 languages and used its 
propaganda as a force multiplier, both for recruitment and attacks (Zelin, 2015). 
The theme and important experience from SQ2 indicated ISIS's ability to publish 
in Western languages resonated with its supporters, while serving as a platform for 
102 
 
 
 
encouraging external attacks by lone actors.  According to Kohlmann (2006), terrorist 
groups use the Internet (and social media) as a low-cost and effective way to 
communicate with supporters and organize, allowing for a transnational approach for 
violence.  Additionally, ISIS often organized fighters in Iraq and Syria based on 
languages, possibly employing individuals from those groups to interact with supporters 
online in their native language (Bakker & de Bont, 2016). 
SQ3 
SQ3 was: Will other designated terrorist groups learn from ISIS's transnational 
approach and adopt similar modus operandi against the West?  The results of SQ3 
revealed other designated terrorist groups have likely learned from both the failures and 
success of ISIS's transnational terrorism approach.  Furthermore, it is possible other 
groups may employ similar transnational terrorism modus operandi.  ISIS demonstrated 
an effective method of promoting lone actor attacks, using simplistic weapons targeting 
civilian and soft Western targets (i.e. Christmas market).  
The theme and important experiences for this subquestion revealed that experts 
expect other like-minded terrorist organizations to emulate and promote similar attack 
methods in order to draw attention to its cause.  However, the majority of research 
participants did not assess this method to be adopted by al-Qaeda, as core leadership 
would want more control over external operations.  According to Barnes (2012), simple 
transnational terrorism attacks like those demonstrated by ISIS leave a smaller 
operational footprint, thus presenting unique security challenges for intelligence agencies 
and law enforcement.  Therefore, inspired lone actor attacks using simple attack methods 
103 
 
 
 
(i.e. knife) is possibly ISIS's long-term impact on Islamic transnational terrorism, and one 
that might be adopted by other terrorist organizations.  
SQ4 
SQ4 was:  What is ISIS's long-term impact on Islamic transnational terrorism?  
The results of SQ4 revealed that ISIS will likely survive in the virtual world, regardless 
of its success or failures in Iraq and Syria.  Research participants indicated that ISIS 
would inspire virtual jihad that that was a long-term impact on Islamic transnational 
terrorism.  Additionally, research participants identified North Africa as a potential 
growth and operational area for ISIS. 
Lastly, the theme and important experiences from SQ4 indicated that ISIS-
associated returned foreign fighters potentially increase the terrorism threat to the West.  
This aligns with literature as foreign fighters are likely to be more experienced than lone 
actors and potentially introduce the attack methods they learned in the conflict they 
participated in (Cordesman, 2005).  Specifically, ISIS could have trained a foreign fighter 
in attack methods in places like Syria and Iraq, then provide the fighter operational 
instruction to conduct a terrorist attack before returning to his home country 
(Hegghammer, 2010).  According to expert perspectives, it is possible ISIS has 
orchestrated such a plan, thus having long-term impact on transnational terrorism and 
security policy.  According to Carfarell and Zhou (2017), it is estimated at least 1,500 
Western foreign fighters have returned to their home countries, some of which potentially 
provided ISIS organizational links into Western countries. 
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Reflections 
I was motivated to conduct this research in order to close the gap in literature by 
identifying future Islamic terrorism trends.  This research should assist with forecasting 
transnational terrorism modus operandi, allowing decision makers additional information 
for counterterrorism strategies and policy responses.  Additionally, I have over 16 years 
within the defense enterprise working counterterrorism issues and this research will 
increase my knowledge on Islamic transnational terrorism, assisting in my professional 
development. 
As previously stated, terrorist groups that do not adapt and "learn" will ultimately 
become irrelevant.  Conversely, terrorist groups will have a better chance of 
organizational survival if they learn from innovation and be adaptive.  According to 
Gartenstein-Ross (2008), terrorist groups do learn from one another; however, this 
phenomenon is not researched enough within the academic community.  Moreover, the 
research on the future of terrorism is dated (predominantly published immediately after 
9/11) and focused on al-Qaida (Bakker, 2012).  There is an abundance of literature on 
terrorism, the present state of terrorism, and ISIS.  Nevertheless, the post 2011 jihadi 
resurgence caught many experts by surprise and it was apparent there was a lack of 
research on the topic (Hegghammer, 2016).  Therefore, this study closed a gap in 
literature and academia by examining ISIS's potential impact on Islamic transnational 
terrorism, which should assist defense enterprise decision making and possibly the 
shifting of security resources in order to prevent future acts of terrorism. 
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Limitations 
As outlined in Chapter 1, there are several limitations associated with this study.  
First, this study incorporated perspectives from 15 experts with the defense enterprise, 
government, and academia selected using purposive sampling.  While 15 research 
participants were an adequate representation, the unique experiences from the research 
participants may not be generalized beyond the scope of this study to other populations 
outside the study.  Additionally, each participant provided his or her perspective based on 
their access to information and various experiences.  Future research could scope the 
research by looking at the central research question and subquestions from unique 
government perspectives (i.e. Department of Justice, Department of Defense, etc...) or 
perspectives solely from academia or the private sector, or across a career field regardless 
of the employer. 
Another limitation of this study is that it relies on interviews and an email 
questionnaire (one participant) for data to lend insight into the phenomenon.  Security 
and safety issues prevented my ability to collect data from individuals directly involved 
with ISIS which could have provided additional insight into the central research question 
and subquestions.  Moreover, this study was limited to open source information and did 
not include classified information (in accordance with Executive Order 13489), which 
likely limited the responses from several of the research participants.  Lastly, it is 
assumed all research participants answered each question honestly and to the best of their 
ability based on their knowledge and lived experiences. 
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Recommendations 
This study was conducted as there was a gap in literature on the relationship 
between post 9/11 transnational terrorism strategies and the organizations that might 
employ said strategies against the West, and how ISIS has shaped such strategies.  As a 
result, several recommendations for future research became evident.  First, the scope of 
this study was limited to the relationship between ISIS and transnational terrorism. Thus, 
in future studies, researchers could expand the breadth of cases by exploring other like-
minded Islamic transnational terrorist group's writings, speeches, and actions.  The 
findings from those research studies could then be compared to the conclusions from this 
study.  Moreover, ISIS's blueprint for terrorism could be examined with other terrorist 
groups that employ a non-Islamic transnational terrorism approach. 
Additionally, future studies could include strategies outlined by other post 9/11 
jihadist strategist for their possible impact on shaping ISIS's terrorism approach.  Future 
research on the relationship between various terrorism strategists and terrorist 
organizations could add to the literature by focusing on the key narratives that "guide" 
terrorist group's transnational terrorism methods and targets.  Finally, this research 
focused on the relationship between ISIS's transnational terrorism approach against the 
West.  Future researchers could identify a different target group other than the West.  For 
example, a researcher could examine ISIS's transnational terrorism approach directed 
against the Middle East. 
Implications 
There is an abundance of literature on terrorism, Islamic terrorism, and ISIS; 
however, there is a gap in knowledge on the potential impact ISIS may have on the future 
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of Islamic transnational terrorism directed against the West.  The majority of literature on 
future trends in Islamic terrorism was published shortly after 9/11 and focused on al-
Qaida.  Therefore, the potential impact ISIS had on Islamic terrorism needed to be 
researched in order to understand its effects on terrorism, both strategically and 
operationally, in order to provide decision makers valuable and credible data needed in 
any effort to degrade and possibly defeat ISIS and like-minded groups. 
Accordingly, the implications for positive social change resulting from this study 
are aimed toward Western agencies tasked with a counterterrorism mandate, to include 
Western law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as decision makers and 
private organizations that conduct research on terrorist organizations.  Such knowledge 
should allow such agencies to shift counterterrorism resources in order to mitigate future 
terrorist attacks.  According to Hedges (2008), agencies tasked with a counterterrorism 
mission must familiarize itself with future terror trends and respond accordingly and 
faster than terrorist groups.  Ideally, this research will inform decision makers on possible 
future trends in terrorism so they can effectively respond in a timely manner with specific 
policies that improve the security of their respective homeland. 
Conclusion 
This study bridged the gap in knowledge by investigating and explaining the 
perspectives of 15 Islamic terrorism experts on how ISIS has shaped the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism.  The central research question and subquestion findings indicated 
ISIS shaped the future of transnational terrorism as it relates to external operations, social 
media and online communication, and home grown violent extremism.  Specifically, ISIS 
has demonstrated the ability to promote attacks by individuals unable to travel to conflict 
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zones, which may have a significant impact on transnational terrorism in the years to 
come.  Instead, ISIS has leveraged social media and other internet platforms to 
communicate its message and violent narrative (attack targets and methods) in an 
effective and cost-efficient manner, while lessoning the operational risks associated with 
foreign fighter travel.  Moreover, the use of simple attack methods and the 
encouragement of lone actor style attacks presents policy and security challenges for the 
defense enterprise.  
ISIS has identified an effective way to interact with like-minded supporters, a 
behavior that could be possibly emulated by other terrorist organizations.  Contrary to 
groups like al-Qaida who significantly communicated with supporters through private 
channels or password protected websites, ISIS had success using publicly accessed 
websites and social media platforms to communicate with supporters, much of the time in 
the supporter's native language.  This likely improved support and aided in recruitment, 
confluent with declaring a caliphate with a clear objective and end state.  Recruiting 
Western foreign fighters and using them to assist in the publishing of literature proved a 
successful tactic and will be possibly replicated in the future by other like-minded groups.  
Moreover, ISIS foreign fighters have shaped the future of transnational terrorism as they 
return back to their home country, possibly radicalized, presenting unique policy and 
security challenges to the country of return.  Regardless of the fate of ISIS as an 
organization, it has challenged “traditional” terrorism methods while shaping the future 
of transnational terrorism, thus presenting unique security challenges to the international 
community. 
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Appendix A: Western Countries 
For the purpose of this research, the West refers to the 28 Member States of the 
European Union (EU), North America (Canada and the United States), plus Switzerland, 
Norway, New Zealand, and Australia. 
Countries European Union 
Australia  
Austria X 
Belgium X 
Bulgaria X 
Canada  
Croatia X 
Cyprus X 
Czech Republic X 
Denmark X 
Estonia X 
Finland X 
France X 
Germany X 
Greece X 
Hungary X 
Ireland X 
Italy X 
Latvia X 
Lithuania X 
Luxembourg X 
Malta X 
Netherlands X 
New Zealand  
Norway  
Poland X 
Portugal X 
Romania X 
Slovakia X 
Spain X 
Sweden X 
Switzerland  
United Kingdom X 
United States  
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Note. Definition of Western Countries. Adapted from “Assessing the Islamic State's 
Commitment to Attacking the West” by Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015, Perspectives On 
Terrorism, 9(4), 14-30. 
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Appendix B: ISIS-Related Attacks (June 2014 – June 2017) 
 Date Attack Location 
 2014   
1 September 24 
Oklahoma Vaughan Foods 
Beheading Moore, OK, USA 
2 October 20 Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu Vehicle Ramming 
St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, 
Quebec, Canada 
3 October 22 Parliament Hill Shooting Ottawa, Canada 
4 October 23 Hatchet Attack on New York Police Officers Queens, NY, USA 
5 December 18 John Bailey Clark Jr. Shooting Morganton, NC, USA 
6 December 20 Joue-les-Tours Police Station Stabbing Tours, France 
 2015   
7 January 7-9 Charlie Hebdo Newspaper Shooting Paris, France 
8 January 7-9 
"Shooting of Montrouge Police 
Officer, 
Fontenay-aux-Roses Jogger 
Shooting, and Porte de Vincennes 
Supermarket Siege” 
Paris, France 
9 February 3 Jewish Community Center Stabbing Nice, France 
10 February 14-15 
Krudttonden Cultural Center and 
Krystalgade Great Synagogue 
Shootings 
Copenhagen, Denmark 
11 April 19 
Woman Shot and Killed in 
Connection with Suspected Church 
Terrorist Attack 
Villejuif, France 
12 May 3 
Curtis Culwell Center Muhammad 
Art 
Exhibit Shooting 
Garland, TX, USA 
13 June 26 Herve Cornara Beheading Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, France 
14 July 16 Navy Reserve Shootings Chattagnooga, TN, USA 
15 August 21 Thalys Train Stabbing Arras, France 
16 September 17 Stabbing of Spandau Policewoman Berlin, Germany 
17 November 4 
University of California, Merced 
(UCM) 
Stabbing 
Merced, CA, USA 
18 November 13&14 
Paris Attacks: Stade de France, 
Restaurants and Bataclan Paris, France 
19 December 2 San Bernardino Shooting San Bernardino, CA, USA 
20 December 5 Leytonstone Subway Stabbing London, United Kingdom 
 2016   
21 January 1 Mosque and Soldier Vehicle Attack Valence, France 
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22 January 7 Shooting of Philadelphia Police Officer Philadelphia, PA, USA 
23 January 11 Jewish Teacher Machete Attack Marseille, France 
24 February 11 Restaurant Machete Attack Columbus, OH, USA 
25 February 18 Bangladeshi Imam Bludgeoning Rochdale, United Kingdom 
26 February 26 Train Station Stabbing Hanover, Germany 
27 March 22 Brussels Bombings - Airport and Metro Brussels, Belgium 
28 April 16 Sikh Temple Bombing Essen, Germany 
29 June 12 Orlando Nightclub Shooting Orlando, FL, USA 
30 June 13 
Police Stabbing and Livestream 
Hostage 
Taking 
Magnanville, France 
31 July 14 Nice Bastille Day Vehicle Attack Nice, France 
32 July 18 Train Axe Attack Würzburg-Heidingsfel, Germany 
33 July 24 Wine Bar Suicide Bombing Ansbach, Germany 
34 July 26 Normandy Catholic Church Attack Saint Etienne du Rouvray, France 
35 August 6 Charleroi Machete Attack on Police Charleroi, Belgium 
36 August 10 Explosive Detonation in Taxi Strathroy, Ontario, Canada 
37 August 20 Roanoke Double Stabbing Roanoke, VA, USA 
38 September 4 Osny Prison Attack Osny, France 
39 September 17 Minnesota Mall Stabbing St. Cloud, MN, USA 
40 September 17&19 
New York-Chelsea Bombing, 
Seaside Park Bombing 
Manhattan, NY and 
Sea Side Park, NJ, USA 
41 October 5 
Double Stabbing of Schaerbeek 
Police 
Officers 
Brussels, Belgium 
42 November 28 Ohio State University Campus Stabbing Columbus, OH, USA 
43 December 19 Berlin Christmas Market Attack Berlin, Germany 
 2017   
44 January 6 Ft. Lauderdale Airport Shooting Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA 
45 January 31 Denver Transit Officer Shooting Denver, CO, USA 
46 February 3 Louvre Knife Attack Paris, France 
47 March 18 Orly Airport Attack Orly, France 
48 March 22 Westminster Vehicle Attack Westminster, United Kingdom 
49 April 7 Stockholm Vehicle Ramming Stockholm, Sweden 
50 April 20 Shooting of Champs Élysées Police Officer Paris, France 
51 May 22 Manchester Arena Bombing Manchester, United Kingdom 
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Note. Data is from June 2014 to June 2017. Adapted from “Fear Thy Neighbor. 
Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West,”by Vidino, Marone, & Entenmann,2017, 
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. Milano: Ledi Publishing. 
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Appendix C: ISIS-Related Attackers (June 2014 – June 2017) 
 Name Description of Attack 
1 Alton Nolen Vaughn Foods Beheading 
2 Martin Couture-Rouleau Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu Vehicle Attack 
3 Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Parliament Shooting 
4 Zale Thompson New York Police Officer Hatchet Attack 
5 Justin Sullivan John Bailey Clark Shooting 
6 Bertrand Nzohabonayo Joue-les-Tours Police Stabbing 
7 Cherif Kouachi Charlie Hebdo Shooting 
8 Said Kouachi Charlie Hebdo Shooting 
9 Amedy Coulibaly 
Shootings at the Porte de Vincennes 
Supermarket, Fontenay-aux-Roses Jogger, and 
the Montrouge Police Officer 
10 Moussa Coulibaly Jewish Community Center Stabbing 
11 Omar Hamid el-Hussein Krystalgade Synagogue and Krudttonden Cultural Center Shootings 
12 Sid Ahmed Ghlam 
Murder of AurélieChâtelain; Alleged Planning 
of a Terror Attack Against a Church in Villejuif, 
France 
13 Elton Simpson Curtis Culwell Center Muhammad Art Exhibit Shooting 
14 Nadir Soofi Curtis Culwell Center Muhammad Art Exhibit Shooting 
15 Yassin Salhi Herve Cornara Beheading 
16 Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez Navy Shooting 
17 Ayoub El-Khazzani Thalys Train Knife Attack 
18 Rafik Mohamad Yousef Spandau Police Stabbing 
19 Faisal Mohammad University of California, Merced Stabbing 
20 Bilal Hadfi Paris Attacks - Stade de France 
21 Ahmad al-Mohammed Paris Attacks - Stade de France 
22 Ali al-Iraqi Paris Attacks - Stade de France 
23 Ismael Omar Mostefai Paris Attacks - Bataclan 
24 Foued Mohamed-Aggad Paris Attacks - Bataclan 
25 Samy Amimour Paris Attacks - Bataclan 
26 Brahim Abdeslam Paris Attacks - Restaurants 
27 Chakib Akrouh Paris Attacks - Restaurants 
28 Abdelhamid Abaaoud Paris Attacks - Restaurants 
29 Tashfeen Malik San Bernardino Shooting 
30 Syed Rizwan Farook San Bernardino Shooting 
31 Muhaydin Mire Leytonstone Subway Stabbing 
32 Raouf el Ayeb Mosque and Soldier Vehicle Attack 
33 Edward Archer Philadelphia Police Officer Shooting 
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34 Unidentified Minor Jewish Teacher Machete Attack, France 
35 Mohamed Barry Ohio Restaurant Machete Attack 
36 Mohammed Abdul Kadir Murder of Bangladeshi Imam in England 
37 Safia Schmitter Train Station Stabbing, Germany 
38 Ibrahim el-Bakraoui Brussels Airport Bombing 
39 Najim Laachraoui Brussels Airport Bombing 
40 Khalid el-Bakraoui Brussels Metro Bombing 
41 Unidentified Minor Sikh Temple Bombing, Germany 
42 Unidentified Minor Sikh Temple Bombing, Germany 
43 Omar Mateen Night Club Shooting, Orlando 
44 Larossi Abballa Police Stabbing Attack, France 
45 Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel Nice Bastille Day Vehicle Attack 
46 Riaz Khan Ahmadzai Train Axe Attack, Germany 
47 Mohammad Daleel Suicide Bombing, Germany 
48 Abdel Malik Petitjean Catholic Church Attack, Normandy 
49 Adel Kermiche Catholic Church Attack, Normandy 
50 Khaled Babouri Machete Attack on Police, Belgium 
51 Aaron Driver Taxi Bomb, Canada 
52 Wasil Farooqui Stabbing, Virginia 
53 Bilal Taghi Prison Attack, France 
54 Dahir Adan Mall Stabbing, Minnesota 
55 Ahmad Khan Rahimi Bombing, New York and New Jersey 
56 Hicham Diop Police Officer Stabbings, Belgium 
57 Abdul Razak Ali Artan Stabbing at Ohio State University 
58 Anis Amri Christmas Market Attack, Germany 
59 Esteban Santiago-Ruiz Airport Shooting, Florida 
60 Joshua Cummings Transit Officer Shooting, Colorado 
61 Abdullah Hamamy Louvre Knife Attack, France 
62 Ziyed Ben Belgacem Orly Airport Attack, France 
63 Khalid Masood Vehicle Attack and Stabbing, England 
64 Rakhmat Akilov Vehicle Attack, Sweden 
65 Karim Cheurfi Champs Elysees Police Officer Shooting, France 
Note. Data is from June 2014 to June 2017. Adapted from “Fear Thy Neighbor. 
Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West,” by Vidino, Marone, & Entenmann, 
2017, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. Milano: Ledi 
Publishing. 
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Appendix D: Schengen Zone Countries List 
The Schengen Zone has 26-member states, plus 3countries that do not have 
border controls with surrounding Schengen countries. 
Austria Iceland Poland 
Belgium Italy Portugal 
Czech Republic Latvia San Marino* (de facto) 
Denmark Liechtenstein Slovakia 
Estonia Lithuania Slovenia 
Finland Luxembourg Spain 
France Malta Sweden 
Germany Monaco* (de facto) Switzerland 
Greece Netherlands Vatican City* (de facto) 
Hungary Norway  
*Not official Schengen Zone members; however, these countries have open borders with 
Schengen countries. 
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Appendix E: 113th and 114th Congress Hearings Related to the Visa Waiver Program 
Congress Session Committee Subcommittee Topic Date 
114th 1st 
House 
Homeland 
Security 
 A Global Battlefield 3/24/2015 
114th 1st 
House 
Homeland 
Security 
Boarder and 
Maritime 
Security 
Combating 
Terrorist 
Travel 
3/17/2015 
114th 1st 
Senate 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
 Visa Waiver Program 3/12/2015 
114th 1st 
House 
Homeland 
Security 
Committee 
 
Countering 
Violent 
Islamists 
Extremism 
2/11/2015 
113th 2nd 
House Foreign 
Affairs 
Committee 
Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, 
and Trade / 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
ISIS and the 
Threat from 
Foreign 
Fighters 
12/2/2014 
113th 2nd House Foreign Affairs 
Europe, Eurasia, 
and Emerging 
Threats 
Islamists 
Foreign 
Fighters 
9/19/2014 
113th 2nd 
House 
Homeland 
Security 
Committee 
 
Worldwide 
Threats to the 
Homeland 
9/17/2014 
113th 2nd 
House 
Homeland 
Security 
Committee 
Boarder and 
Maritime 
Security 
An 
Examination of 
the Threat 
Posed by ISIS 
Terrorists and 
Western 
Passports 
9/10/2014 
113th 2nd 
Senate 
Homeland 
Security and 
Governmental 
Affairs 
Committee 
 
Cybersecurity, 
Terrorism, and 
Beyond 
9/10/2014 
Note. Data is from 2014 to 2015. Adapted from “European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: 
Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the United States,” by Archick, Belkin, 
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Blanchard, Humud, & Mix,2015, International Journal of Terrorism and Political Hot 
Spots, (10)1, 1-43. 
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Appendix F: Invitation to Participate Email 
 
Mr. or Ms.___ 
The purpose of this email is to invite you to participate in my doctoral study that focuses 
on ISIS’s impact on the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.  Your participation will 
be vital and contribute to the body of literature and knowledge available on this 
phenomenon and may lead to positive social change. 
I would like to introduce myself.  My name is Richard “Bryant” Culp and I am a Doctoral 
student in the Public Policy and Administration program at Walden University, located in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Moreover, I have over fifteen years working counterterrorism 
issues in support of the U.S. Department of Defense.  This study will fulfill my 
dissertation requirement within the Public Policy and Administration program.   Dr. Boris 
Bruk serves as my dissertation Chair and Dr. Dick Larkin is a secondary committee 
member. 
The proposed study will use either a face-to-face interview or a questionnaire with open-
ended questions, both of which should take approximately 45 minutes to complete.  If 
you agree to the research, the researcher will contact you to either schedule and interview 
or send you a questionnaire to be completed at your earliest convenience.  Your 
participation is voluntary and if you choose, you may withdraw from this study anytime 
during the process and your confidentiality will be assured.  The attached Informed 
Consent form includes more detailed information about the study, as well as how you can 
participate, your rights as a research participant, and the measures taken to maintain 
confidentiality and protect your identity. 
As previously stated, if you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to 
participate in a face-to-face interview or complete a research questionnaire.  Additionally, 
I may have to contact you after I receive the questionnaire or after the completion of the 
interview to ensure I have interpreted your responses accurately. 
If you have any questions after reading the Informed Consent form or about this study, 
you may contact me.  You may also contact the Walden University faculty member 
identified on the consent form. 
If you agree to participate in this study, please maintain a printed copy of the consent 
form for your records. 
I would value your participation in this study and am available to discuss this further 
should you have any questions.  I appreciate your time and consideration for participating 
in this request. 
Sincerely, Richard “Bryant” Culp  
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Appendix G: Interview Protocol 
Opening Statements (paraphrased) 
 
1.  Hello, I am Richard Culp and I am working on my PhD in Public Policy, focusing on 
terrorism-related research.  This study is a required portion of my PhD program. 
 
2. This information you provide will be used within this study to fill a gap in literature on 
ISIS’s impact on the future of Islamic transnational terrorism.   
 
3. You have already signed an informed consent form, but I want to highlight some key 
points. 
 a. You may decide at any time to excuse yourself from this interview. 
 b. You may decide to withdraw your participation from this study at any time. 
c. You identity within the study will remain confidential and I will not use any 
information that you provide that will risk identifying your participation. 
d. You may skip any question that you are uncomfortable in answering. 
e. With you permission, I would like to audio record the interview. 
f. You can request a copy of the transcript of this interview. 
g. At this time, do you have any questions? 
 
4. This interview should take approximately 45 minutes to complete.  Are you ready to 
start the interview? 
 
5. [Start Audio Recording] 
 
6. Demographic questions: 
 a. Age 
 b. Professional Field 
  i. Defense enterprise 
  ii. Academia 
  iii. Private organization 
 c. Position 
 d. Area of expertise 
  i. Years of experience 
 
7. That concludes demographic questions.  Let’s move on to the research questions.  Do 
you have any questions at this time? 
a. What is your perspective on how ISIS has impacted the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism? 
b. What is your perspective on how the nature of the threat from ISIS is different 
than other threats from Islamic terrorist groups in the past? 
c. What is your perspective on whether or not ISIS’s transnational terrorism 
approach is innovative?  If so, how. 
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d. What is your perspective on other designated terrorist groups learning from 
ISIS’s transnational approach and adopting similar modus operandi against the 
West?  
e. What is your perspective on ISIS’s long-term impact on Islamic transnational 
terrorism? 
 
8. Thank you for participating in this interview.  Do you have any questions?  Should any 
questions arise, please feel free to contact me at richard.culp@waldenu.edu or +44 7507 
906 823.  I appreciate you taking to time to participate in this study. 
 
9. [End Audio Recording] 
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Appendix H: Interview Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire comprises of biographical questions and five open-ended questions for 
written responses. Please write as much as you like and note that written responses will 
not be analyzed for writing skills. Only the information provided will be used for this 
study. 
 
 
1. Gender:   
2. Age:    
3. Professional 
Field: 
 Defense 
Enterprise  Academia 
 Private 
Organization 
        Mark all that apply.    
4. Position:    
5. Area of Expertise:    
6. Years of 
Expertise:    
 
7. What is your perspective on how ISIS has impacted the future of Islamic 
transnational terrorism? 
 
8. What is your perspective on how the nature of the threat from ISIS is different than 
other threats from Islamic terrorist groups in the past? 
 
9. What is your perspective on whether or not ISIS’s transnational terrorism approach is 
innovative?  If so, how. 
 
10. What is your perspective on other designated terrorist groups learning from ISIS’s 
transnational approach and adopting similar modus operandi against the West?  
 
11. What is your perspective on ISIS’s long-term impact on Islamic transnational 
terrorism? 
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Appendix I: Participant Table 
Participant Gender Age Professional 
Field 
Position Area of 
Expertise 
Years of 
Experience 
1 Male 64 Academia Professor Terrorism 
Finance 
44 
2 Male 38 Defense 
Enterprise 
Counterterrorism 
Expert 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
13 
3 Female 40 Defense 
Enterprise 
Counterterrorism 
Expert 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
9 
4 Male 39 Academia Counterterrorism 
Finance 
Consultant & 
Presenter 
Terrorism 
Finance and 
Operations 
14 
5 Male 38 Defense 
Enterprise 
Counterterrorism 
Expert 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
20 
6 Male 52 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Advisor 
Sunni 
Terrorism 
33 
7 Female 32 Defense 
Enterprise 
Counterterrorism 
Analyst 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
9 
8 Male 50 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Advisor 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
and Finance 
16 
9 Male 31 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Analyst 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
13 
10 Male 45 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Advisor 
Sunni 
Terrorism 
17 
11 Male 64 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Expert 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
33 
12 Male 37 Defense 
Enterprise 
Strategic 
Security Advisor 
Sunni 
Extremism 
15 
13 Male 46 Academia Lecturer & 
Consultant 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
25 
14 Male 32 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Expert 
Sunni 
Extremism 
11 
15 Male 44 Private 
Organization 
Counterterrorism 
Expert 
Islamic 
Transnational 
Terrorism 
26 
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Appendix J: Coding 
Name Occurrences References 
2014 violence 
  
Didn’t care 4 6 
On purpose 6 8 
Too violent 5 5 
Underestimate 3 3 
Importance of caliphate 
  
End state 4 5 
Recruitment 12 15 
Innovation and impact 
  
Apps 2 2 
Drones 2 2 
Encryption 4 4 
External Operations 12 27 
Finance 7 11 
No 1 1 
Professionals 5 7 
Social Media 14 22 
Violence 4 7 
Women and kids 7 7 
Yes 7 8 
Other groups learning 
  
AQ 6 6 
Yes 13 21 
Potential growth areas 
  
Africa 8 13 
Europe 6 7 
Israel 1 2 
Philippines 6 8 
Russia and Caucasus 1 3 
South America 1 1 
Yemen 2 2 
Returnees strengthen domestic jihad 
  
No 5 6 
Yes 8 10 
Types of attacks 1 1 
Will ISIS survive 
  
No or will struggle 5 6 
Virtual 6 6 
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Yes 11 18 
  
146 
 
 
 
Appendix K: Participant Data 
2014 Violence 
Name: Didn’t care 
Participant 9  
I don’t think it was a mistake on their part.  Even though they did some atrocities things.  
I think it was more like a media stunt.  How do you get in the news?  You do something 
absurd, right.  And it started in 2014, but their atrocities continued throughout, since we 
are talking through 2017 since we are talking about the beheadings.  We have the 
beheadings Egypt, the drowning in cage, the burning alive, throwing homosexuals off the 
roof, the heads on spikes in Syria in the town center. 
Participant 11 
I think they didn’t care about the Western response. I don’t think they realized it.  They 
didn’t calculate the possible responses as part of their decision to do the beheadings I 
don’t think. 
Participant 15 
I think in 2014, they probably didn’t care.  But I think a part of them not caring was also 
the underestimation of how the West would respond to their own citizens being 
beheaded. 
So, I think ultimately people like al-Baghdadi don’t care what the West thinks.  He’s got 
his goals, he’s got his ideology, and consequences be damned. 
Participant 12 
Not entirely sure they cared about the Western response. 
Certainly, they probably didn’t see Operation Inherent Resolve being put together in the 
scale and scope of the airstrikes.  The fact that virtually every country on earth united 
against them to kick them out of Iraq and Syria.  And the human rights abuse they were 
committing.  Even if they had foreseen it, as long as they thought they were following in 
the path of the law in their caliphate was legitimate, I don’t think they would have cared.  
Because they thought that one was going to help them overcome any and all opposition 
and obviously that didn’t happen.  
Name: On purpose 
Participant 9 
I think it was like almost like a draw.  The group obviously wants hardened fighters, so 
put out the message that we are willing to do whatever it takes for jihad, and you are 
going to attract those types of people.  You are going to attract the kid of guys who are 
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willing to go to that level.  Versus that if you put out a softer message about following the 
laws, you might not get that fighter, that draw, the young men that are full of the spunk.   
Participant 6 
I think it was intentional to solidify their position as a caliphate and legitimate power.  
So, it seems from the outside, a calculated objective of theirs.  To invite the response.  
But, I do think to legitimize their status, they believe was the established caliphate, they 
had to decisive actions that would not only shock the world, but promote their cause in 
prove they were legitimate to their followers. 
Participant 5 
No, I think Isis was going for a different narrative than what you saw with AQ, where 
they were trying to be in more control and more viewed, legitimate is not the word, more 
of a something that everyone that could get behind. 
I don’t know if they estimated that much but the apocalyptic narrative, of the West 
coming into Syria was definitely in their calculus. So, some sort of response was 
absolutely what they were expecting and hoping.  And it probably drove a good bit of 
their recruitment as they were able to sell it as the crusaders are coming back into the 
Levant.  SO come join the fight. 
Participant 14 
I think they knew the impact was going to be.  I think they underestimated their 
recruitment numbers.  So, even though using social media was a new thing and there was 
a lot of communication, these ISIS guys talking, getting people come through social 
media and stuff, I don’t think the numbers were there to sustain the movement. 
The recruitment numbers seemed almost so low for some countries.  Consider hot spots 
like Kosovo, there was an infinitive amount, so if you died you died.  It wasn’t the 
recruitment numbers to keep because of the sustained Western bombing campaigns.  
Participant 8 
I think of that time in 2014, they were very, moving very swiftly to establish not only the 
notion of the caliphate, but also a lot of what they were looking to do as I understood it is 
to create the mechanism for the next generation, and the next generation after that to have 
their successors. So it is not just todays fight, but breeding future generations of Islamic 
State ground troops, families, followers of the caliphate, so part of that process was not 
only stripping the identities of these people, but having the women to bear the children.  
But also, to offer reward to attract fighters outside of Iraq and Syria so they can offer a 
fighter from Belgium or someplace else a bit of a trophy or some reprieve. As unpleasant 
at that sounds, that was the way it was in Syria. To be able to offer them a woman for 
days fighting or weeks fighting.  So, I think they probably made some short term gains 
out of doing so.   
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Participant 7 
I think they did it intentionally, but I think they probably didn’t do it to draw the West in 
either.  They just wanted to kill those people.  It think that was just there acting the 
foundation of their ideology. 
Name: Too violent 
Participant 4 
Destroy the organization and stuff.  When has that ever happened before?  And so I think 
the backlash to their brutality and their open attacks and stuff like that has worked against 
them in the end. 
Participant 10 
Yeah, I think 
Participant 1 
Let’s cut off a few heads. Now they miscalculated.  It was too horrific. And so you see an 
immediate, oh shit, maybe we ought to stop that.  And you saw the videos stop almost 
immediate.  They did a study, survey, oh boy, we are losing even our Muslim brothers, a 
chunk of them.  You see that. The Jordanian pilot was horrible. 
Participant 3 
As you know, AQ broke ties with them for a bunch of reasons, but mostly because they 
felt that ISIS was too brutal, too aggressive, not methodical enough.  And you can see 
that in a lot of plotting.  Right, so AQ’s 9/11 plot was very planned out.  There was one 
plot and it was fully approved by everyone involved and the financing was cleared. 
Participant 7 
I don’t know because that is their ideology.  They believe that.  And I think they believe 
it still.  Some of the leaders have become a little more strategic.  But I think ultimately 
they are victim to their own ideology that is very violent. 
Name: Underestimate 
Participant 10 
Yeah, I think they underestimated, ISIS underestimated the response from Western and 
coalition forces.  They didn’t think they were going to get hit with air strikes  
Participant 15 
But I think a part of them not caring was also the underestimation of how the West would 
respond to their own citizens being beheaded. 
Participant 7 
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I do think that. Because even though a lot of those guys who were involved in that or 
advising that, or involved in different roles, they knew what the US and coalition could 
do in Iraq.  They knew because they had experienced that. But it was also a time where, 
they are not stupid, they understood US policy I think saw we were trying to not be more 
involved.  We were trying to be less involved, I think they did it underestimate that.  I 
think they possibly only thought about key westerners.  Maybe only what the US, maybe 
the UK. I think, putting my Iran hat back on, I think they ultimately also underestimated 
Iran. Iran had a major role in that.  Some argue larger than then US did.  And I think they 
really underestimated that.  Same with Russia.  They did not think about those other 
entities.  Had a huge impact. 
Importance of the Caliphate 
Name: End state 
Participant 9 
It becomes attractive.  If you are just saying come fight and you don’t have an end goal, I 
think you wouldn’t get as much traction.  But by saying there is an end goal. Hey the end 
goal is to control a piece of land and then we get to own it and run it, then you put 
yourself in a place of power. 
Participant 10 
It basically gave them a clear end-state 
It gave people fighting an end goal of what they were looking for. 
Participant 2 
And that is where ISIS did a really good job of it.  And, basically turned AQ’s strategy on 
its head.  Where they said, no, it is here and now.  The caliphate is now. 
Participant 8 
Basically pressed to service, they had to have that brand and that appeal.  We are going to 
be the ones that in Dabiq.  We are going to be the ones left standing.  So, you are 
probably going to want to be on our side kind of thing.  So the caliphate was a very 
important part of that message. 
Name: Recruitment 
Participant 9 
We are going to make a spot where we can make the rules and if you come, you can be a 
part of this brand new caliphate, which they call it the Islamic State.  Let’s call it a state.  
They wanted to make their own operational area that they controlled all the rules and 
controlling these young men.  We are going to pay you and you can make the rules with 
us. 
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Participant 4 
I think that the lifestyle, money is a huge part of that.  And these kids living in the slums, 
they see this so called lifestyle, and they might have even sometime even referred to it 
that way.  They want to go there, they get to kill the infidels, have wives, and money, 
what else does this poor kid from the suburbs in Paris actually want.  That is what he 
wants.  But I think that is a huge part of the recruiting process, was actually controlling 
territory and having the hope of the actual caliphate that was wealthy and have all these 
benefits for these people. 
Participant 10 
It also helped reach out to disenfranchised individuals that are on the fringe of everything 
and gave them something to look forward to with the promise land. 
Gives them monies and riches and wives, land 
Participant 6 
I do think they was key to maybe people sitting on the fence of ideology.  Almost the 
lack of AQ type operations or actions.  People sitting on the fence that were disgruntled, 
that could relate to what the message was.  And again with territory and the actions 
taking.  They could make that decision and it moved in that direction.  I think that was 
pretty critical to their recruiting message. 
Participant 11 
That changed everything for them.  Until then, I think they had some popularity.  They 
also had a lot of detractors for their violent activities, but once they declared the 
caliphate, that was their cross over event that made people take them seriously regardless 
of anything else. 
Participant 5 
It gave them the central rod for everyone to follow.  One of the biggest issues with AQ is 
their lack of ability to respond and keep a leader out front since Bin Laden went into 
hiding all those years ago. But having the Caliphate and Baghdadi as kind of a focal point 
as something they could drive people towards.  The lightning rod for people to follow 
behind. 
Participant 15 
I think recruitment wise, it probably had a much bigger impact in the West, 
I much bigger impact in the West among disinfected Muslims in Western populations 
than it did within Middle East itself.  Certainly, bigger impact than it had on Middle 
Eastern governments.  It gave them no legitimacy among the Jordanian government, 
Saudi government.  But, that call seems to be very strong disinfected, poor, majority 
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Muslim populations in places like the UK and Belgium, and France.  And I think that is 
where it had the bigger impact. 
Participant 13 
This perception of legitimacy was a victory for them and definitely an image the West 
wished to dissolve as quickly as possible.  
Participant 12 
There were enough people that did.  Tens of thousands of people flooded into Iraq and 
Syria from all over the world.  The announcement of the caliphate had a catalyzing effect 
on the global Sunni world, drawing people from just about every nation on earth. 
The ranks of ISIS rapidly swelled, even though most of the Sunni leadership in Cairo and 
Mecca, did not consider that legitimate.  It was enough to make ISIS a serious force to be 
reckoned with for a short period of time.  There were people who were waiting for ages 
for the caliphate restored and I think there were many other Sunni’s worldwide that 
probably weren’t 100 percent sure it was legitimate or not.  But it was enough to excite 
and energize and spur volunteers for donations.  All of that is incredibly hard to track.  
Tens of thousands of volunteers and tens of millions of dollars flooded into Iraq and 
Syria.  And if it hadn’t been for the international coalition, had a very good chance of 
taking over Iraq and Syria and moving the governance there.  
Participant 2 
No, part of our strategy will be attacking the West as well, it is here and now, the 
caliphate.  And, that appealed to generation of jihadist that are younger, have less of an 
attention span with modern day social networking communications and stuff like that, 
was allowed them to attract the tens of thousands of foreign fighters from across the 
world.  So, more than anything that AQ attracted, even during the Soviet jihad. 
Participant 14 
I think they underestimated their recruitment numbers.  So, even though using social 
media was a new thing and there was a lot of communication, these ISIS guys talking, 
getting people come through social media and stuff, I don’t think the numbers were there 
to sustain the movement. 
So at first I think that the impact of declaring a caliphate was a positive act for 
recruitment.  It brought back old thoughts on restoring caliphates from the past.  That 
probably did help with the recruitment drive as people wanted to see a unified Muslim 
nation.  
Participant 7  
So that establishment of the caliphate is also what sort of made them different than AQI 
and their former brand.  So, I think it was important even though it was only a little bit 
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different than what they had been doing before, it made a big impact especially to people 
who were outside the war zone, in Europe, the America’s, or Asia.  Especially in Asia 
who were like this is not just another terrorist group.  This is the caliphate that is 
establishing from their perspective. 
Innovation and Impact 
Name: Apps 
Participant 9 
Also, the use of different apps, instead of using text messaging and phone calls, they 
immediately went to apps that they knew might be end to end encrypted. They pushed for 
innovation. 
Participant 7 
But I think if you look at other terrorist organizations, they are not utilizing those same 
tools. As they could for their own purposes.  Especially things like telegram and 
encryption and like there are other apps and email that are encrypted, they use those 
things on purpose.  So, because they know.  
Name: Drones 
Participant 9 
Not only in their weaponry, have you known using the most advanced weaponry out 
there.  In open source, they talk about the use of drones, they are trying to be forward 
leaning 
Participant 12 
You can see it in the way they have adapted commercial technology like drones to drop 
grenades and things like that. 
Name: Encryption 
Participant 9 
They immediately went to apps that they knew might be end to end encrypted. They 
pushed for innovation. 
Participant 10 
And they are one of the few groups that use point to point encryption for communication. 
Participant 3 
So, first of all, that is one of the ways that ISIS developed in a way that AQ never did.  It 
was there use of online communication.  Everybody kind of knows the going dark 
problem in using encrypted apps. That is going to continue to be an issue.  So, there is 
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that problem.  They have found a way to communicate in a way that doesn’t get them 
caught. 
Participant 7 
But I think if you look at other terrorist organizations, they are not utilizing those same 
tools. As they could for their own purposes.  Especially things like telegram and 
encryption and like there are other apps and email that are encrypted, they use those 
things on purpose.  So, because they know.  
Name: External Operations 
Participant 9 
Yes, it is successful.  And it gets in the news.  Here in Africa there is, 100 people die it 
doesn’t make the news.  You kill one French guy and the whole media social media is on 
fire.  So it’s easy publicity, cheap publicity.  Why not.  It is kind of like the Islamic State 
promote the idea of jihad by yourself anywhere.  You don’t need to be under our sharia 
laws.   Just do it in your own way.  It is like self-made jihad if you will.  And they 
promote that. 
Participant 4 
They have encouraged anybody to do anything they can.  
They funded, they decided, they facilitated different attacks and planned these things, 
whereas ISIS.  They don’t even know what attacks are in planning until they happen, and 
then they claim credit.  And their people that do these attacks in Europe or the United 
States, they do their videos and stuff like that giving the credit to ISIS.  Even though ISIS 
didn’t even have to expend any risk or resources.  None of that.  It is brilliant in a way, 
but then it is also brought the wrath of the world down upon then. 
Well, focusing on their external attacks, yes, I do. Like we mentioned before, it costs 
them nothing.  Or next to nothing.  They have very little operation risk.  The risk is 
focused in on only an individual or maybe a very small group of just a few people, so I 
think it is they wave of the future when it comes to attacks outside of a conflict zone.  For 
all of those reasons, it works.  It is effective.  It is cheap. It is low risk.  All of those 
things. And once they have decided their brand is brutality and death, then they have 
nothing to lose as far as “oh shoot, they killed a bunch of kinder garners.”  Great you 
know.  AQ might not have wanted that, but ISIS does.  So it works perfectly for them.  
As long as that is their brand and they are not worried about backlash or other casualties 
apart from a target. Then it completely works.   
I think we are seeing it across the board.  Even people without a cause, like the mass 
shootings in the States.  They don’t even have a cause and they are doing that.  And so, 
with causes like ISIS or other things like that, sure, I think that is what we will see in the 
future. 
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But I would almost say that the mass casualty, but attacks, they were already rare.  But 
they will continue to be rare, and even more rare than they were in the past, because you 
have this other method that is tried and true.  And doesn’t come with all of the baggage, 
the expense and risk and everything.  And it works.  And it generates all this fear because 
you never know when some dude is going to come crashing through the crowd in a 
pickup truck or a delivery truck or something versus, “well, I am not in New York, I am 
probably good.” 
Participant 10 
Another big seller was they decentralized attacks.  They empower the people to attack 
and it is random.  It is not the centralized attack at home type of deal. 
Participant 6 
I think right now, it is unique to ISIS.  
I think so just because of the economic impact of doing them.  They get the media 
attention they want.  And it doesn’t cost them a lot. So, that being financially equal.  
They can convince somebody to drive a truck into a crowd of such people. It will garnish, 
at least in the short term, the same media attention as a larger attack.  
Participant 5 
I would say they definitely more efficient and willing to do some of the things the 
inspired attacks. Working one on one with people in the conflict zones with people in the 
West, Australia and those sorts of things to do attacks. 
And ISIS willingness to give up some kind of control I guess or willingness to accept 
some risk in what the outcome of the attack would be was different that AQ and 
somewhat innovative.  But they were just perfecting I guess the technique AQ had 
shown. 
And I think that will be the biggest impact from ISIS will be kind of  the acceptance and 
justification for lone actors to do some sort of small scale attacks anywhere in the world 
without ever having contact with, traveled to, or anything with ISIS or any other terrorist 
organization, but will just be more willing to act. 
Because a lot of these guys will be looking for stuff they can drive up on a sidewalk 
somewhere.  A small arms attack in a café like we saw in Australia and stuff like that.  
And in the West, there is less of a calculus for the target containing Muslims. Obviously, 
something in Turkey or the Middle East is going to have that calculus that comes into it.  
But in the West, I think that will be much less from a lone actor perspective short of 
attacking a mosque.  They are unlikely to find large concentrations of Muslims that 
would be involved in the targeting.  
Participant 15 
155 
 
 
 
They had a very hierarchical structure (AQ).  I think that is more of reactionary tactic to 
increase security. I mean, AQ had the ability to be more centralized and structured 
because the West was much more lax and things like 9/11 were happening because it was 
possible.  But post 9/11, the US, UK and the rest of Europe clamped down, empowering, 
using social media and those types of tactics gave ISIS more reach I guess into the places 
where security was much tighter.  And they couldn’t smuggle in people that have been in 
training camps.  So, the way to do it was to empower and radicalize. 
Participant 13 
The long-term impact is the TTP’s for other groups seeking to establish themselves on an 
equal platform, i.e. being recognized internationally, gaining traction in its movement, 
and galvanizing a large segment of a population that threatened Iraq’s newly established 
infrastructure.  
Participant 1 
Lone wolf, driving a car down the road and running people over. Talk About morphing 
into efficient killing machines. We don’t have to find explosives.  We don’t have to find 
suicide bombers that are willing to do that. When is the last time you hear of a suicide 
bomber. Who ever thought they would take over a plane with box cutters. Who ever 
thought somebody would rent a car and drive it and watch and see when people are out to 
lunch and fire that bad boy up and drive it as fast as you can hitting and killing everything 
that moves? Who in the hell is going to go into Aria Grande concert and do something 
stupid.  And one person can cause that mass terror and say that it is.  And now everybody 
is scared and it’s great.  It is one person.  With a hundred dollar a day car rental. 
Participant 2 
But then declaring calls they put out to others, were similar to what AQ did, but it was 
more effective because ISIS model was much more present and much more persuasive if 
you are saying you can’t come here, do something in the service.  And what you are 
going to do something in the service of is on the verge of happening, not some future 
thing 100 years in the future, for no immediate gain.  These people, who want to drive 
trucks into Nice and can connect their action to something they believe was going to be 
on the verge of happening. 
Participant 14 
I agree.  I think a lot of countries in the Middle East, there typical militaries don’t 
empower the lower soldier.  ISIS did change that model a little, empowering the 
individual to conduct attacks.  At the lower level too, and their actual military. 
You have three guys conducting a mass attack.  That is three dudes less conducting 
further attacks. 
Participant 3 
156 
 
 
 
And they knew exactly what they were going to target and when they were going to 
target it and how they were going to do it.  And ISIS has taken that, and adapted it in a 
way that not only allows them to conduct and claim more attacks, but also beat 
counterterrorism measures that were targeting these groups.  
So, you can see that in Paris, Brussels Ataturk. That happened in quick succession, three 
major terrorist attacks in 6 months.  We have never seen that operational tempo before.  
So I think ISIS has shown other groups that they can have a much quicker operational 
tempo. 
And they have done that in a couple of ways.  The first being opportunistic targeting.  So, 
if they have members or associates who have access critical infrastructure, mass 
transportation, the West.  Any targets of interest, they will coop that person and 
knowledge and they will use it to their advantage. It doesn’t matter to them if they hit that 
specific building or that particular train.  One particular flight.  They just want a 
successful attack to happen.  So, they are giving autonomy back to their operatives.  Yes, 
they want spectacular attacks.  Yes, they want them to operatives to follow through with 
the plans set in motion, but they are giving them that freedom to say, this isn’t working or 
hey, our guy here is compromised. 
How do we change our plan? And that happened with Brussels as well.  So, opportunity 
targeting.  A little autonomy with their operatives. And they are also completely 
outsourcing.  I think that is what you mean by decentralizing and a lot of people call it 
that.  But like they are basically saying hey, you want to conduct an attack in our name, 
you are free to do so.  You can pledge to us, you can say you did it for ISIS, whatever, 
but we want you to just go out and conduct an attack in our name.  Here are the ways you 
can do it. 
That took on a life of its own, that article did.  It was printed, and reprinted, and reprinted 
again.  And by printed, I mean published on the internet.  It showed up in a million 
different formats.  And what they learned from that was if we give people specific 
guidance, if we give them a recipe, give them exact targets to go after.  The type of target 
we want to go after.  If we tell them exactly what to do, there is a better chance they will 
do it.  So, it is no accident that they said hey, take your truck and drive it into a crowd.  
And then Sayfullo Saipov, and then takes a truck and drives it into a crowd.  So, when 
they give that specific guidance, they take out the element needing an expertise, or 
needing even a network of people to help you get things done.  Anybody can go to a U-
Haul store, rent a truck and drive it into crowd.  So, whenever I brief that topic, I always 
ask the group who here owns a car.  And of course, everybody raises their hand.  So, I 
mean you have your deadly weapon in your possession.  So, that is another way they 
have affected the future.  They are telling people you don’t need to know how to build a 
bomb.  You don’t need to know how to fly a plane.  You don’t need to know how to 
make a chemical or biological substance.  You just need to be able to drive a car.  So, 
they have taken it from sophisticated, complicated, high impact attacks and driven into 
the low impact, but lower impact, but anyone can do it.   
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There was a whole lot of opportunity for advancement for a short period of time within 
ISIS.  And you just had to get in with one really good guy, and then he would give you 
his information and his sort of historical knowledge of whatever he was working on.  And 
then you took it over if he got killed in whatever manner.  And so it was always really 
fascinating to me because it seems like they pretty strictly adhere to that.  So like 
everybody first job was to pick their successor. Who is the guy you are going to trust.  
Who is the guy you are going to tell all your secrets to so they can continue on. 
And it happened.  Not only the new guys never told anybody else.  So, you still have that 
compartmentalization that is so critical to their plotting because if one part of it goes 
down, the rest of it doesn’t necessarily fall.  It just goes to the next guy.  So, it is 
fascinating the way they built their hierarchy in that respect.  And they are not stupid.  
They know as CT pressure increases, soon as there is public rhetoric of defeating ISIS 
and they put a timeline on it.  The group moved its most important elements to safety.  
So, media and external operations were preserved in large part by ISIS. 
Participant 7 
But I think it is really dependent on what a stronger wants to get.  So for the past year, 
they haven’t had a Rumiyah in a year or something.  I think maybe September was the 
last one. Their news outlets went out.  A big blow was when they stopped putting out 
French radio things for a really long time.  So, if they had those things.  I think people 
underestimated the impact of those things because you had all those inspired attacks that 
were happening.  And their media was really strong.  And people were like sympathetic 
to this thing. I think it is too early to tell.  Is it a coincidence that the media drastically 
dropped because of their capabilities when they were losing ground in Syria?  And, their 
folks were being targeted.  Is it a coincidence then inspired attacks drastically dropped in 
Europe when they lost that language ability?  
But I think for home grown terrorism, I think I am not sure that would be the wave of the 
future because a lot of times, people ultimately want to make a political statement.  
Terrorism is for a violent political change. 
So, if you run a car, that is going to be on the news for a day or two in England, maybe, 
but if you want to make a really big impact, you are going to do something a little more 
advance.  You are going to do something like Barcelona or Manchester.  Where you are 
going to have news for a really long time, for years later.  And you are going to take up a 
lot of resources investigating.  I think that is more of the future.  People are going to stop 
and think and I’m upset about this thing.  All of this propaganda is out there, in Rumiyah 
and other publications.  How to build a bomb.  How do something that is very complex.  
And do that. I think we are going to see less of the knife attacks and truck attacks.  Those 
seem like frustrated people to me. 
Name: Finance 
Participant 4 
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I think that it completely changes the game.  If they are able to self-finance then it frees 
them from a lot of considerations.  They can brand themselves anyway they like.  And the 
world be damned in their opinion because they have their own money and their own 
people.  And so, that completely changes the game. 
Participant 10 
And it self-financed with what they take over they can tax everything and bring 
everything up to speed. 
Participant 13 
The financial support received for the movement was also significant.  
Breaking away from the conventional operations, ISIS’s effective command and control 
was also exhibited in the funneling of funds and support using global interconnectivity. 
Participant 1 
The first thing that shocked me is that they were not depend on anyone else's money.   
That was the big takeaway.   They are a whole piece was an are going to generate their 
own dollars.   If someone was earning money to us that's great. Other terrorist models 
prior to that relied heavily heavenly on donations and the Saudi regime.   Very wealthy 
people and Osama bin Laden putting a lot of his own wealth.  They were very successful.  
If that wouldn’t have happened on that day it would have lost everything.  
They earn their own money. They are self-sustaining. They have mimic a nation state. 
They have a leader.  They have courts. They have everything you want to have and on 
top of that they have a propaganda machine second to none. 
Straight line versus the circular piece.  There is not a lot written on it. That is me. So, 
straight line is a classic terrorist theme.  Raise the money, move the money, store the 
money. And use them.  We talked about BSA and how that gets put in there. So, you 
raise the money.  How do they raise the money? They raise the money from donations, 
store it until they can use it. And initially they put it in banks, they use the stock market, 
and they were able to multiple the money expediently. 
One of the things with ISIL is that they developed accounts, just like the cartels did.  
They can’t do it, so they have people that can do it.  You pay them a whole bunch of 
money or you develop your own people.  Put them through law school.  Put them through 
and make them CPAs.  Somebody that is for the cause, put them in college and develop 
them.  They have the money to do it and they have nothing but time.  
Participant 2 
That is a key lynch pin, key component of their land grab.  That is absolutely critical.  
And, why I think the model of controlling and seizing territory is so important, because it 
comes with the benefits of self-sustain benefits of independent revenue generation.  
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Taxing people, the people who they will control, or taking control of whatever resources 
are there at the time.  And that’s a big deal.  I don’t think that you always are going to 
have donors, Saudi Arabia has its own problems to fight these days. Obviously, the 
money from the family is legit and is sustainable.  And that is why it is so important and 
that is why ISIS paid a premium on some territory and were able to command.   
Near state like resources.  Which perpetuate and sustain themselves.  SO, I think it is 
absolutely important. 
Participant 8 
They are going to have to turn to, and they are turning to other types of funding.  It is the 
criminality aspect, the organized crime is the insular part of their organization.  We are 
probably going to continue to see the impact. 
Participant 3 
And they first thing they go after are banks and prisons.  Why, people and money.  And 
that is how in an oil rich environment, they still sell oil on the black market.  They are 
still generating revenue.    
Front companies are another way too.  I know there are a lot of people and this is where 
crosses is over into cyber stuff.  Using front companies.  People don’t know what they are 
paying for. 
Name: No 
Participant 5 
I don’t know that any of it was innovative. 
Name: Professionals 
Participant 5 
The recruitment of Westerners, again a lot of what they did, AQ had done in the past. Just 
not on a wide scale. 
Even the use of language, AQAP was using multiple languages especially English and 
Arabic, but ISIS was able to use a lot of their recruits to develop the multi lingual 
platforms to target the different places. 
Participant 1 
Absolutely.  You have a doctor that has debt, it is just time before a doctor from the us or 
nurse from the us gets involved, if they haven’t already. So, their ability, the money gives 
them the ability to be more flexible than AQ. It is run like a fortune 500 company, and 
fortune 500 companies that have gone under. The ones that have been unsuccessful, look 
at the auto industry. We don’t build a superior product the United States. Why?  Because 
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they haven’t learned. A United States guy that goes to japan after the war, he went to all 
the auto companies and I am going to teach you a new philosophy on how to build things.   
One of the things with ISIL is that they developed accounts, just like the cartels did.  
They can’t do it, so they have people that can do it.  You pay them a whole bunch of 
money or you develop your own people.  Put them through law school.  Put them through 
and make them CPAs.  Somebody that is for the cause, put them in college and develop 
them.  They have the money to do it and they have nothing but time.  
Participant 2 
Inspire was an English language vehicle, but ISIS with all its foreign fighters is able to 
create a lot of different periodicals, whether this inspired them or not that were not only 
focused in English, but in French, North African dialect Arabic and many other 
languages, German and stuff.  Written by Germans, fluid, native language speakers even 
in Indonesian and stuff like that.  Which resonated, and that is part of propaganda is 
having a native speaker speak to us.  Everyone knows, trying propaganda, and trying 
these nuanced things to motivate people, if you don’t have local references, when you are 
trying to appeal to the global scale, but also talking the types of local references in the 
way they say it in the native language, then that is the most attractive way. 
Participant 14 
So with those initial people coming in with a doctorate, and knowledge in engineering.  
Once they were gone, they were gone.  And the populations there couldn’t sustain the 
innovation that was initially brought forth.  So, you have the guys who show up the 
doctors and stuff, once they are dead, they are gone. 
Participant 3 
But also in terms of virtual jihad, I think ISIS is starting to use, we have seen a lot of 
hackers get on board the ISIS philosophy.   And we have seen in some of the ISIS 
plotting efforts to compromise websites.  For the most part, they were probably using it to 
get names or phone numbers or whatever. 
Because they were putting out this kill list for quite a while.  But I think there is the 
potential, if they were to regroup and advance there cyber efforts.  That they could 
conduct denial of service attacks or other ways of disrupting life online. 
Name: Social Media 
Participant 9 
If you look at their media, they had the best. I’ve read their magazines, the image quality, 
the editing of the magazine, are phenomenal.  Something you could see printed in a store.  
And then if you read some of the religious messaging in there, it invokes emotion.  They 
use a lot of poetic language.   
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So, I think it drew on the modern technology of today with media, and then bringing in 
the historical stuff.   
Islamic State took over Mosul I Iraq, they implemented laws, taxation, and they had a 
long term plan.  They used current technology to get there.  They reached out across the 
world via twitter, YouTube, and sensationalized videos that were high quality and high 
definition, and I don’t feel like they ever. They reached back to their roots of Islamic 
Jihad to tell the story, but they used modern day communication means to do it. 
Participant 4 
Where, they are doing these propaganda videos inside their own controlled areas where 
all the beheadings and all these other things they are doing.  The Jordanian pilot, that kind 
of stuff, it is so brutal that it worked on one side.  
I think that has been key to their success.  It is very empowering, it is very egalitarian and 
democratic.  I don’t know if that is the right word, but it is evolved to the group more.  
Free to join, not money wise, but free for people to join and take part.  It is the same 
model they have with their attacks.  
Same thing with getting access to propaganda and everything else. 
Participant 10 
They also use social media as a recruiting platform. 
Participant 6 
Social media obviously, and having a younger cadre, they were able to do that fairly 
rapidly.  Like any terrorist group, the actual attacks were not sophisticated in that it didn’t 
have to devote a lot of resources.  From technology and using it, they really took 
advantage on their younger groups to take advantage of the social media platforms and 
technology that was already out there. 
Participant 5 
And, if anything their innovation came in the use of social media and those sorts of 
things.  But again, those are things like Al-Awlaki were doing, but it was not the 
platforms themselves weren’t as developed so he didn’t have the options and just wasn’t 
as good at it. He was more in the AQ mindset as opposed to what these ISIS were guys 
were doing.   
Participant 15 
I think they were a bit of innovative in their use of technology and social media.  But that 
may have been just a consequence of the technology being available.  
Multilingual, and in a way, ISIS learned it from AQAP with Inspire Magazine and with 
AQ. 
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Participant 13 
The boundless opportunity the internet offers is a medium they continue exploiting in 
order to spread their message and acquire support for their cause.  
Participant 1 
It is propaganda.  It is advertisement 
Participant 12 
Well, they are certainly innovative in a sense they figured out how to do things that AQ 
never really did.  AQ has a media wing.  It didn’t end up being as nearly successful as 
ISIS’s media wing.  Maybe it was the slick, professional quality of their publications.  
Maybe it was their use of social media to find and attract lone wolves that have been 
conducting attacks all over Europe, America, and elsewhere.  Like you said, knowing 
how to put together a nice online magazine, people have been doing that for decades.  But 
they were the first ones to do it really well, really slick, polished, and professional. 
Participant 2 
I think it is both an improvement upon AQ’s model that basically at its best, started with 
AQAP and the Inspire magazine. And, its improvement upon that they used it much more 
effectively.  They used new social networking sites and technology and other things for 
the better effect.  For the most part, it was an extension and vast improvement on that 
model of Inspire attacks in places, smaller scale attacks trying to do. 
Inspire was an English language vehicle, but ISIS with all its foreign fighters is able to 
create a lot of different periodicals, whether this inspired them or not that were not only 
focused in English, but in French, North African dialect Arabic and many other 
languages, German and stuff.  Written by Germans, fluid, native language speakers even 
in Indonesian and stuff like that.  Which resonated, and that is part of propaganda is 
having a native speaker speak to us.  Everyone knows, trying propaganda, and trying 
these nuanced things to motivate people, if you don’t have local references, when you are 
trying to appeal to the global scale, but also talking the types of local references in the 
way they say it in the native language, then that is the most attractive way. 
Participant 14 
That was unheard of.  I can’t remember how many languages.  Very innovative, great at 
the time, good idea.  And able to hit a wide market quickly.  Again, they had the first 
push for that technological innovation.  If they have the one guy who knows Bosnian and 
is doing it, and is gone, that cuts those numbers down.  They had the innovation initially, 
but not the staying power to keep it going. 
I think the publications that were put out in the past by other terror groups have always 
been there.  Same things, how to make a bomb, how to do this, I just think the ease of 
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access to the information is what made ISIS stand out.  Things weren’t hidden in the dark 
web.  It was social media, you can post everywhere, how to make a bomb. 
Participant 8 
It is become, not necessarily random, but with the proliferation and use of the internet, 
that has been able to garner the attention and attract otherwise people that were probably 
not going to subscribe to the religious aspects of the organization or the ideology 
necessarily.  Still see the connection or want to join and be a part of it or contribute or 
otherwise support.  That is the very random or very difficult thing to detect and interdict.   
Participant 3 
They are outsourcing that.  And they are doing that through propaganda.  So, they 
learned, I think from.  You have to look back to look forward.  Right.  So, ISIS has 
looked back at some of the particular propaganda that has come out and if I.  From my 
point of view, they have learned from things like Inspire and Inspires’ article on how to 
build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom.  
The other thing ISIS did that AQ never did is that they started using public forums for 
their propaganda.  So, you didn’t need to be part of those private subscription based 
forums where everybody has to have a legit email address.  You just need a twitter 
account basically and you can get that stuff.  So, they have made it more publicly 
available.  But also in terms of virtual jihad, I think ISIS is starting to use, we have seen a 
lot of hackers get on board the ISIS philosophy.   And we have seen in some of the ISIS 
plotting efforts to compromise websites.  For the most part, they were probably using it to 
get names or phone numbers or whatever. 
Participant 7 
You have them trying to recruit, trying to communicate on social media who have never 
gone to Syria.   
That is another thing that is available to them. If you think of Osama bin Landen when 
they put out the videos that was a really unique thing.  That took a lot of resources on 
their part to do that.  Now, anyone can do that anywhere and put that out there.  And ISIS 
can have it immediately and literally have no ties to them. 
Name: Violence 
Participant 11 
They are only innovative at the level of their violence is dramatically greater than 
anything before.  They are also innovative in the sense of how they sort of shamelessly 
publicize themselves, publicize their agenda.  AQ would never done things like that. 
I heard this theory from somebody.  That each new generation of terrorist and terrorist 
groups attract attention.  Survive and grow by a radical increase, and exponential increase 
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in their violence.  So, AQ, 3,000 people in the twin towers.  That was beyond belief.  
Then you got ISIS with randomly killing as many people as possible by amateurs.  Just 
terror, just killing for killing sake.  I mean, that is how they have changed terrorism.  
Because whatever comes along in the future, is going to have to start with that as their 
baseline, and then come up with a new wrinkle or extend it somehow.  Maybe nobody 
will, but. 
Participant 5 
From a propaganda standpoint, again their willingness to accept risk in things like 
beheading.  So we saw with Pearl years ago when AQ. SO we had seen that happen 
before, but AQ the saw the impact and the reaction and pulled back from those sorts of 
things.  ISIS was willing to blow through that stop sign and go more forward.  
Participant 15 
Their big innovation is the level of barbarity I think. 
Certainly, their innovation was to up the violence level above what previous groups have 
done.  Just the brutality.   
I think in order to shocking, the next group, in order to take the oxygen out of the room as 
it were and to steal the front page and to be the lead story in Western media, they are 
going to have to up the level of violence. 
Participant 12 
You can see how innovative they are in the way they torture and execute people, in a 
savage, psychotic, barbaric sort of way.  Worst then most other global Sunni terrorist 
groups are.  But are localized Sunni terrorists groups around the world are.  
Name: Women and kids 
Participant 9 
Yeah, faking it.  Making a man dress up like a woman, to do operations. I wonder if it is 
because women are not really considered part of the jihad.   And in a paternal sense of 
hierarchy.  There is the cubs to caliphate as well.  So, ISIS has the program to 
indoctrinate and brainwash children.  I think they really had a long-term goal and a long-
term plan.   
Participant 10 
Yes, I do.  The use of women and kids.  There is less operational scrutiny. They are better 
recruiters, the women are. 
Participant 6 
Like any terrorist group, the actual attacks were not sophisticated in that it didn’t have to 
devote a lot of resources.  From technology and using it, they really took advantage on 
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their younger groups to take advantage of the social media platforms and technology that 
was already out there. 
Participant 11 
Yeap 
But I think that’s not new in terrorism, but to the degree and the openness and to the 
degree to which they exploit that.  Exploit everything.  That is new in terrorism. 
Participant 14 
Use of drones, women and children. 
Participant 3 
So, they are telling their people yes we are going to lose because the Westerners will 
always try to kill us.  Which is why we have to kill them first.  Why we will come back 
and do it again.  Why they train children.  You hear all about cubs of the caliphate. 
Kids as young as boys 7, 8, 9, but then a lot of teenage women who may have come from 
other countries who wound up with ISIS became teenage brides and whatever.  Also went 
through training.  They know how to operate a suicide vest.  They know how to operate 
weapons.  Everyone that is part of this organization is trained in how to keep it alive by 
fighting and killing.  So, like I said, unless you kill every single person who has been part 
of this, you just don’t kill off the group. 
Participant 7 
Operational it is general enough it can evoke multiple answers from whatever the 
perspective of the person.  If you think about like ISIS using women and children, using 
in air quotes.  Again, it goes back to some of the propaganda them by saying, yeah that 
was us.  They had the only all-female jihadi cell.  From the UK that were arrested a 
couple of months ago.   
So, I think you are going to see a little bit of that.  I don’t think that will be a thing.  There 
are more and more studies that are coming out by people who were conducting research 
inside Syria that are saying that women have this major operational impact.  They were 
acting as recruiters. They were the recruiters.  They were the ones thinking very 
strategically and influencing all of this.  So, if you think about that, okay, you are going 
to have, and a lot of them too, especially from Europe, saying that is was women pushing 
the male fighters to go fight.  So a lot of statistics are coming out and that will be 
whatever it ends up being but it is really interesting.  
So you think even you have women and children returning from the war zone, they are 
under a lot less scrutiny, especially, children.  What can you do?  Women are just under 
less scrutiny.  
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So when they are coming back.  At the same time too, even if you are a country that has 
very proactive counterterrorism laws or capabilities, if you were a recruiter that is not a 
lot of evidence to bring you up on terrorism charges.  You are going to have to have some 
kind of smoking gun online.  It will be very difficult.  So these people are going to be 
here and they are probably even more pissed off because people they knew and loved 
died and died in airstrikes possibly by a country they are going back too.  So I think that 
is going to be a major, again not an immediate issue, but, mid to long term issue.  
Especially with the kids that are coming back, who were even born there with hearing 
about the good old days?  Even when they come back to their communities and in their 
mosque or where ever people are talking about the good old days.  Oh you look just like 
your father.  He was such a good fighter.  He was such a good man.  There are movies 
they make about kids that get pissed and like start fighting for that kind of thing.  I think 
long term children, but I think midterm is going to be returning women, because they are 
going to be under a lot less scrutiny and they going to be the recruiters. You can have one 
guy who wants to ram a vehicle.  And he either does and he is arrested forever.  You can 
have women who can recruit a lot of people to do that and not be under the scrutiny.  
Name: Yes 
Participant 9 
I think they changed the nature of terrorism.  
Participant 4 
That they have played the game fast and loose, rather than AQ.  Where AQ seemed to 
have a lot more control.  They kept things in line and they had a certain strategy that they 
wanted to keep things within that scope.  And they didn’t allow certain things to happen.  
They didn’t want to let it out of their prevue.   
Participant 10 
Yes, I do. 
Participant 15 
They are probably innovative in a modern context.  
Participant 13 
The long-term impact is the TTP’s for other groups seeking to establish themselves on an 
equal platform, i.e. being recognized internationally, gaining traction in its movement, 
and galvanizing a large segment of a population that threatened Iraq’s newly established 
infrastructure.  
Participant 14 
Yes, I consider them innovative.  
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Utilizing old traditional beliefs prevented any further innovation from happening. 
Participant 8  
Yes, I think what they did masterfully well was combine everything from the blitzkrieg 
type attacks and military operations combined with holding ground and putting in place 
ministries and the notion or resemblance of having a legitimate functionally governance.  
Other Groups Learning 
Name: AQ 
Participant 9 
I think AQ is going to learn from this obviously.  They are going to go okay, we can’t 
just take over a city because, like you said, thirty nations response.  So, I think AQ’s 
model has always been and will always be a longer trajectory where it is win the hearts 
and minds of the people slowly adapt them into your version of sharia law, your 
understanding of Islamic texts.  And, you know, I feel like AQ does attacks and they 
promote attacks against the West, they are also much focused on local operations and 
getting people to adhere to what they believe in. I don’t think AQ will follow the same 
ISIS model and I do think they will learn from it.  As soon as they declared the caliphate 
everyone in the world was like all eyes on you buddy.  So, I think AQ is learning from 
that. 
Participant 4 
I would say that it would be unlikely for AQ to change in that way.  
Participant 10 
I think they are set in their ways.  There is a clear divide between the two groups of 
attacking, the near attack and the far attack. 
Participant 5 
I would not expect somebody like AQ be willing to take on more of the allowing some 
guy to do an attack in their name.  Which is something they have always wanted and to 
control the message of their attacks much more closely than ISIS has. 
Participant 8 
I think it is almost been in some sense a way for AQ to distinguish themselves that we are 
the true base.  And we are still known as upholding an ideology as opposed to these 
barbarians.  It is not necessarily think that AQ would adopt that strategy or tactics. 
Participant 3 
From my perspective, AQ charts its own course, right.  As they build the new generation 
of leaders, they might take on some of the ISIS qualities or ISIS ideas.  But AQ kind of 
168 
 
 
 
does things their own way and that is why they are sort of in bed with Iran right now.  
But, for like other groups, I think what concerns me are that factions or like in Africa, 
there might be smaller groups of really aggressive fighters.  
Name: Yes 
Participant 9 
I think AQ is going to learn from this obviously.  They are going to go okay, we can’t 
just take over a city because, like you said, thirty nations response.  So, I think AQ’s 
model has always been and will always be a longer trajectory where it is win the hearts 
and minds of the people slowly adapt them into your version of sharia law, your 
understanding of Islamic texts.  And, you know, I feel like AQ does attacks and they 
promote attacks against the West, they are also much focused on local operations and 
getting people to adhere to what they believe in. I don’t think AQ will follow the same 
ISIS model and I do think they will learn from it.  As soon as they declared the caliphate 
everyone in the world was like all eyes on you buddy.  So, I think AQ is learning from 
that. 
Participant 4 
I would expect newer groups to adopt similar tactics simply because those tactics are 
reckless.  And they come with strategic risks.  
And so new groups that are reckless as a movement their newness, I definitely see that 
happening again in the future, over and over again. 
Participant 10 
Yes, I think they will.  I think they will take that away.  Simple, small scale, small scale 
attacks with simple weapons that do the most damage.  
I do see that a little bit with TTP, the Taliban Pakistan.  I see a little bit with that with 
LET out of Pakistan too.  They have a little bit of that going on small scale. 
Participant 6 
Yes, I would assume, propaganda and those type of messaging that other groups are 
taking on board how they are doing it.  Their multi linguist linguistic type platforms.  
And taking lessons, either positive or negative on how that is working.  It would be hard 
to imagine that even people that are not members or where members and left, that they 
aren’t somehow be sharing how they do it or what went right or wrong. 
Participant 11 
They might imitate or adopt similar tactics, such as open source usage.  Just to survive.  
And to counter that and to survive in the environment that ISIS is dominating.  They 
would adopt things that seemed to work for ISIS. 
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Participant 5 
Could it be replicated, sure? It would just need. It is obviously going to be different in 
some ways because it is all dependent on the environment in which you are doing it.  
They got lucky if you will or took advantage of the ongoing conflict in Syria, the weak 
Iraqi government, and the marginalization of the Sunni’s in Iraq to take over that big 
chunk of land in Eastern Syria, Western Iraq. Which gave them a foothold to not only 
claim they had a caliphate, but also manage and govern land, which gave their claim of a 
caliphate some legitimize that they were actually controlling something. 
I am sure they will adopt some, and I think we have even seen, again, I haven’t looked 
that closely at AQ messaging, but I think we have seen it become more responsive. 
Especially Zawahiri over the past year or so.  It is still not nearly what ISIS does, but it 
does seem to be a bit quicker in response to things.  So, I think they will learn some of 
those lessons. 
I am trying to think which one it would be. I would think it would be more likely some of 
their affiliates break off depending on what happens.  I don’t think they will ever be the 
vanguard like ISIS was or like AQ ever was. But maybe more leading edge of ISIS 
ideology.  But I think the big factor in that will be what happens to the guy’s still ISIS 
leadership.  Do they go to an affiliate?  DO they end up in the Sinai or Libya, then they 
may drive it from there.  The question is then is that ISIS core or if some of the leadership 
goes to Libya, then is it ISIS Libya now instead of ISIS core. 
Participant 1 
Of course.  They don’t see if coming (finance).  It leaves a digital trail. You cannot 
eliminate it.  There are weak points, attack points, are fundamentally there.   
Participant 12 
It makes sense.  Whenever one group figures out how to do something successfully, 
especially in the digital information age.  That technology and knowhow is going to 
proliferate through the internet, through blogs.  Whether it is how to make an explosive 
gas or build an IED or put a grenade on a drone.  Other groups are going to inevitably 
figure that out.  And it is not just in terrorism.  It is in conventional warfare.  When 
someone invites a new technological innovation, like putting armored treads on a vehicle 
like a tank.   That changes the nature of warfare forever.   
In the future, armed drones.  ISIS was the one who really came up with that idea and 
made it work effectively and actually did some damage.  Things like that are going to 
proliferate.  
Participant 2 
I do and I think we seen AQ in so much as an unified organization big parts of it and 
powerful parts of it adapt in Syria, like what was formally known as al-Nusra Front.  And 
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realize that to have power, sometimes you have to collaborate.  You can’t be totally 
rejectionist.  And that caused problems.  A lot of the groups mainly participate.  It is 
almost like a loosening of their position.  Modify of their position for short term gain is 
much more pragmatic.  Supposed to saying it is my way or the high way kind of stuff.  
We will have to do this and then if we have to participate in certain power structures 
where we don’t have complete and total power, but we can do that.  We can eventually 
still have that vanguard inside, and then once we have the power, be the parasite that 
bursts out from that.  So, I do think that is the case.  I think that AQ is for the most part 
dead.  AQ as a unified organization has been dead for a long time. 
Participant 14 
Absolutely, I think a lot of other groups probably have changed their market, their 
branding. 
This isn’t just Islamic terrorism.  Anyone could.  I think we will see the model that ISIS 
has put out. For the transnational world, we see their initial innovation we saw through 
them will move across to other groups. 
Participant 8 
And you may see more surgical moves by state actors to conduct terrorism again.  And 
this type of terrorism will probably, we will see this for a while. 
If you dwindling or otherwise just spinning your wheels, then maybe we will adopt the 
ISIS moniker.  And yeah, let’s go out and do some of their stuff and get there blessing.  
Maybe it will work for us. 
Participant 3 
Killing seven people in New York City is a win for them.  It is not 3,000 people and two 
major buildings coming down.  But it is still a win.  So, they are willing to take quantity 
over quality, I think.  And I think other groups are watching what they do, and they 
realize once you have that increase in operational tempo, which is attack after attack after 
attack, or attempt and attempt after attempt.  It doesn’t matter how successful you are.  
You are a) having attacks and projecting power externally, but b) you are getting all this 
media attention so your brand starts to build.  And when you build a brand like that, you 
have all the people watching and every time there is an attempt or an attack, somebody 
with a like mind for whatever reason takes notice.  And they then have that precedent. So, 
hey that guy did that attack with that car, I can do that too.  So, it starts to build itself.  So, 
I think that is another way which they are affecting the future of terrorism. 
But, for like other groups, I think what concerns me are that factions or like in Africa, 
there might be smaller groups of really aggressive fighters. Or really aggressive people 
who are just willing to attack and don’t. Those are the people who concern me. Not 
people who have ideology, but people who just want to be violent for no reason.   
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So, I think you will see maybe smaller groups, but I really do think the ISIS problem is 
generational.  So, whether or not people subscribe to ISIS per say, particularly in 
European countries, I think there are people there might be close enough to network with 
people who were part of ISIS.  You know what I mean.  Like the neighborhood, like the 
Molenbeek neighborhood.  And I think that kind of stuff.  I don’t know if that plays out at 
groups or individuals. 
Do we have a lone actor problem?  We definitely do in the United States.  And I am 
pretty sure that is happening elsewhere as well.  There are places like pockets of pro ISIS 
people who are necessarily officially ISIS, so technically other groups, but who work 
under the same perimeters.  You see a lot of it in South East Asia, the Philippines, where 
that group actually held territory for a little while.  Bangladesh where it is just sort of law 
less.  Especially in countries where they don’t acknowledge they have a terrorism 
problem.  That stuff is just sort of ripe for. 
And they are telling them exactly how to do it.  Exactly the way they built ISIS core.  
They are laying out the plan for their affiliates.  So, you see a lot of that.  So, I don’t think 
the really heavy ISIS people will leave the core area.  But I do see where there are 
permissive operating environments. That is where you could start to see smaller pockets 
of resurgence.  I think that happens in Philippines and South East Asia.   
Participant 7 
I could see them doing that. I could see other groups like AQ doing that in very isolated 
incidents.  I don’t think AQ core would ever want that kind of thing, but I could see 
people who are extremists disenfranchised with ISIS for whatever reason, 
disenfranchised with AQ for whatever reason maybe because they are being told not to 
attack the West at large like ISIS is doing.  Either disenfranchised with that.  I could see 
one offs going forward with that.  Especially if AQ would have more successes in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  And that was a new news headline.  People might become 
more amenable to that sort of thing.  I think, the thing ISIS wanted to do is gain support 
and how they did that.  They wanted to gain support in very far reaches.  But I don’t think 
other groups would do that until they are mission aligned with that. 
Potential Growth Area 
Name: Africa 
Participant 9 
I think the Sahel is probably a really good place for jihad because there is not really good 
control.  The problem is how you get fighters to a desert.  No one wants to live there.  
The place is terrible.  
Participant 4 
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Egypt is a huge question mark.  The massive population and there is a lot of unrest and 
poverty.  I could see something happening there.  
Sahel, sure. It is actually happening right now in the Sahel.  In the Maghreb as well.  
Arabian Peninsula. 
Participant 10 
I see a movement to North Africa, 
Central Africa 
Participant 5 
So, good portions of Africa, 
Participant 15 
I think Africa is a big future front.  
So, Africa is a big one.  
Participant 2 
I also think Africa, can be a growth area for the movement. 
And Africa is probably the most ripe for all its extremist brands of stuff per growth, but I 
just don’t see Libya had the best chance right now, the wild card is Egypt, we can talk 
about that in a second. 
Participant 14 
I think my thoughts are always North Africa.  Africa in general, but I guess North as it is 
familiar 
Participant 7 
Africa  
Name: Europe 
Participant 11 
More urbanized, over populated, over governed, areas like Europe would the ISIS 
ideology is popular.  They are already there, but I think there is some potential for them 
to grow. 
Participant 5 
The one area I would say that might be somewhat concerning at least from a Western 
perspective are places in Europe with large refugee populations where you are seeing a 
lot of right wing attacks. Or governments that swing right wing and marginalize or 
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victimize those populations that would then make them more susceptible to anti-Western 
propaganda.  
Participant 15 
Depending on the continuation of the migrant crisis and other demographic changes in 
Europe, and depending on how far you want to forecast out, Europe could be a big front.  
I mean even forecast far enough out, we could look at Germany and France.  Where with 
migration and the nature order of how migration happens.  And the fact that the 
traditional white Western European families are not having as many children.  If we 
forecast out 50 to 100 years, there could be much larger Muslim populations in those 
countries that then could lead to either terrorist groups or peaceful political action.  
Participant 1 
Parts of Belgian where they will not have police. 
Participant 14 
Europe, maybe just little bouts 
Participant 7 
Caucasus 
I think Turkey is a major thing to look at.  Despite all the recent economic crisis, and the 
craziness, Turkey is always the wild card.  Turkey is always important to note they are a 
member of NATO.  So they are friends with the West and all that.  At the same time, they 
are friends with Russia and enemies with Russia, and Israel and enemies with Israel.  
They boarder Syria.  They have done multiple incursions into Iraq.  So, they are friends 
and enemies with Iraq.  
Name: Israel 
Participant 2 
In Syria or Iraq, or I can see it moving towards Israel.  Here is why I think.  It is easy to 
say the most recent thing is probably the most likely thing to happen again. 
In terms of galvanizing or regrouping, a powerful dangerous movement that can be a 
threat to nation states, or nation’s states that we care about would be the Levant.  I could 
see it mutating perhaps into southern Syria along the Israeli boarder or Lebanon or 
something like that. Or just appearing again in Iraq or along the Syria boarder. 
Name: Philippines 
Participant 10 
Philippines 
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Participant 15 
Philippines maybe. 
Participant 1 
So, let’s go to the Philippines and take on one of the islands. 
Participant 8 
Pacific  
Participant 3 
There are places like pockets of pro ISIS people who are necessarily officially ISIS, so 
technically other groups, but who work under the same perimeters.  You see a lot of it in 
South East Asia, the Philippines, where that group actually held territory for a little while. 
Yeah, Philippines is definitely a place of concern.   
I think that happens in Philippines and South East Asia.   
Participant 7 
Philippines. I think it went BBC or sky news there was an article on their headlines in the 
morning, they were talking about how long it went before a major news network started 
covering in the Philippines and the cities ISIS has taken over.  I think it was a year for 
any major Western news network picked it up.  That is a huge deal.  That is a huge deal. 
Name: Russia and Caucasus 
Participant 7 
Caucasus 
Russia has less of a presence or we have less of a presence there.  I think that is going to 
be a place to look.  
I think the Caucasus are another place.  That is a conflict zone that is very open to foreign 
fighters.  
Name: South America 
Participant 9 
I think anywhere where there is almost a collapsed state or non-control of territory. I 
mean I think there is potential for growth in even in South America, a place like 
Venezuela where the economy is taking.  
Name: Yemen 
Participant 6 
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Heavily infused Shia areas such as Yemen might not be the best place 
Participant 8 
Yemen 
Returnees Strengthen domestic Jihad 
Name: No 
Participant 4 
I don’t really see that. I think that those countries that have large foreign fighter 
populations that have traveled to the conflict zones, they have reacted, policy wise, going 
to the crunks of my paper.  Policy wise, they have reacted to those things in such a way 
that is has become effective.  They have investigated everyone that has returned.  France 
for example, they have brought charges against nearly every single foreign fighter that 
traveled to the conflict zones.  And other countries had different methods of going about 
it, but those might be rehabilitation.  For some of them, it is incarceration. And for others 
like Bosnia, they have reintegrated because their whole population was that way anyway.  
They weren’t as disenfranchised as they were someplace as they were in some place like 
France or Belgium.  And so, I don’t think so.  There might be that latent disgruntled 
nature of those populations that exists, and maybe with some other trigger that could 
bring those things back out, and they could act out in some way.  But, I think those guys 
have suffered in a war zone, they have matured, they have returned, they have been 
prosecuted or rehabilitated or whatever, and now that’s probably over with for 99 percent 
of them.  
Participant 15 
No, not really.  I think for the most part.  Even though there is a growth in Muslim 
populations, especially in Western Europe.  They tend to be moderate and somewhat, it is 
a relevant term, they are not by in large in my experience, they are not jihadist.  And it is 
still a minority of those populations that are jihadists. So, I don’t think strengthened, 
maybe.  In the sense that 2 is a bigger number than 1.  But, I don’t know that it has made 
it any bigger of a problem in Europe.  But as the population grows, who knows.  I think 
part of that depends on how the West deals with the situations in the Middle East.  
Everything originates in the Middle East.  And if that can be stabilized, then things 
elsewhere, then things elsewhere can become stabilized. So, I don’t necessarily think that 
foreign fighter returnees create a significant long-term problem for Western democracies, 
or whatever.  It certainly could if policies are miss-stepped.  Right now, I don’t think so. 
Participant 8 
Responded quite well.  And I think the trouble as we are seeing with some fire brands 
that seem to have free access under freedom of speech to hold picnics and Quran parties 
and whatever else to get the name out, that turn into recruiting events.  That is difficult to 
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suppress.  So, those communities will probably still be there to the extent that it is going 
to still foster the movement to what we are seeing in 2014, 2015, 2016, I don’t think that 
will be the case.  I think that tapered off, but largely because of the, just my opinion, 
largely because of the ways that Islamic State was managing things.  
Participant 3 
No, because I don’t think they will return.  Particularly from the US perspective.  
In terms of making it a greater threat, to domestic terrorism in the country, I don’t see 
that.  Because I don’t see volumes of people returning, but also most people who have 
conducted attacks in the United States were radicalized here and never traveled.   
Participant 7 
They are obviously doing a decent job.  I think they are doing a fantastic job given the 
self-imposed constraints that they give themselves.  I am not saying they are bad, but they 
are self-imposed.   Privacy concerns, legal restrictions.  I mean if you look at the CT laws 
of Europe, you have some countries where you say you are going to go or want to go to 
Syria to fight with ISIS, you can be arrested.  Other people you have to basically have to 
be about to carry out an attack in that country territory to be arrested.  Sharing 
information is difficult because one country could be like “I heard this guy was going to 
travel to Syria” and the other country was okay, what do you want me to do about it.  So 
there is a lot of difficulties, but I think it is going to be a mid-term. Or like midterm issue.  
I think immediately basically people who wanted to come back, I think already did.  They 
are not coming back now.  Those people I think the majority want to try to get a job, 
settle in, be part of their community.  Somewhat excluded and still somewhat 
disenfranchised with society, but they are going to have a really hard time getting a job.  
Because you went to fight in Syria, you are coming back Maybe you do, maybe the one 
guy who genuinely that was real dumb.  I shouldn’t have done that.  Now, you are not 
going to have an easy time finding a job.  Even if you are in a country where that is not 
against the law.  Yeah, you are going to have more members of an ostracized society.  
You are going to have people targeted by right wing groups.  I think they are becoming 
strengthened over the past year at least.   
Name: Yes 
Participant 9 
They meet up with people in prison.  They become more radicalized.  
And I don’t think Europe is going to be able to do that because European politicians don’t 
understand Islamic ideology and religion.  So, how can you de-radicalize someone if you 
don’t understand the roots of why they did it in the first place?  
Participant 4 
There might be a few kicking around that might want to carry out some sort of violence 
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Participant 10 
I think it does. I think it strengthens it through there been there, done that and they can 
recruit people.  Plus, if they don’t fit into society well and they come back out of jails 
after being arrested, they are going to go back to what they know.  Which is the violence, 
the criminal activity. 
Participant 6 
There is always that fear, in detention or prison, do they create an atmosphere or can they 
can still radicalize from within there. 
I suppose in some aspects they will remain either wittingly or unwittingly a source of 
recruitment. 
Participant 11 
I don’t think they are doing a decent job.  It is like the problem of going to prison and 
trying to deradicalize people.  You don’t know if people are really deradicalized or if they 
are just deradicalized to get time cut off their sentence.  So, you have all these people 
who come back and you can observe them, monitor them, whatever.  But you are really 
not tracking them intimately, twenty-four seven.  You are not really, it is hard to keep 
track of their online, especially with encrypted.  So, it may look to some as if security 
forces are containing or preventing attacks, but I don’t think it address or knows or 
penetrates into the influence these guys are having on others. 
Participant 5 
But again, those guys will always pose a threat because of the ideology in their head and 
you can never tell which one is the guy who came back and abandoned his past life and 
which guy is the one covering up for intentions down the road.   
Participant 12 
Those folks coming home are going to be dangerous.  They are going to be especially 
dangerous in soft liberal places like Europe that doesn’t have the tools and doesn’t have 
the right mentality to handle that.  Somebody coming back from Iraq and Syria might 
know how to go to their local Home Depot and build explosives.  Those people are going 
to be incredibly dangerous for a long period of time because they have been radicalized, 
they have the knowhow.  And they are probably thinking well, the caliphate, the wheel of 
time turns, the caliphate is on the decline, but in time, especially in Europe, our 
populations are going to rise and we will come out on top.  There is significant danger 
there. 
Participant 14 
So, I think that law enforcement hasn’t done enough.  I think ISIS itself also did enough 
for the message that came back from the returnees was that it wasn’t what it seemed.  It 
178 
 
 
 
wasn’t good.  It didn’t meet the expectations from ISIS was promoting.   I think that 
helped law enforcement, but sometimes law enforcement hasn’t done enough. 
Will ISIS Survive 
Name: No or will struggle 
Participant 9 
They’ve lost their territory in Iraq and Syria.  They have lost their so-called caliphate. So, 
there are a lot of networks and affiliates out there that pledge or don’t pledge, or their 
pledges are accepted or not. Communication has definitely broken down right now.  I 
don’t know if the groups outside are able to adhere too, in the current state, it is breaking 
down slowly.  I don’t know if they have the same message.  They might not be receiving 
the same message that they were getting during Islamic State’s height.   
Participant 4 
I think they will have to rebrand and regroup.  
Certainly not in their current form.  
Participant 15 
No, I think they will burn out.  In a way, all revolutionary and at a certain point, and it 
has happened to Hezbollah, at a certain point, the revolutionary movement becomes the 
anti-establishment becomes the establishment, eventually.  So, in order to survive all 
organizations, have to evolve and adapt.  No, I think in iteration and current way they 
operate, they will burn out.  They can’t survive. 
Participant 12 
That is a fantastic question.  So, losing the physical caliphate has massively hurt them.  
The fact that they lost their caliphate means to most of the beyond the fence Sunni’s that 
are watching them.  It proves that their caliphate was not legitimate.  That has hurt their 
recruiting numbers.  It’s hurt their ability to raise funds. You are not seeing the massive 
influx of people to Iraq and Syria.  Push people back out of those areas, flee from their 
safe havens spaces that they create.  I think that is dead.  Serious damaged accrued by 
losing their physical caliphate. 
Participant 7 
I guess it would depend on how you would define its current model.  So, if it is a 
caliphate and somewhere around the Levant, then maybe not.   
Name: Virtual 
Participant 9 
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It is an ideology.  It is not just a physical place.  I think the ideology will live on.  People 
aspire to do something great and if you are just stuck in some low end, crappy job but 
you got somebody radical and gets your emotions stirring about an idea.  That idea is 
going to live on for a while.  And even if it does go away, it will just morph into 
something different. 
Participant 10 
I think they will, maybe not in current form, but they will survive in the cyber realm, or 
the virtual jihad if you will. 
Participant 6 
Yes, I think that’s might be what they count on in the future.  Is, regardless of numbers, is 
establishing that global presence on the internet. 
Participant 11 
The virtual world where their message is circulating is going to expire people in the real 
world.  The small guys, they people who can’t get into other groups.  The ones that want 
to be authorized by anybody to be so violent and act out their revenge fantasies.  That’s 
what ISIS really tapped.  Is people’s powerlessness and their willingness to subjugate 
themselves to any ideology or authority that licenses them to act out?  So that is what 
ISIS has got going. 
Participant 2 
So, that is the model they are doing now.  I don’t see some people are bullish about it, the 
dangers of the virtual jihad.  Along the lines of a more decentralized, itemized Salafist, 
transnational attack model.  Because I just don’t see.  You have something to motivate 
that.  To inspire that and without that base, people are less likely to do it.  Because for 
what, what motivate you then to do it. 
Participant 3 
But also in terms of virtual jihad, I think ISIS is starting to use, we have seen a lot of 
hackers get on board the ISIS philosophy.   And we have seen in some of the ISIS 
plotting efforts to compromise websites.  For the most part, they were probably using it to 
get names or phone numbers or whatever. 
Name: Yes 
Participant 4 
I think they will become more decentralized and become more cellular.  And all of that.  
And there is no way they can control territory for much longer.  
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I don’ think they will go away anytime soon.  I think they will be more like AQ in that 
sense, then that they will be decentralized, they will be hidden and all of that sort of 
thing, but their tactics and how they carry out their mission will be their own way.  And 
they have already shown us how they do that. 
Participant 6 
It think if they, it all depends on the future of ISIS leadership.  Whatever cadre they have 
deciding if they get to a point where it would be their demise, they would go. And then 
try to separate themselves from the group.  But I don’t think they are at a point where 
they would need to do that.  If they have still some resemblance of global support.  
Participant 11 
I think they will survive for a long time.  
Participant 5 
Something of it will survive.  They may on their own behalf reorganize or change their 
model just to thrive better.  But I don’t see us or anyone else being able to completely 
wipe this sort of thing off the face of the planet.  There are people in too many countries 
around the world that believe in this.  And there are too many people entrenched that can 
just sit in their room and spout about this stuff online.  It will keep some sort of 
following. 
Participant 15 
In order to be successful in achieving political and ideological goals, I think they will 
have to be more pragmatic, much like Hezbollah or some of the others. 
Participant 1 
ISIL problem is that we are not going to ever kill all of them.  Their propaganda machine 
continues to generate new and forward thinking people. 
I don’t think the current model has changed from the old model. And I think they 
continue to innovate, I think they will continue to chug along.  The minute they get stale 
and get happy with what they are doing, they will fold. 
Again, they don’t have to hold territory.  They can spread themselves thin.  They can go 
into the city centers. They can dominate there.  Because they are so vicious. They have 
no rules to play by, except their own.  They have court system, they have fines, and they 
have all these things. They are making the rules for themselves.  They don’t respect your 
rules or my rules, and they require their people respect their rules.  And as long as you are 
finding people willing to work under those and make enough money, it is a brilliant 
strategy.  Absolutely brilliant. 
Participant 12 
181 
 
 
 
Certainly not everyone is just laying down their arms and surrendering.  Plenty are 
fighting to the death or moving to new battlefields.  So, I think it will evolve, it will 
morph.  I think the surgeons got rid of the tumor in that location, but there is still cancer 
cells throughout the body.  It might in time in fade with successful CT efforts, or could 
evolve, adapt and become something more dangerous.  I’m not sure anyone knows what 
the end game is.  It is an interesting question.  I’m not sure. 
Participant 2 
I don’t see that there is anything right now.  I do think ISIS has the best chance of 
reinventing itself.   They really wouldn’t have to reinvent itself, laying low and then 
remerging along with a similar model as they did in the interim years between Zarqawi 
being killed 2008 2009 in its decline to 2011 2012.  Whenever we pulled out or drew 
down and they regrouped and re-strengthen.  And then they took advantage of the 
security shortfalls that were there.  And I think can happen again.  I mean, it is the most 
likely major event that happened.   
I think they will more likely attempt to replicate the success they had before by laying 
low, regrouping, and then waiting to seize territory.  
Participant 14 
Me personally, it will survive.  Eventually it just keep getting degraded and degraded.  
But there will be little hints of them.  Not enough for it to matter at most.  That is long-
term.  I think we will always see little hints of it.  Someone trying or a new guy, not 
enough to sustain what we saw in the past. 
Participant 3 
They can be military defeated.  I am pretty sure they are or will be.  But you are not going 
to kill unless you kill them all.  You can’t kill the ideology.  I don’t see them leaving 
Syria and Iraq.  That is built into their narrative as the holy land.  So, I think they will 
probably stay there.  But what they are really good at doing what other groups have not 
done is that they built this global network.  They took on 8 branches or affiliates, 
whatever you want to call them.  Eight provinces in one year.  The first year of having 
announced their caliphate.  So, they went from zero to hero in like pretty quick.  They 
have all these people worldwide who have pledged to that.  So now as they are losing 
land in Syria and Iraq, they are calling on those groups saying hey, it is your job now and 
you need to pick up where we can’t.  And move forward. 
So, I think one of their special gifts is being able to adapt.  And I think we have seen that 
time and time again.  I always say they are one of the most innovative and adaptable 
companies in the world.  One of the best public relations machines. 
And where they could not be, they just kept a small faction of people who knew exactly 
what they were doing.  And they keep records of associates and they pass down contacts 
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and phone books and all kinds of stuff.  They seem to have built in their own survival 
methods within the organization. 
Another interesting way they insure their survival.  That all shows how they adapted to 
CT pressure and all that sort of stuff.  But keep in mind in terms of their propaganda, they 
have built defeat into its narrative.  So, they told their people to get ready.  We are going 
to lose and then we are going to come back again.  So, they are building defeat, 
expansion, and resurgence into their narrative.  They are in Baghdadi’s statements where 
he says stay where you are for the time being and we are going to get ready and out time 
to fight will come.  It is not now. 
Participant 7 
I mean if you talk about ISIS as the ideology as an extremist Islamic organization who 
wants to create a caliphate in the Levant, I think that will still exist.  I mean, people are 
going to want that.  Even the inter Islam fighting that happens is over that same exact 
thing.  I think that will continue.  
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Appendix M: Curriculum Vitae 
 
Richard B. Culp  
 
 
EXPERIENCE 
Intelligence professional with over fifteen years of experience in counterintelligence, 
counterterrorism and all-source analysis 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Senior Counterintelligence & Counterterrorism Analyst  
US AFRICOM TERRORISM & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
10/31/17 to Current 
 
US EUCOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATATIONS ANALTIC CENTER, 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM DIVSION      
04/01/14 to 10/30/17 
03/09/08 to 03/16/11 
 
Ø Researched, fused, and analyzed cyber, counterintelligence and terrorism-related 
intelligence in support of EUCOM, CYBERCOM, NORTHCOM, PACOM and 
CENTCOM areas of operation 
Ø Developed actionable cyber-related intelligence from gathered social media and open 
source data 
Ø Vetted and maintained a list of identified targets in support of EUCOM contingency 
planning/operation tasking 
Ø Achieved subject matter expert status in both the counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence fields of endeavor while directing and supervising a section of all-
source intelligence analysts 
Ø Created and presented cyber, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence updates for 
daily EUCOM staff briefings 
Ø Trained junior intelligence analysts on team research, analysis, production, and 
dissemination practices 
Ø Updated, populated, and utilized national-level terrorism and counterintelligence 
databases while conducting network analysis and target identification 
Ø Extensively collaborated with numerous IC organizations to downgrade and release 
sensitive information (FORREL) to host and partner nation law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies  
Ø Produced organizational studies for meetings with EUCOM host nation intelligence 
services through DIA bilateral sharing agreements 
Ø Conducted research to detect patterns, trends, and developments which provided 
indications and warnings of cyber threats  
Ø Data mined and analyzed various social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter and proficient in online security research 
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Ø Prepared and presented in-depth cyber, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence 
briefings during exchanges with host nation military/intelligence agencies 
Ø Authored analytical assessments that were published in the EUCOM Commander’s 
Regional Highlights, Secretary of Defense’s Readbook and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
intelligence updates 
Ø Performed link and pattern analysis to identify cyber actors supporting anti-
NATO/anti-US malign influence campaigns  
Ø Produced daily counterintelligence, counterterrorism and cyber-related assessments 
while frequently briefing EUCOM senior leadership in support of operations 
 
Counterintelligence Agent 
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ COALITION ANALYSIS & CONTROL 
ELEMENT (ACE), Baghdad, Iraq 
V CORPS G2 ACE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CELL, Heidelberg, 
Germany 
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY COMMAND, Virginia, U.S.A. 
UNITED STATES ARMY      
10/10/02 to 02/16/08 
 
Ø Demonstrated ability to work efficiently and effectively during worldwide wartime 
operations by deploying and directly supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom 
Ø Processed, analyzed, and disseminated all-source intelligence to include 
Counterintelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Communications 
Intelligence, and Human Intelligence 
Ø Produced critical source report evaluations in support of combat operations and 
provided quality control for Iraqi theater Human Intelligence requirements 
Ø Responsible for identifying intelligence gaps and providing assessments to senior 
intelligence officers 
Ø Analyzed data pertinent to force protection, cybersecurity, personnel and physical 
infrastructure security 
Ø Researched, analyzed, and prepared oral and written assessments of trends in Iraq 
Ø Authored articles and reports on a wide range of topics including cyber, political, 
tribal, and order of battle issues that were incorporated into daily intelligence 
briefings 
Ø Prepared and presented country threat briefings and anti-terrorism training to 
individuals deploying in support of Overseas Contingency Operations 
Ø Conducted law enforcement screening of contract linguists in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 
Ø Responsible for analyzing non-obvious relationships using biometric data to identify 
potential terrorists/persons of interest  
Ø Conducted security inspections and surveillance operations   
Ø Provided security protection to DoD data, documents, and other relevant information  
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CIVILIAN EDUCATION 
WALDEN UNIVERSITY, Minneapolis, Minnesota  
Ph.D. (expected graduation 2019) 
Major: Public Policy and Administration 
 
HAWAII PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, Honolulu, Hawaii 
Master of Arts, With Distinction, May 2013 
Major: Global Leadership and Sustainable Development 
 
 
SHENANDOAH UNIVERSITY, Winchester, Virginia 
Bachelor of Science, Cum Laude, December 2001 
Major: Administration of Justice & Sociology 
2001 Sociology Student of the Year 
 
ADDITIONAL EDUCATION 
Advanced Counterterrorism Course (2015) 
Terrorism Threat Finance, Defense Intelligence Agency (DISAP II) (2011) 
Counterintelligence Analytic Methodologies Course (2009) 
Islam in the Contemporary Operational Environment (2009) 
Terrorism Finance Tradecraft (2008) 
Counterterrorism Analyst Course (2005) 
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Course (2005) 
Counterintelligence Agent Course (2003) 
 
 
